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THE FATAL PASSAGE: EXEMPLARY RELIEF
AND THE HUMAN INSTINCT FOR
SELF-PRESERVATION*
EDWARD CHARLES DE VIVO**
I. INTRODUCTION
1600:02 That don't seem right does it?
1600:05 Ah, that's not right
1600:07 (W1ell) -
1600:09 Yes it is, there's eight'
1600:10 Naw, I don't think that's right
1600:19 Ah, Mlaybe it is
1600:21 Hundred and twenty








1600:48 l1'e only want five hundred
1600:50 Come on, forward
1600:53 Forward
1600:55 Just barely climb
1600:59 (Stalling) we're (falling)
1601:00 Lar,, we're going down, Larry
1601:01 1 knout it
1601:01 (Sound of impact)'
1986 Copyright by Edward Charles De Vivo.
** B.A., New York University, 1975: J.D., University of Notre Dame, 1978:
M.A., New York University, 1982. Mr. De Vivo is associated with the New York
City law firm Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives.
I This conversation is taken from the cockpit voice recorder of the fatal flight of
Air Florida Palm 90 which crashed into the Potomac River on January 13, 1982.
National Transportation Safety Board, Aircraft Accident Report- Air Florida, Inc;
Boeing 737-222 N 62 AF,January 13, 1982, at Appendix "F" [hereinafter cited as
303
304 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
THIS CONVERSATION, which spanned a total of fifty-
nine seconds, ended in the death of the speakers, a
flight crew, and the more than sixty passengers aboard
their fatal flight.2 With the accident occurring in an at-
mosphere of freezing conditions and near-blizzard snow-
fall, the question lingering long after the news media
forgot about the incident was, "Why did Air Florida flight
number 90 take off from National Airport in Washington,
D.C., if the weather was so bad?"
The fatal crash of "Palm 90" into the icy Potomac River
on January 13, 1982, is one of many recent mass aviation
disasters which leave legal scholars to ponder the propri-
ety of punishment through the award of damages in civil
law. In the aftermath of the Washington, D.C. incident, a
host of other tragic mass aviation disasters have occurred.
The eleven worst disasters in aviation history all occurred
within eleven years, between March 1974 and August
1985. 3 Three of these took place within four years of one
another and resulted in the loss of 1,122 lives.4 With the
advent of larger, faster jet transport aircraft which re-
moved aviation from its adolescent stage, mass aviation
disasters have become more costly in human life, placing
the question of exemplary damages in sharper, more dra-
matic focus.
Proponents of punitive damages in mass aviation disas-
ters philosophically envision the use of punishment as a
necessary means to deter future tragedy in modern-day
jet transportation. Deterrence with its related societal
benefit has been the mainstay of the rationale for punish-
ment in the criminal law sector since the early develop-
Washington, D.C. Accident Report]. The dialogue was between Captain Larry
Wheaton and First Officer Roger Pettit. Id.
2 See infra notes 328-39 and accompanying text for a detailed factual analysis of
the events leading up to the crash of Palm 90.
.1 N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1985, at A6, col. 3-4. Beginning with the March 3, 1974
Turkish Airlines DC-10 crash over Ermenonville, France, 3,457 lives have been
lost in the 11 worst aviation disasters through August 12, 1985, when the worst
single aircraft disaster occurred, involving ajapan Air Lines aircraft which crashed
into a mountain in Tokyo, killing 524 people. Id.
4Id.
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ment of English law.5 However, the importation of this
rationale to American jurisprudence, especially in the civil
law context, is unbefitting in civil aviation which histori-
cally uses as a backdrop a model that adjusts conflicting
interests among litigants who are not intent upon seeking
punishment of each other.6
The proposition that punishment is not reserved solely
Originally the English judicial system was reluctant to review ajury's determi-
nation of damages because the English jury was composed of local citizens who
were familiar with the dispute at hand. 1 T. SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES
§ 349, at 688 (9th ed. 1912); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
§ 6, at 25 (1935). Thus, the courts deferred to the province of the jury and ex-
erted no judicial control over the quantum and rationale of a jury's damage
award. 1 T. SEDGWICK, supra, at 688.
However, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the personal knowledge
of the local jurist no longer enjoyed the attention it previously received because
standards for measuring damages began to develop in the English judicial system.
Id. at 688-89. These standards for measuring damages in personal injury cases
permitted recovery only for pecuniary loss. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 518 (1957). However, in Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils.
K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763), the court justified an excessive jury award
in a tort action. The decision became the benchmark of the law on punitive dam-
ages. 1 T. SEDGWICK, supra, at 689-90.
The Huckle litigation arose out of the struggle of King George the Third to
suppress a journal, "The North Briton," which was published by the radical John
Wilkes. King George issued a warrant to arrest the printer but named no one on
the warrant itself. The plaintiff was imprisoned for six hours under the general
warrant. The court permitted the jury to award exemplary damages against
Money, the arresting officer. When the defendant requested a new trial, Lord
Camden refused and articulated his justification for the exemplary award: "I think
they [the jury] have done right in giving exemplary damages; to enter a man's
house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than
the Spanish Inquisition; a law under which no Englishman would wish to live an
hour." Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils K.B. at 206-07, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768-69. The
underlying rationale of this decision which took root in the United States was that
exemplary damages express a particular community's or society's disapproval of
the conduct at issue. Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal
of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158, 1160 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Punitive Damages]. Hence, despite the expected influx of damage awards
which contemplated recovery of intangible injuries such as pain and suffering, see,
e.g., Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 26 (1889), the primary justifications given by
the American judicial system for permitting excessive jury awards were punish-
ment and deterrence. See, e.g., Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791,
801, 197 P.2d 713, 720 (1948); Note, Punitive Damages, supra, at 1160-61.
"1J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES L. & PRAc. § 2.02, at 4 (1984).
The conflict which immediately arose with respect to the doctrine of punitive
damages was whether punitive recovery would have a debilitating effect on civil
law's purpose, adequate compensation of the victim. By injecting an element of
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for the criminal justice system can be subjected to a two-
tier analysis vis-a-vis the mass aviation disaster. The first
tier focuses on the appellation "pilot error" to prove that
what occurred in the cockpit in the final moments before
the loss of life was deliberate conduct guided by evil mo-
tive, wanton disregard or recklessness. When this fails,
the punitive damage advocate moves to the second tier
and attempts to place the punishable blame upon the cor-
porate air carrier which employed the flight crew. Gener-
ally, the latter theory is couched in terms of deficiency in
training. This more easily lends itself to deliberate, con-
scious decision-making than does the split-second sponta-
neous reaction of a flight crew, whose destruction is as
imminent as that of their passengers.
Whatever propriety attaches to either prong of this
analysis, the recorded history7 of mass aviation disasters
involving operational fault8 demonstrates that punish-
punishment into the system which was designed purely to compensate, the civil
law system took on a somewhat schizophrenic complexion. Id. at 4.
Prosser, in recognizing this problem, stated that in an "anomalous respect...
the ideas underlying the criminal law have invaded the field of torts." W. PRos-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (4th Ed. 1971). This line of rea-
soning is supported by the argument that if the conduct under scrutiny does not
deserve criminal punishment, the matter should be left to resolution under the
civil law sector. In that area, the focus is appropriately on "the adjustment of
conflicting interests" of those who are intent upon reaching a desirable result,
rather than on the infliction of punishment by either party upon the other. W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw § 3, at 11 (1972).
7 See generally Mohler, Introduction, in PILOT ERROR: THE HUMAN FACTORS iX-X
(R. Hurst and L. Hurst ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as PILOT ERROR]. The "unre-
corded" history of mass aviation disasters and the wrongful death litigation which
ensues therefrom arguably lends more credence to the concept of punishment of
the air carrier because those instances where the carrier is in the most adverse
litigative posture are settled forthright without reported judicial decisions on the
issue of punitive damages.
8 The scope of this article is limited to operational incidents whereby the con-
duct under scrutiny vis-a-vis punitive damages generally was in the form of spon-
taneous response, enveloped in an emergency scenario. The analysis throughout
this article does, however, consider the conduct which preceded the split-second
ultimate decisions which either caused or contributed to a particular mass aviation
disaster. That "preceding" conduct may be in the form of corporate planning or
pilot training which, if found to be deficient, could be viewed as the long-term
cause of the crash.
A further, intentional limitation on the parameters of this analysis is that it does
not discuss operational incidents in the general context of transportation. Rather,
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ment beyond compensable damages seldom is assessed
against the civilian aircraft operator. The same is true
whether the liability theory selected is international treaty
law,9 federal statutory law,' 0 or individual state law on pu-
nitive damages."
If recorded history accurately portrays the role of exem-
plary damages in operational aviation incidents, then the
question becomes whether there is one prevalent legal
doctrine which serves as the cornerstone to this area of
law. Arguably there is no such commonly accepted doc-
trine. In the most recent aviation cases, a principle known
as "depecage"'12 has shifted some of the emphasis away
from the cockpit scenario to enable closer scrutiny of cor-
porate conduct. In general, however, application of legal
doctrine has become displaced by a less tangible standard.
When the conduct under microscopic view concerns the
final moments of a flight crew's lives, the fact finder is
caught in a dualistic struggle shared by even the most
seemingly reckless of pilots.'" Mankind entertains a basic
it is limited to aviation because entrustment of aircraft passengers' safety places a
much higher standard of skill and performance on the aircraft operator than is
placed on operators of other forms of carriers. Certain statistics, including the
Eysensk Personality Inventory, which study the operator's accident-prone traits
are totally inappropriate to an analysis of a pilot's mental state as disaster awaits
him in the operation of a commercial jet transport aircraft. See C. Berry, The
Human Factor in Aircraft Accidents, reprinted in The Nineteenth Annual Journal of
Air Law and Commerce Air Law Symposium § H (March 1985) (available in
Southern Methodist University Law School Library). For an insightful analysis of
the interface between the legal principles and the human factors, see PILOT ER-
ROR, supra note 7, at 1-17.
9 See infra notes 38-109 and accompanying text.
1o See infra notes 110-210 and accompanying text.
1' See infra notes 211-437 and accompanying text.
12 See Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
58 (1973). "This process of applying the rules of different states to determine
different issues has the forbidding name of depecage, although it is sometimes
more colloquially referred to as 'picking-and-choosing'." Id.
As explained in detail, infra at Part V, the proper application of the principle of
depecage has given rise to the concept of "extraterritoriality" in assessing corpo-
rate behavior vis-a-vis liability for punitive damages.
13 E. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 17 (1973). "And so we can understand
what seems like an impossible paradox: the ever-present fear of death in the nor-
mal biological functioning of our instinct of self-preservation, as well as our utter
obliviousness to this fear in our conscious life." Id. See generally E. BECKER, Es-
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instinct for self-preservation14 and, but for a suicidal mis-
sion, this makes for a shift in emphasis from legal to onto-
logical principles when one must decide if the flight crew
consciously delivered the loss of their passengers.
Hence, this article should be viewed as an invitation to
the reader to decide for himself whether and to what ex-
tent it is conceivable for a pilot to consciously risk his own
ultimate demise and thereby cause all those aboard to
perish with him. At least one court has held in so many
words that such an occurrence is not conceivable. '5 Pilot
error is a multifactorial phenomenon which is imperfectly
understood and, as such, the attribution of legal responsi-
bility between the criminal and civil sectors must be very
carefully delineated. 16
In the aftermath of a mass disaster, a vast amount of
energy is expended in the teardown of the wreckage, syn-
theses of cockpit voice recordings and flight data record-
ers, and computerized simulations of the flight scenario
which led up to the crash. However, the presence and
magnitude of the psychological element is not as readily
presented for proper analysis. One commentator has ex-
plained the problem this way:
In a crash investigation, for example, the acceleration to
which the cockpit was subjected might have been recorded
and enquiries can reveal the pilot's sleep patterns for the
CAPE FROM EVIL (1968); J. CARSE, DEATH AND EXISTENCE (1980); N. COUSINS,
HUMAN OPTIONS (1981); C. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM (1978); R.J. LIF-
TON, THE BROKEN CONNECTION (1980); I. D. YALOM, EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY
(1980).
'4 Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See
infra notes 235-437 and accompanying text.
m Sauvage v. Air India Corp., Judgment of Jan. 27, 1977, Ct. of Cassation,
(Sup. Ct. of App., Pt. 1, Brussels, Belgium). See also Grey v. American Airlines,
227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956), discussed infra notes
68-73, and accompanying text.
- See British Air Navigation Order, Article 20, cited and discussed in Hill &
Pile, Some Legal Implications of Pilot Error, The Log (Journal of the British Airline
Pilots Association) 44:9 (June 1983). This delineation is clearer in the English
legal system which perhaps could serve as a model for American jurisprudence.
For example, a pilot commits an offense under English law if he flies an aircraft
knowing that he is too fatigued to do so. Id.
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previous few days. But establishing the importance of the
real relationship between the crew members as a factor in
the accident, or the degree to which the captain was wor-
rying about his child's health ...may well be virtually
impossible. t
Even when a tangible legal standard such as that fos-
tered by depecage emerges in the assessment of corporate
conduct, the complexity of the man, as opposed to the pi-
lot, too often clouds the shaping of the corporate carrier's
safety philosophy. A large proportion of the professional
pilot's training is devoted to preparing him for situations
which will hopefully never be encountered. But in the
process of corporate self-reflection, when the carrier must
ask itself whether it has done enough to safeguard against
real emergencies, how does it assess whether it has suffi-
ciently trained the correct spontaneous response? How
far must the carrier go to "over train"' 8 its pilots so that
response time is as automatic as possible when simulation
of disaster becomes reality? Moreover, is it the corpora-
tion's responsibility to train against complacency in its
most senior and experienced pilots?' 9
Whether scrutiny focuses upon the cockpit scenario or
corporate decision-making, the intricacies of the human
mind should reveal to the fact finder, investigative and ju-
dicial alike, that the logic behind punishment may be for-
eign to the mass aviation disaster. Each individual's
finitude is housed within an infinitive awareness of his
own mortality and this dualistic tension is the rub. It has
been said that the difference between a pilot and his tech-
nologically intricate aircraft is that only the former pos-
sesses the sensibilities to care about getting himself and
his passengers home safely.2 °
Hence, if the reader does not endorse the thesis put
'7 PILOT ERROR, supra note 7, at 15-16.
18 Id. at 11-14.
19 Id. "Many [experienced] pilots have begun what proved to be a final flight
secure in the knowledge that 'it can't happen to me'." Id. at 13. See also E.
BECKER, supra note 13, at 120.
2,, PILOT ERROR, supra note 7, at 13-16.
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forth herein, then, at the very least, the appellation "pilot
error" should be assessed in a constructive manner. Lia-
bility exposure of the corporate air carrier cannot be eval-
uated dispassionately because the errors committed by
the human system are not provoked by a breakdown that
is as predictable and identifiable as those errors commit-
ted by the aircraft system. When the immediacy of death
enters into the pilot error analysis, the punitive damage
advocate must satisfy himself that two human beings in a
cockpit were less interested in their own survival than they
were interested in the survival of their passengers. Thus,
it is the instinct for survival that creates tension when at-
tempting to apply exemplary relief against the carrier to
civil aviation cases.
II. THE BACKDROP
At least five basic functions have been identified
through which the American criminal law system utilizes
punishment to fulfill the intended purpose.21 One is a re-
tributive function which expresses society's disapproval of
the criminal behavior.22 The second and third functions
involve deterrence, focusing on the effect of the punish-
ment on the particular criminal as well as other members
of society who might engage in similar behavior. 23 The
fourth and fifth functions are more action-oriented than
the first three because they focus on removing the crimi-
nal from society rather than trying to influence him by
leaving him in society.24 These latter two functions of
punishment work to insulate society from the dangerous
individual by incarcerating him while he is simultaneously
rehabilitated for the dual benefit of himself and the soci-
ety from which he was extracted.2 5
2 1 Note, Punitive Damages, supra note 5, at 1161.
22 W. L. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 200, at
61-76 (6th ed. 1958).




When the functions performed by criminal punishment
are viewed under the guise of civil law, however, the ef-
fects to be gained from a utilitarian standpoint are mini-
mized. Society at large has less to gain from punishing a
tortfeasor than it does from punishing a criminal because
the propriety of punishing the wrongdoer must be as-
sessed according to very indefinite criteria. This indefi-
niteness places the functions to be served by punishment
and deterrence on a sliding scale and makes the assimila-
tion of purpose between the criminal and civil systems dif-
ficult, if not impossible. Among those jurisdictions
allowing punitive damages there is wide diversification as
to what constitutes tortious conduct for which exemplary
damages should be awarded. 26 The societal need to dis-
courage the malicious tortfeasor is greater than the need
to punish one whose conduct was grossly negligent. Yet
both forms of behavior may be equally punishable, de-
pending upon the particular jurisdiction's punitive dam-
ages law. The application of those penal sanctions
reserved for criminal conduct, however, would be dis-
torted if it were extended to the grossly negligent
tortfeasor.
The American tort system focuses upon that jurisdic-
tion which has the most legitimate interest in assessing
punitive damages; but once assessed, that system yields
little more than a societal satisfaction that the tortfeasor
has been punished. 27 It is questionable whether this re-
sult can be looked upon as a benefit to society in the first
instance since the satisfaction derived by that society im-
posing punitive damages possesses an ironic twist of ven-
geance well beyond even the functions which punishment
serves in the criminal law system. 28 The real benefit, in-
stead, is derived by the individual plaintiff, who receives a
windfall profit beyond the just compensation which the
tort system is designed to foster. In this sense, there is no
26 See infra notes 211-437 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
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real retributive function in the civil law sector vis-a-vis so-
ciety at large. In a civil law context, the by-product of the
law of punitive damages is a fluctuating degree of culpa-
bility that is not statutorily defined on a state-by-state ba-
sis. The misdirected result is a windfall profit to the
plaintiff. These by-products, however, do not fulfill the
original purpose behind the assessment of exemplary
damages.
In the context of the operational aviation case,29 the
original design of the law of exemplary damages becomes
even more clouded for three reasons. First, there is a
sliding scale ranging from gross negligence through reck-
lessness to malicious behavior against which a court has to
apply the facts of the case. There is no statute, as there is
in criminal law, setting forth each degree of behavior and
its relation to the degree of crime that has been commit-
ted.3 0 The civil law leaves the court with a gray area to
determine from the flight scenario whether the aircraft
operator was reckless or perhaps possessed some evil mo-
tive in his actions leading up to an airline disaster.
Second, the assessment of punitive damages in the op-
erational aviation case does not act as a deterrent. In
2" As stated, an operational aviation case involves a sequence of events during
the actual operation of a commercial passenger flight. This article examines ex-
emplary damages solely in the context of the air carrier against whom the dam-
ages are considered. It does not delve into the liability of the aircraft
manufacturer or other entities involved in an operational aviation case, except to
the extent that the aircraft manufacturer is involved in the flight crew's ability to
respond immediately before a crash. See infra notes 330-32, 392 and accompany-
ing text.
30 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1975). In New York, for exam-
ple, there are various gradations within the crime of homicide, each gradation
with a definitive penalty attached to it. First degree murder is committed only
when (1) the victim is a police officer killed in the course of performing his official
duties (where the wrongdoer knew or should have known he was an officer),
(2) the victim is an employee of a correctional facility killed in the course of duty,
or (3) at the time of the commission of the crime, the defendant was in custody or
had escaped from custody upon a life sentence or an indeterminate term the mini-
mum of which is fifteen years and the maximum of which is life. Id.
Second degree murder can be intentional, highly reckless or done in further-
ance of a felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1975). A similar delinea-
tion applies to first and second degree manslaughter. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.10,
125.15 (McKinney 1975).
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
those instances where a major disaster is involved, the
crew members have lost their lives too. The only means
of venting the deterrent factor is to punish the crew's em-
ployer for improper and inadequate training. As demon-
strated herein, the principle of "depecage ' ' 3' has become
a significant deterrent as applied to the most recent airline
disasters, shifting the emphasis away from the cockpit sce-
nario and focusing instead on the site of the origin of the
conduct. The concept of "depecage" has been given
great weight by the judiciary in its recent attempts to use
the sliding scale of various degrees of behavior to deter-
mine whether to penalize the air carrier for the conduct
of its crew. 2
The third reason that the design of civil punishment is
somewhat thwarted in the operational aviation case in-
volves the relationship between the crew and its passen-
gers. The legal representatives of passengers will argue
that the passengers entrusted their safety to the flight
crew. Instead of rebutting this argument, the airline will
pursue it to the point of diminishing return for its advo-
cate. The airline will pose the question that if the flight
crew knew what was in store for themselves as well as their
passengers, would they have taken all lives into their
hands and engaged in reckless or other punishable behav-
ior? Short of deeming such a flight scenario a suicide mis-
sion, what justification exists for punishing the
commercial air carrier? Though the commercial air carrier
is admittedly wrong and accountable to the injured vic-
tim, it is not deserving of a penal sanction especially when
the split-second decisions before impact cannot counter
the fatal demise of the flight. What room would there be
for recklessness or malicious thought when two pilots can-
not alter the sequence of events which delivers their own
.1 See supra note 12 and infra notes 235-437 and accompanying text. In relation
to the concept of depecage, the "extraterritorial" factor, infra note 236, is a signif-
icant development which has effectively shifted the focus of the punitive damage
analysis toward the initiation point of the wrong and away from what actually took
place in the cockpit.
'2 See infra notes 235-437 and accompanying text.
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death as well as that of the passengers? The judicial pro-
gression, by treaty law,33 federal statute34 and state statu-
tory provisions, 5 is an exhibit of those legal tensions
which inherently reside in this area of the law. Beyond
those tensions, however, there exists an area for consider-
ation which evades legal analysis yet strongly dictates the
role of exemplary damages in civil aviation.
III. TREATY LAW: THE WARSAW CONVENTION
In 1925, a group of representatives from approximately
twenty-three countries met in Paris to discuss the concept
of limited liability for commercial airlines in what was
then a fledgling aviation industry.3 6 As the Paris Confer-
ence adjourned and preparation for the Warsaw Confer-
ence was contemplated, the general sentiment toward an
innovative design for establishing a ceiling on the amount
of damages recoverable for wrongful death, personal in-
jury or the loss of goods or personal effects was expressed
most descriptively by the Reporter for the Preparatory
Committee: "[W]hat the engineers are doing for ma-
chines, we must do for the law. ' 3 7
Nearly four years elapsed before the second conference
representatives reconvened and further canvassed the is-
sue of limited liability. Finally, after many hours of discus-
sion, on October 12, 1929, an international treaty, now
commonly known as the Warsaw Convention, was drafted
and signed by twenty-three nations to provide uniformity
to the terms and conditions of international transporta-
tion by air.3
.11 See infra notes 36-109 and accompanying text.
-, See infra notes 110-210 and accompanying text.
I. See infra notes 211-437 and accompanying text.
6 II Conference International de Droit Priv6 A~rien, 4-12 Octobre 1929, Var-
sovie 17 (1930) (author trans. 1966) [hereinafter Warsaw Proceedings], cited in,
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 497, 498 n.5 (1967) [hereinafter Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn]. See also 1
C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAw 328-29 (4th ed. 1977).
.11 Id. See also Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 36, at 498-502.
-" Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S.
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The central underpinning of the Warsaw Convention,
both as originally formulated and to date, is Article 22,
which places a maximum ceiling on the damages recover-
able from an air carrier when a passenger has been in-
jured or killed in international transportation 9.3  The
internationally established rule states that subscribing air
carriers will be liable for damage sustained by a passenger
in the course of international transportation up to an
amount not exceeding 125,000 Poincare francs.40 Under
article 22(4) of the treaty, the franc is defined as a gold
coin consisting of 65.5 milligrams of gold.4 ' The United
States equivalent at that time was $8,300 and this became
the monetary limitation as applied in the context of War-
saw Convention cases brought in the United States.4 2
11 (1934), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1982) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw
Convention]. See also Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 36, at 498.
Pursuant to article 37 of the Warsaw Convention, the treaty was to become
effective:
ninety days after ratification by five of the High Contracting Parties
at the Warsaw Convention (Article 37). France, Poland, and Latvia
all deposited their ratifications on November 15, 1932, joining
Spain, Brazil, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, which had previously done
so; and on February 13, 1933, the Convention entered into force.
Great Britain and Italy deposited their ratifications on the following
day, and by the end of 1933 twelve countries, including most of the
European nations, were members.
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 36, at 501-02. On Feb. 13, 1933, the Con-
vention attained sovereign status as a formally adopted international treaty. Id.
Today, there are 117 signatory nations to the Warsaw Convention. The signato-
ries are listed in Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, May 8, 1979, G18, at 16.
39 Warsaw Convention, supra note 38, art. 22. Article 22 provides:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier
for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs.
Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical pay-
ments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Id.
The methodology for converting the liability limitation into United States dol-
lars is explained at length in Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 36, at 552-63.
4o Warsaw Convention, supra note 38, arts. 17, 22. See also Lowenfeld and Men-
delsohn, supra note 36, at 499.
41 Warsaw Convention, supra note 38, art. 22(4); see Warsaw Proceedings, supra
note 36.
42 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 36, at 499. The United States at-
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It was not long before the $8,300 limit proved to be
inadequate and unable to keep pace with the socioeco-
nomic changes experienced by the United States.
Through periodic episodes of reconsideration of the
monetary limitation,4 3 an Intercarrier Agreement finally
tended the Paris and Warsaw Conferences merely as an observer. It was not one
of the original signatory nations when the Warsaw Convention was adopted on
October 12, 1929 but became a signatory in 1934 pursuant to art. 38:
(1) This convention shall, after it has come into force, remain open
for adherence by any state.
(2) The adherence shall be effected by a notification addressed to
the Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall inform the
Government of each of High Contracting Parties thereof.
(3) The adherence shall take effect as from the ninetieth day after
the notification made to the Government of the Republic of Poland.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 38, art. 38.
43 See 2 ICAO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAw (1955) (Doc.
No. 7686-LC/140) [hereinafter cited as HAGUE PROCEEDINGS]. Both historical
and economic measures caused the Convention's monetary limitations to be peri-
odically reconsidered. In September, 1955, a diplomatic conference was con-
vened at the Hague to consider the status of the Warsaw Convention. Id. The
Hague Conference was the culmination of several years of extensive research de-
voted to revising the Convention. Id. Immediately after World War II the issue of
revision had been referred to the Comite International Technique d'Experts Juridiques
Aeriens (CITEJA) by the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization. Be-
cause the CITEJA was dissolved in 1947, the Legal Organization (ICAO) contin-
ued this study. As a result of discussions in the ICAO Legal Committee, several
draft conventions were formulated during the years 1948 through 1951. Id. In
January, 1952, a special subcommittee appointed by the ICAO Legal Committee
drafted a completely new convention in Paris to replace the Warsaw Convention
in its entirety. Id.
Prior to convening at the Hague, the ICAO Legal Committee gave serious con-
sideration to utilizing the Paris draft as the new starting ground for rewriting and
replacing the original Convention. Id. After extensive debate in the committee,
however, it was determined that the more practical and expedient manner in
which to proceed was to conform the existing Warsaw Convention to the contem-
plated revisions rather than to work from the 1952 Paris draft.
Therefore while recognizing the unquestionable value of the draft
formulated at Paris by [the ICAO Legal Committee's] sub-commit-
tee and of the preparatory and exploratory work undertaken by its
rapporteur, Major K.M. Beaumont, particularly inasmuch as the
draft represented a systematic rearrangement, including drafting im-
provements, of the contents of the Warsaw Convention and also in-
cluded fresh treatment of certain subjects, the Committee decided
that the object of effecting only limited necessary amendments
would be better achieved by taking as the bases of its discussions the
Warsaw Convention itself rather than the Paris draft.
Id.
Having decided to work from the Warsaw Convention itself rather than the
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emerged in 1966, whereby the carriers agreed to raise the
draft prepared in Paris in 1952, two major considerations became the focal point
of the Hague Conference: (1) an increase in the monetary value of the liability
limitation and (2) a modification of article 25 relating to the "wilful misconduct"
exception. ICAO Legal Committee, Report on the Revision of the Warsaw Convention,
in 2 HAGUE PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 93, 96-99. The proposal which emerged from
the Hague Conference was to raise the liability limitation from $8,300 to $13,000.
Id. at 76-81, 93-100. The United States had attempted to raise the limit to
$25,000. ICAO Legal Committee, Minutes 9th Sess. 1953, at 162-163, 270
(ICAO Doc. No. 7450-LC/126)(1954). By compromise, it was agreed to double
the originally established $8,300 ceiling and establish a new limitation of liability
in the amount of $16,600. Id. at 270.
Although the United States endorsed the Hague Protocol, ten years elapsed
before either the President of the United States or the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee took a firm stand on ratification. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra
note 36, at 515-16. The United States grappled with the concept of limited liabil-
ity in death or injury cases even after it agreed to the accord reached at the Hague
in 1955. The United States did not sign the Hague Protocol at the conference,
demonstrating its equivocation despite its acknowledgement of the Protocol's in-
crease of the monetary ceiling on recoverable damages. It is unknown to what
extent the tragedy over Medicine Bow Peak, Wyoming in October, 1955, killing
members of the Mormon Tabernacle Choir, captured the minds and hearts of
those who originally favored the United States' adherence to the Hague Protocol.
Id. Moreover, the doubling of the $8,300 ceiling established by the original War-
saw Convention did not mollify the opponents of the Warsaw Convention.
In June, 1961, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote
to the new Secretary of State regarding the hiatus over Hague ratification:
[The Hague] Protocol was referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations onJuly, 24, 1959, and as of this date, the Executive Branch
has shown little interest in it. I should like to learn, therefore,
whether the Department of State would want the Committee on For-
eign Relations to act on the Protocol during this session of the Con-
gress. If not, I would be interested in learning the reasons why the
Department of State does not desire Committee action on the Proto-
col at this time.
Letter from Senator J.W. Fulbright to Secretary of State Rusk (June 12, 1961),
referred to in Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 36, at 516 n.73.
The receipt of the letter by the Department of State prompted a new look at the
Hague Protocol. Consequently, the Kennedy administration introduced domestic
legislation under which an air carrier would be compelled to insure passengers at
a higher monetary level. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee thereafter left
no doubt as to where it stood, stating that the Warsaw Convention liability limita-
tion was an "extremely inadequate amount of compensation" and further that
"even the $16,600 limitation . . . is highly inadequate by U.S. standards."
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 36, at 545-46 (citing SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, HAGUE PROTOCOL To WARSAW CONVENTION, S. EXEC. REP.
No. 3, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 9-10 (1966)). The Senate Committee called for com-
plementary insurance legislation for protection of up to $76,000. Id. at 6-7.
After lengthy Congressional debate on the insurance legislation, it became evi-
dent that there was little chance of its enactment. Automatic recovery through
compulsory insurance projected serious concern over the potential for aircraft
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liability limitation to $75,000. This interim proposal be-
came known as the Montreal Agreement44 and was predi-
cated upon further reconsiderations of the monetary
limitation as would become necessary to accommodate fu-
ture ,economic alterations.45
sabotage and became the gravamen of the controversy over the Hague Protocol in
1964 at hearings before a special committee composed of representatives of the
State Department, the Justice Department, the CAB and the FAA.
The argument was that an automatic recovery of 50,000 dollars was
'an invitation to sabotage,' not only in less developed countries
where this would be a 'king's ransom,' but even in the United States.
Unlike trip insurance or large amounts of life insurance purchased
shortly before a flight, there could be no record that could lead to
identification of a saboteur.
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 36, at 538-39 n.157.
In fact, the issue had gained such momentum that neither the Senate nor the
House of Representatives would call for a hearing on the Hague Protocol. Id. at
544-45. As opposition mounted, so did the United States' unhappiness with the
unrealistic monetary limitation. In an atmosphere of increasing dissatisfaction,
the Executive Branch of the United States government denounced the Warsaw
Convention on November 15, 1965, to become effective six months from that
date, on May 15, 1966. See Department of State Press Release No. 268, 53 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 923-24 (1965).
A chasm thus emerged between the United States and the rest of the world over
the limitation on liability in international air transportation accidents. On the
same date that the formal notice of denunciation was deposited by the United
States, the Department of State issued a press release indicating that the United
States would continue its adherence to the Warsaw Convention provided that an
international agreement limiting liability to approximately $100,000 could be
reached. Id. The Department of State further stipulated that it would continue to
adhere to the Warsaw Convention pending the adoption of such an international
agreement, provided there was a provisional arrangement among the principal
international airlines waiving the limits of liability up to $75,000 per passenger.
Id. at 924.
44 The Civil Aeronautics Board, Agreement 18,900, Agreement Relating to Lia-
bility Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol (1966), ap-
proved by Civil Aeronautics Board, Order No. E23680 (May 13, 1966), reprinted in
31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) and in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Montreal Agreement].
45 See Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 36. Under the impetus of the
United States' denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, the ICAO held a confer-
ence in Montreal in February, 1966 in an effort to fulfill the United States Depart-
ment of State's proviso. Id. at 552. The Department of State released the proviso
on November 15, 1965. Id. at 551. While the Montreal conference proved incon-
clusive and the May 15, 1966 denunciation date for the United States was drawing
closer, domestic and international air carriers reconsidered interim measures
which they had, on previous occasions, found to be unacceptable. As a result, the
carriers agreed to a monetary liability limitation in the amount of $75,000, with-
out regard to fault on the part of the carrier. See Montreal Agreement, supra note
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In order to counterbalance the ceiling on recoverable
damages, the Warsaw Convention shifts the burden of
proof onto the carrier. The carrier is presumed liable for
the damage alleged to have occurred unless the carrier
can prove that it either has taken all necessary measures
to avoid the damages or that it was impossible to do so. 46
While article 20 provides a measure whereby the carriers
can establish a defense against liability on the basis of "all
necessary measures," article 25 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion offers plaintiffs a countermeasure whereby they, too,
can lift their wrongful death or personal injury case out of
the Warsaw Convention,47 but for very different reasons
than those contemplated by article 20. Under article 25, a
plaintiff has an opportunity to disqualify the application
of the $75,000 liability limitation by proving that the car-
rier was guilty of "wilful misconduct. 4 8
44. The United States government, as a result of this interim resolution, withdrew
its denunciation of the Warsaw Convention on May 13, and gave its approval to
the Montreal Agreement of 1966, Department of State Press Release No. 111, May 14,
1966, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 956-57 (1966) which became effective on May 15, 1966.
See Montreal Agreement, supra note 44.
4, Warsaw Convention, supra note 38, art. 20. Article 20 provides:
(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or
that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures.
(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall not
be liable if he proves that the damage was occasioned by an error in
piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in navigation and that, in
all other respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary meas-
ures to avoid the damage.
Id.
47 For a discussion of plaintiffs who seek to "lift out" their $75,000 claims and
then prosecute their wilful misconduct cause of action afterward, see In re Korean
Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 19 Av. CAs. (CCH) 17,584, 17,595-96.
48 Warsaw Convention, supra note 38, art. 25. Article 25 provides as follows:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provi-
sions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the
damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his
part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
said provisions, if the damage is caused under the same circum-
stances by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his
employment.
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The wilful misconduct exception to the liability limita-
tion under article 25 of the Warsaw Convention has been
a cause of concern and extensive debate since its promul-
gation. According to the original draft of the treaty writ-
ten in French, the carrier cannot invoke the liability
limitation provisions if the damage was caused by "dol"
or by such default on the carrier's part so as to be consid-
ered the equivalent to "dol. ' ' 49 It has become established
that the nearest equivalent to the term "dol" in the Eng-
lish language is "wilful misconduct." However, even this
translation does not seem to coincide with the original in-
tent of the treaty drafters who selected the word "dol.
' 50
49 See the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico's decision in Delgado v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) 18,462 (Puerto Rico 1982) for a particu-
larly revealing discussion of the controversy which arose over the French "dol"
and its English interpretation as "wilful misconduct." See also Koninklijke Lucht-
vaart Mattschappij N.V. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Holland v. Tuller, 292 F.2d
775, 778-79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961); 1 C. SHAWCROSS & M.
BEAUMONT, AIR LAw § VII, 210-13 (4th Ed. 1982); S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, 1
AVIATION TORT LAW 11.37 (1979). See also infra note 101 and accompanying
text.
-0 While the English translation of the Convention certainly serves a useful pur-
pose, it must be abandoned where its meaning conflicts with the meaning in-
tended by the original French text. A vigorous debate arose among the framers of
the Convention during the drafting of article 25 with respect to what conduct on
the part of the carrier should permit circumvention of the limitation of liability
provided by article 22. SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERO-
NAUTICAL LAw, MINTrES 58-62, 211-14 (R. Horner & D. Legrez trans. 1955) [here-
inafter cited as MINUTES]. The operative term originally proposed, and eventually
adopted, was the French term dol. Id. at 212. In the course of considering the text
of article 25, however, a counter-proposal was made by the German delegation to
the Convention to replace the term dol with the French termfaute lourde. Id. at 55.
The English translation of dol has been described variously as an "international
illicit act," MINUTES, supra, at 59, 60, or "an unlawful act or non-fulfillment of a
duty, done with the intent to cause damage." R. MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY RE-
GIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER 124 (1981). On the other hand, the
French term faute lourde means a "serious wrong," MINUTES, supra, at 61, and
"does not require an intentional act or omission but a complete and unjustified
disregard of the possible consequences of the act or omission." R. MANKIEWICZ,
supra, at 124. Faute lourde has been likened to gross negligence under English
common law. Id.
The merits of the French terms dol andfaute lourde were considered and debated
by the delegates. MINUTES, supra, at 58-62. Professor Ripert of France voiced the
following concern over the adoption offaute lourde:
The German Delegation proposes to make the carrier liable at any
time that he has committed a serious error.
[I]f you introduce in an international convention an expression so
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Still, the conflict which has emerged over the years in
those Warsaw Convention cases where "wilful miscon-
duct" is alleged against a carrier has not focused so much
on the question of translation as it has on the case-by-case
factual issue of what constitutes wilful misconduct. 5'
The United States has been a party to the Warsaw Con-
vention for more than fifty years. Although plaintiffs in
hundreds of personal injury and death cases have at-
tempted to circumvent the Convention's limitation of lia-
bility by attempting to prove "wilful misconduct," only
four have been successful.52 In American Airlines v. Ulen, 53
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia affirmed the district court's ruling that the
carrier's charter operation of a flight from Washington,
D.C. to Mexico City flew at an improper altitude, causing
the plane to crash into Glade Mountain in southwest Vir-
ginia. The evidence established wilful misconduct on the
part of the flight crew because the plan called for flight at
an altitude of 4,000 feet within one and one half miles of a
mountain 4,080 feet high.54 With a finding of wilful mis-
broad, so imprecise as "faute lourde". . . courts will declare, with
regard to an accident, that a "faute lourde" was committed .... I
am suspicious of all general formulae which risk destruction of the
Convention.
MINUTES, supra, at 61. Ultimately, a compromise was struck between the compet-
ing camps. Dol was retained in the final draft of article 25, but a measure of flexi-
bility was left to the Convention's signatories.
,51 See, e.g., article 25, Warsaw Convention, supra note 38, which, among other
provisions of the Warsaw Convention, invokes domestic (state) law to resolve par-
ticular issues arising out of the treaty language. In the case of article 25, the issue
of the "fault" which will be deemed the equivalent of "dol" is left to domestic law.
Id.
52 In re Pago Pago, 419 F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1976), afd, No. 78-3591, slip
op. (9th Cir. 1982); LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965); Koninklijke Luchtvaart Mattschappij N.V.
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Holland v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 921 (1961); American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir.
1949). Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951), infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text, in-
volved intentional conduct by a mechanic and hence is not, in reality, representa-
tive of a wilful misconduct finding in an operational case.
186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
Id. at 534.
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conduct the Warsaw Convention limitation was deemed
inapplicable. 55 The court based its finding on a determi-
nation that American Airlines deliberately and intention-
ally formulated a flight plan which directed its aircraft to
fly into a mountain at the very center of a chosen airway.56
In Koninklike Luchtvaart Mattschappi N. V KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines Holland v. Tuller,5 Circuit Judge Burger,
writing for the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, affirmed the district court's deci-
sion that there was sufficient evidence to find KLM and its
ground agent guilty of wilful misconduct. The aircraft
crashed into the tidewaters of the Shannon River approxi-
mately one minute after its takeoff from the airport in
Shannon, Ireland. KLM's failure to properly instruct pas-
sengers of the location of life vests and their use; failure
to broadcast an emergency message; failure to provide for
the safety of the plaintiff after his peril was known; and
the failure of KLM's ground agent to monitor radio
messages and initiate rescue procedures precluded the in-
vocation of the Warsaw liability limitation.58
In LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines5 9 a jury finding
of wilful misconduct rested upon deductions from indirect
evidence concerning the flight crew's missed approach
and crash into a mountain northeast of the city of Rome.
The crew alleged that it had obtained a radio compass
bearing on a navigational beacon which, in fact, was more
than thirty miles from the aircraft's actual position.60 Ex-
pert testimony at trial established that the absolute maxi-
mum transmission range of the beacon was only twenty-
two miles.61 Since the inferences which had been drawn
to find Sabena guilty of wilful misconduct were reason-
able, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
SId.
5"Id.
-1 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
Tuller, 292 F.2d at 779-82.
" 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965).
LeRoy, 344 F.2d at 271.
61 Id.
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Circuit held that the jury's finding must not be
overturned.62
In the vast majority of article 25 cases, however, the car-
rier has prevailed on the issue of wilful misconduct.63 In
Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd. ,64 the dis-
trict court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a directed
verdict, thereby finding that the pilot's failure to follow
instructions to maintain a certain altitude over a radio sig-
nal station constituted wilful misconduct. The court rea-
soned that even though the pilot did not intend the fatal
crash near Half Moon Bay, California, his conduct consti-
tuted recklessness and thus was sufficient to invoke the
"wilful misconduct" exception to the treaty liability limi-
tations.65 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed the directed verdict for
plaintiffs and held that there was evidence from which the
jury properly could have inferred that the pilot thought he
was bringing the aircraft down at the proper location.66
The appellate court stated that once the case went to the
jury, its verdict should not have been upset if reasonable
men could find in defendant's favor, as they could have
done in Berner.67
6,2 Id. at 268-75.
63 See Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 369 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 996 (1967); Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346
F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), rev g 219 F. Supp. 289 (1963), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983
(1966); Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 989 (1956); Rashap v. American Airlines, Inc., 1955 U.S. Av. R. 593
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Froman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 1953 U.S. Av. R. 1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 284 A.D. 935, 135 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1954), motion for leave to
appeal denied, 308 N.Y. 1050, 125 N.E.2d 434, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955);
Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., 281 A.D. 105, 117 N.Y.S.2d 276
(1952), afyd, 305 N.Y. 830, 114 N.E.2d 37, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 874 (1953); Wy-
man v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1943), aftd, 267 A.D. 947, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459, afl'd per curiam, 293 N.Y. 878, 59
N.E.2d 785 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945).
346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), rev g 219 F. Supp. 289 (1963), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 983 (1966).
65 Berner, 219 F. Supp. at 324-26.
Berner, 346 F.2d at 537-38.
Id. at 538.
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In Grey v. American Airlines, Inc.,68 recovery was sought
exclusive of the Warsaw limitation when an American Air-
lines flight crashed near Dallas, Texas on November 29,
1949. At trial, evidence showed that one of the engines
backfired and forced the aircraft to seek clearance to land
in Dallas.69 Disregarding a direct order from the Captain,
the First Officer failed to execute a missed approach in the
mistaken, but good faith, belief that the Captain's order
would lead to an immediate crash.70 The jury found that
miscommunication in the cockpit occurred between the
time the aircraft crossed the boundary of the airport at an
altitude of 200 feet and the time it crashed on top of the
hangar of the Dallas Aviation School. The jury further
found that the disaster was due to wilful misconduct.7'
The trial court, however, granted American Airlines'
motion to set aside the verdict and directed judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs pursuant to the Warsaw limitation.72
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the directed verdict upholding the liability
limitation:
If defendant had the burden of proving that there was no
wilful misconduct on the part of any member of the crew,
we think a jury would have been warranted in finding on
this record that the burden had not been sustained. There
are too many gaps and imponderables, to say nothing of
the conflicts and inconsistencies, some of which we have
not thought it necessary to collate.
But we cannot discover anything in the case to warrant a
finding that there was wilful misconduct. It is said that the
Captain was in command and that he was the only one au-
thorized by Civil Air Regulations 61.301, 61.310, to act in
an emergency. But we find nothing in the Regulations to
justify this conclusion. The plane was in extremis; whatever the
First Officer did or failed to do was done to save the plane and the
- 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), afg 95 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), cert. de-
nied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956).
m) Grey, 227 F.2d at 284.
7) Id. at 286.
71 Id. at 284.
72 Grey, 95 F. Supp. at 758.
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lives of all on board including his own. 7 3
In Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. , Judge
Augustus Hand, writing for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, reversed the ruling of the
Southern District Court of New York which upheld limit-
ing the maximum recoverable damages to $8,300 for the
death of a passenger killed enroute to Shannon, Ireland
on December 28, 1946. The underlying basis for the Sec-
ond Circuit's reversal was the lower court's exclusion of
the findings of various inquiry boards. These findings
documented a faulty altimeter on the aircraft, thereby
properly giving rise to jury instructions that one of TWA's
mechanics intentionally omitted to perform a necessary
safety check.75
In In re Pago Pago Aircrash ofJanuary 30, 1974,76 a Boeing
707 aircraft crashed on American Samoa, killing the
ninety-seven persons aboard, including all members of
the flight crew. The record reflected evidence that the
aircraft descended too quickly, was flying too low and too
fast, and that the crew failed to use proper callout and
instrument checking procedures during the runway land-
ing approach. 7 7 The district court held that the determi-
nation of wilful misconduct was a question for the jury
and accordingly allowed into evidence facts pertaining to
the flight crew's conduct. 78 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the jury could
properly find from the evidence that the flight crew's con-
duct not only constituted negligence but that taken cumu-
latively, the crew's errors could be found to have
constituted wilful misconduct.79
Additionally, there are two federal court decisions find-
ing carriers guilty of wilful misconduct; however, neither
7, Grey, 227 F.2d at 286 (emphasis added).
74 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).
75 Pekelis, 187 F.2d at 126-31.
M No. 78-3591, slip op. (9th Cir. 1982).
" Id. at 5.
78 In re Pago Pago, 419 F. Supp. at 1160.
711 In re Pago Pago, No. 78-3591, slip op. at 6.
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of the incidents involved operational acts or omissions
concerning the flight itself and hence do not typify article
25 cases. First, in Hill v. United Airlines,8 ° the plaintiffs
made reservations on United Airlines to travel from Kan-
sas City to Denver to Seattle, where they planned to de-
part for the Orient on Northwest Airlines. Once airborne
on the Kansas City-Denver leg, United announced that in-
clement weather in Seattle led to cancellation of the Den-
ver-Seattle flight. In rerouting from Denver to Seattle
through Portland on the advice of a United Airline ticket
agent, plaintiffs discovered in flight that the Seattle air-
port had, in fact, been open. When they ultimately ar-
rived in Seattle, plaintiffs learned that they not only
missed their Northwest flight to Tokyo, but also that
United did not have the proper equipment in Denver to
meet its scheduled Denver-Seattle flight."' In a rather
twisted interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, the dis-
trict court first held that the terms of the Convention ap-
plied to the facts before the court. The court then
assimilated the plaintiffs' assertion of intentional misrep-
resentation to "wilful misconduct" under the Warsaw
Convention.82 The language of article 25, the court said,
is broad enough to encompass intentional misrepresenta-
tion when it arises in international transportation. 3 On
the basis of this finding, the court denied the defendant's
motion for a determination of the applicable law and for
judgment thereon. 4
The second "Warsaw" case not based on operational
conduct is Tarar v. Pakistan International Airlines.85 In Tarar,
the family of Feroze Tarar sued the airline for failing to
properly transport the human remains of the decedent to
his homeland in accordance with the family's Islamic reli-
550 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Kan. 1982).
si Id. at 1050.
82 Id. at 1055.
83 Id.
- Id at 1056.
" 554 F. Supp. 471 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
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gious belief8 6 Among the various family members, only
decedent's son entered into the contract for carriage of
the casket from Houston, Texas to Lahore, Pakistan.
Thus, only his claim for damages invoked the provisions
of the Warsaw Convention, while all other plaintiffs' re-
coverable damages were governed by Texas law.8 7 The
court's characterization of the decedent's son's suit as a
"Warsaw" case stemmed from its interpretation of article
1 of the Convention. Under article 1, the treaty applies to
"all international transportation of persons, baggage, or
goods." 88 Despite its admission that human remains are
neither "person, baggage, or goods," the court found that
the case fell within the ambit of the Convention. 9 With
respect to the son's claim for damages under the Warsaw
Convention, the court held that the carrier intentionally
refused to load the human remains of the decedent
aboard the agreed upon flight to Pakistan. Wilful miscon-
duct was therefore established. 90
Most recently, in Butler v. Aeromexico,9 1 the July 27, 1981
crash of a DC-9 on final approach to Chihuahua Airport in
Mexico gave rise to the issue of whether the flight crew
knowingly entered weather conditions which caused them
to lose sight of the landing area and, in turn, lose control
of the aircraft. The district court relied specifically on the
crew's failure to execute a missed approach when they lost
visibility. By equating the term wilful misconduct with
"wantonness" under the relevant law of Alabama, the dis-
trict court held that the carrier was guilty of wilful miscon-
duct.92 Having identified the standard to which the court
could relate, vis-a-vis its working knowledge of Alabama
law, it defined plaintiffs' burden of proof as follows:
86 Id. at 472-75.
87 Id. at 478-79.
" Warsaw Convention, supra note 38, art. 1.
- Tarar, 554 F. Supp. at 478-79.
90 Id.
9, No. CV82-PT-9322-S (N.D. Ala. 1984), aft'd, No. 84-7714 (lth Cir.
1985)(available on WEs'LAw, Fed. database).
92 See Butler, No. 84-7714 at 8.
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"[t]hat the flight crew intentionally committed an act or
intentionally omitted a duty with knowledge that the act
or omission would probably result in injury, or in a man-
ner as to imply reckless disregard of the consequences.' 9 3
The district court then concluded that the misconduct
of the Aeromexico flight crew was sufficiently wilful or
reckless to lift plaintiffs' cases out of the liability limitation
regime of the Warsaw Convention.94 However, the same
misconduct was not sufficient to justify a finding of wilful
misconduct under Alabama law.95 Hence, the court de-
ferred to the applicable state law to determine how to
measure wilful misconduct and thus, to decide whether
article 25 should be invoked.9 6 However, the court
wrongfully equated article 25's "wilful misconduct" with
Alabama's "wantonness," rather than correctly upholding
the state law definition of wilful misconduct. In determin-
ing how the Warsaw Convention would apply to plaintiffs'
recovery, the court seemed intent upon stripping the car-
rier of the liability limitation imposed by the Convention
by dissecting the legal issue of what constitutes wilful mis-
conduct.97 If misconduct is wilful under the Warsaw Con-
vention, then it should be considered wilful under the
particular state statutory interpretation to which the court
has resorted. The dynamic circumstances of the flight
crew's actions and mental processes themselves do not
give rise to multiple interpretations of one concept,
namely "wilful misconduct". However, once the court
locked the article 25 concept into something less than Al-
abama's interpretation of the same term, the district court
was able to use this back door to keep Alabama law intact
while achieving its objective of removing the ceiling from
plaintiffs' recoverable damages under the Warsaw
Convention. 9
- Butler, No. CV82-PT-9322-S at 14.
- Id. at 19.
05 Id.
See Butler, No. 84-7714 at 8.
07 Id. at 10-11.
i Id. at 8-9.
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Thus, as interpreted by the court in Aeromexico, wilful
misconduct under article 25 of the Warsaw Convention is
not sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages
under Alabama law.99 Although the court does not ex-
pressly state this finding in so many words, the effect of its
holding against Aeromexico is in violation of the distinc-
tion between wilful misconduct and punitive damages up-
held in other jurisdictions.10 0 Hence, even when a court
properly resorts to applicable state law to decipher the
meaning of wilful misconduct under article 25 of the War-
saw Convention, finding the carrier guilty may not neces-
sarily result in liability for punitive damages.' 0'
In punitive damage analyses by the judiciary, then, the
Warsaw Convention demonstrates that the standard of
"wilful misconduct," regardless of how it is interpreted
vis-a-vis state statutory application, is seldom met by a
plaintiff, and judgment is generally limited to the scope of
recovery set forth in article 22 of the treaty. 10 2 Despite a
growing identifiable trend in the American judicial sys-
tem's expression of dissatisfaction with the liability limita-
tions imposed by the Warsaw Convention, 0 3 a strong
id. at 11, 12, 19.
See In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois, 500 F. Supp. 1044, 1050
(N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Lin v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 U.S. 878 (1981); Malandris v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 703 F.2d 1152, 1173-76 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983); Doralee Estates v. Cities Service Oil Co., 569 F.2d
716, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1977).
Il See Warsaw Convention, supra note 48, art. 25. The direct effect of a finding
of wilful misconduct against the carrier is that the liability limitation of $75,000 is
lifted. Id. The damage implications which ensue from a finding of wilful miscon-
duct are that the plaintiff then can seek provable damages up to any amount he
desires.
In this sense, a finding of wilful misconduct does not arouse the retributive and
deterrent forces which normally justify an assessment of punitive damages.
Hence, even when a court holds that there is sufficient evidence to support a find-
ing of wilful misconduct, such evidence may not legally support an award of puni-
tive damages because the Warsaw Convention reference to "wilful misconduct"
depends for its interpretation upon the particular state law by which the term is to
be measured. See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 742-44
(C.D. Cal. 1975).
102 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
102 See Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d 1383, 1385-87 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.
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countervailing consideration inevitably re-emerges in
each wilful misconduct case.
In retrospect, what is it about Ulen, t0 4  Tuller, t0 5
Sabena,10 6 and Pago Pago10 7 that sets them apart from the
overwhelming majority of Warsaw Convention decisions
that adhere to the liability limitation regime? Perhaps the
common thread which weaves the three wilful misconduct
decisions together is that in each case, the flight crew had
an opportunity to make a conscious, informed decision
which implicitly dictated whether the flight would be
placed in jeopardy. An opportunity to jeopardize the
safety of flight, even though not deliberate or "wilful" in
the true sense, riles the sensibilities of the fact finder be-
cause the flight crew members no longer are viewed as
merely victims of the calamity. Rather, they appear as the
holders of the strings which can influence the fate of the
flight. Thus, the crew becomes a reflection of the merit
behind punishment for the loss of innocent lives.' 08
Such conjecture aside, however, the practicalities be-
Ct. 1338 (1985); In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d
1301, 1309-10 (9th Cir. 1982)(also referred to as Causey v. Pan American World
Airways); In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F.
Supp. 833, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aftd, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Polskie Linie Lotnicze (LOT Polish Airlines) v. Robles, 104 S. Ct. 147 (1983);
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aff'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1983), affd, 466 U.S. 243 (1984); Lisi v. Alitalia-
Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 253 F. Supp. 237, 239-43 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 370 F.2d
508 (2d Cir. 1966), affd, 390 U.S. 455 (1968) (an equally divided court without
opinion); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, 352 F.2d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 1965); Mertens
v. Flying Tiger Line, 341 F.2d 851, 856-57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816
(1965).
104 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
1o See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
'o, See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
,l There are at least two other identifiable factors which may go toward ex-
plaining the "wilful misconduct" cases under the Warsaw Convention. First, in
Uen, plaintiff sued for damages resulting from personal injury rather than from
death. Ulen, 186 F.2d at 530. Violet Ulen was present to give her own accounting
of the crash. The presence of a victim to give a first-hand account of the carrier's
conduct arguably has great impact upon the fact finder.
Second, the flight crew's escape from mass destruction is offensive to the sensi-
bilities of any fact finder. Regardless of the propriety of a flight crew's instinct to
survive a crash, such conduct becomes assimilated to recklessness or wanton dis-
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hind the wilful misconduct issue suggest that the over-
whelming majority of judicial decisions that have held
against the wilful misconduct exception represent an illu-
sory statistic. How many operational cases really exist
where settlement out-of-court for damages above the lia-
bility limitation is prompted by the strong likelihood that,
if tried to a jury, the issue of wilful misconduct would be
resolved against the carrier? No one knows.
If left to conjecture, then perhaps what can be dis-
cerned is that each person, the fact finder included, is
faced with his human condition. When the legal stan-
dards and theories are put aside, each person is left with
an infinite awareness of his own mortal finitude and must
ask himself whether, put in the position of the flight crew-
man, he would jeopardize his own life by conduct which
bears such a high risk of destruction. At least one fact
finder who has squarely addressed the question answers it
this way: "[I]t is hardly conceivable that [a flight crew]
wanted to perish [with their passengers].' ' 9
IV. FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW: THE DEATH ON
THE HIGH SEAS ACT
Through the enactment of what is commonly referred
to as the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), Congress
attempted to provide uniformity to the treatment of
wrongful death cases 10 occurring in those waters that are
beyond three miles, or one marine league, from the terri-
regard for the safety of the passengers. This was the problem confronting Circuit
Judge Burger in Tu~ler, 292 F.2d at 777.
Most recently, wilful misconduct was alleged against the carrier in the context
of the Tuller facts when an in-flight fire broke out aboard Air Canada Flight No.
797 on June 2, 1982. Twenty-three passengers died in the fire while eighteen
passengers and all five crew members safely evacuated the aircraft. Some of the
Air Canada crew members were among the first persons to exit the aircraft upon
its landing at Greater Cincinnati Airport. Wilful misconduct has been alleged
against Air Canada in the litigation which has arisen out of this incident and is
pending as of the time of publication of this article.
'- Sauvage v. Air India, Corp., Judgment of Jan. 27, 1977, Ct. of Cassation
(Sup. Ct. of App., Pt. 1, Brussels, Belgium).
-,o S. REP. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1919); H.R. REP. No. 674, 66th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1920); 59 CONG. REC. 4482 (daily ed. March 17, 1920).
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torial waters of the United States or the shores of any
state or other territory belonging to the United States."'
The invocation of the DOHSA vests in the personal repre-
sentative of the decedent the right to maintain a wrongful
death action. 112 That right of recovery is limited to the
pecuniary loss suffered by the death of the decedent." 13
The seminal decision on the scope of recoverable dam-
ages under the DOHSA is Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil
Corp.."' The decision in Higginbotham arose out of an avi-
ation disaster in the Gulf of Mexico' '5which resulted in
the death of the pilot and three passengers. The District
Court for the Western District of Louisiana found that ad-
miralty jurisdiction existed because the accident occurred
on the high seas, 1 6 in conjunction with the operator's ex-
it 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982). Section 761 reads as follows:
§ 761. Right of action; where and by whom brought.
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine
league from the shore of any state, or the District of Columbia, or
the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal
representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in
the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive
benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent
relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have
been liable if death had not ensued.
Id. at § 761.
112 Id.
-. 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1982). The scope of "pecuniary loss" vis-a-vis recovery
under the DOHSA is discussed in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S.
573, 585 (1974); Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 786-92 (5th Cir. 1976); Na-
tional Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400, 402-04 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
885 (1959); Chute v. United States, 466 F. Supp. 61, 65-68 (D. Mass. 1978).
Prejudgment interest also is awardable in a DOHSA action at the discretion of
the trialjudge. National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d at 406; Dugas v. National
Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386, 1392 (3d Cir. 1971).
The recoverability of survival damages for the decedent's pain and suffering
prior to death is not as clearly established as recovery of prejudgment interest. See
Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974)(Powell, dissenting). See
also Bodden v. American Offshore, Inc., 681 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1982); Dugas v.
National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971).
114 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
1 -N Id. at 424. The codification of certain principles of admiralty law became
applicable to aviation cases with the decision in Executive jet Aviation, Inc. v. City
of Cleveland, 448 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1971), aFd, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). See infra
note 120 and accompanying text.
", Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Co., 357 F. Supp. 1164, 1167 (W.D. La. 1973).
1986] EXEMPLAR Y DAMAGES 333
tensive offshore activities." 17 On the issue of damages, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ex-
pressly limited the holdings of earlier cases" 18 to deaths in
territorial waters, and thereby emphasized strong adher-
ence to the uniformity theme which served as the corner-
stone to the creation of the DOHSA. As a result of
Higginbotham, it is now a well-established principle that
the explicit statutory limitation on recovery in high seas
death actions pursuant to Section 761 of the DOHSA" 9 is
to be applied without judicial inroads.
When the DOHSA is applied in an aviation case, 120 its
effect is not altered and recoverable damages thereby re-
117 Id. at 1167.
11 Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Co., 545 F.2d 422, 435-36 (5th Cir. 1977). The
decisions in Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970) and Sea-Land
Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974), respectively, created a cause of ac-
tion for general maritime wrongful death and extended the recoverable damages
under such an action to encompass non-pecuniary losses.
See supra note 111.
2" The transition from the DOHSA's original design as an admiralty law device
to the skies which blanket the high seas was effected in 1972 by the United States
Supreme Court. In Executive jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249
(1972), a flock of seagulls was struck by an aircraft on takeoff from a regional
airport in Cleveland, Ohio. The aircraft lost engine power and ultimately sank in
Lake Erie. The operator of the aircraft commenced an action against the City of
Cleveland for the latter's failure to keep the runway free of birds as well as its
failure to give adequate warnings of the presence of the birds. Id.
From the United States Supreme Court's preliminary reference to the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals' decision in Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 384
F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967), the Court launched into an extensive expos6 on the
applicability of federal admiralty jurisdiction to aviation tort claims. In Chapman it
was determined that in order to assert federal admiralty jurisdiction over aviation
cases, there had to be more than a nexus between navigable waters and the situs
of the allegedly wrongful conduct. Id. at 966. Locality of the wrong over the
"high seas" in and of itself was insufficient to make the DOHSA applicable. Id.
Bearing upon the insufficiency of a "locality" test to bring aviation tort cases
within the ambit of the DOHSA, the Supreme Court, in Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at
268, held that admiralty jurisdiction over tort cases may be invoked only when the
"locality" nexus was combined with a second requirement that the wrongful con-
duct at issue have some relationship with traditional maritime activity upon navi-
gable waters. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had determined that the alleged
tort occurred on land before the aircraft crashed in Lake Erie and therefore found
it unnecessary to consider the question of a maritime relationship. Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 448 F.2d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1971), af'd, 409
U.S. 249 (1972). The United States Supreme Court upheld both the district
court's findings and the Sixth Circuit's affirmance, memorializing the two-prong
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main limited to the pecuniary loss suffered. However, a
test for determining whether an aviation tort case properly invokes admiralty ju-
risdiction. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 274.
While the Supreme Court in Executive Jet explicitly stated that the DOHSA in-
vokes admiralty jurisdiction, 409 U.S. at 263-64, 271 n.20, it left open the ques-
tion of what happens once the admiralty jurisdiction is found. Id. at 271. Since the
decision in Executive Jet was handed down by the Court in December of 1972,
courts have had to grapple with the issue of whether jurisdiction under the
DOHSA is exclusive or concurrent with state court jurisdiction. Many times a
plaintiff suing in a representative capacity for the death of an individual arising
out of a mass aviation disaster will intentionally avoid pleading the DOHSA de-
spite the fact that the crash occurred on the high seas and meets the criteria
adopted by the Supreme Court in Executive Jet. Plaintiffs who do not want their
cases in federal court because they do not want the rules and procedures of the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982), to apply will
argue that the DOHSA at least invokes concurrent jurisdiction with the state
court. Thus, the plaintiff will argue that he has the right to prosecute his claim in
state court under state substantive law on the issues of both liability and damages.
The effect of succeeding with such an argument is that plaintiff is able to "lift" his
case out of the exclusive jurisdiction of the DOHSA and thereby avoid the federal
statute's limitation on recovery to pecuniary loss.
The prototypical argument in opposition to plaintiffs' circumvention of the
DOHSA is that the underpinning of the DOHSA, namely uniform application of
law and remedy to cases arising in admiralty, would be thwarted in the mass avia-
tion disaster case where consolidation and coordination of the various claims is
paramount to the just and speedy resolution of those claims. This is particularly
so in light of the role played by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
which selects one forum where all the cases can be consolidated just for pre-trial
proceedings on the sole issue of liability. The consolidation procedure does not
prejudice any plaintiff from having his case remanded to the court in that state
from which the case emerged, and plaintiff thereby can utilize all the pre-trial
discovery already conducted to thereafter try his case on the issue of damages in
the forum he originally selected.
The conflict between concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction over DOHSA claims
is heightened by the language of Section 767 of the Act and the judicial interpre-
tation it has received. Section 767 provides as follows:
The provisions of any state statute giving or regulating rights of ac-
tion or remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter. Nor
shall this chapter apply to the Great Lakes or to any waters within
the territorial limits of any State, or to any navigable waters in the
Panama Canal Zone.
46 U.S.C. § 767 (1982). Section 767 of the DOHSA and alternate wrongful death
remedies available through the state court system are discussed at length in Safir
v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 241 F. Supp. 501, 505-09 (E.D.N.Y.
1965).
In the most recent instance where these prototype points and counterpoints
faced one another, two federal district courts from the same state have taken op-
posite positions. In litigation arising out of the tragic shootdown of Korean Air
Lines Flight No. KE 007 over the Sea of Japan on September 1, 1983 more than
150 wrongful death actions were filed against Korean Air Lines and others. Two
actions in particular were filed in state court in California for the counties of San
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''punitive" element of damages has emerged under the
Francisco, Hendrie v. Korean Air Lines, No. C 84-5413 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. filed June 22, 1984), and Los Angeles, Van Ryn v. Korean Air Lines, No. C
507348 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. filed July 23, 1984).
Korean Air Lines removed both actions to the appropriate federal district court
within the State of California so that the cases could be consolidated for pre-trial
liability proceedings with the other pending actions pursuant to the Rules of the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of
Sept. 1, 1983, 575 F. Supp. 342 (J.P.M.D.L. 1983)(originally consolidating forty-
two actions against Korean Air Lines in the District of Columbia).
After the Hendrie matter was removed to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California on August 10, 1984, and the Van Ryn matter was
removed to the Central District of California on August 31, 1984, the Hendrie and
Van Ryn plaintiffs, on October 1 and September 13, 1984, respectively, moved to
remand their actions on the basis of the DOHSA giving rise to at least concurrent
jurisdiction between the state and federal courts.
Korean Air Lines, relying on federal question jurisdiction which had served as
the original basis for removal from state court, contended that California's own
state courts viewed the DOHSA as exclusively federal and that to view it otherwise
would thwart the very purpose of uniformity for which the Act was promulgated.
The Northern District of California agreed with Korean Air Lines and denied
plaintiff's motion. Hendrie v. Korean Air Lines, No. C 84-5413 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. filed June 22, 1984), denying remand, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1984) (mem.
Henderson, J.) The Central District of California, relying heavily upon the East-
ern District of New York's decision in Safir, 241 F. Supp. at 509, found "no affirm-
ative support" for exclusivity. Plaintiff's action in Van Ryn therefore was
remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court. Van Ryn v. Korean Air Lines, No. C
507348 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. filed July 23, 1984), remand granted, (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 10, 1985)(mem. Rymer, J.).
After motions both to reargue the Van Ryn matter and to appeal the district
court's decision were denied, Korean Air Lines on April 2, 1985 moved in the Los
Angeles Superior Court to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter juris-
diction. Movant cited three cases, two of which hailed from the Los Angeles Su-
perior Court, which had found no state court subject matter jurisdiction in
DOHSA cases because the Act gave rise to exclusive federal jurisdiction. Touhey
v. Ross-Loos Medical Group, 111 Cal. App. 3d 958, 168 Cal. Rptr. 910, 911-12
(1980)(superior court did not have jurisdiction over wrongful death action where
cruise ship passenger died on land one year after sustaining injuries); Cairl v. The
Boeing Co., 39 Cal. App. 3d 137, 113 Cal. Rptr. 925, 926-27 (1974)(federal court
jurisdiction exclusive in DOHSA action); Gordon v. Reynolds, 187 Cal. App. 2d
472, 10 Cal. Rptr. 73, 77 (1960)(state courts cannot have jurisdiction of action for
wrongful death under the DOHSA).
Faced with this unequivocal authority to dismiss plaintiff's complaint due to lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, the state court on May 3, 1985, without opinion,
nevertheless denied the motion. What the court did do, however, was to stay all
proceedings in the pending action so as to force plaintiff to await the outcome of
the multidistrict pre-trial discovery on all liability issues. It should be noted that
the stay issued by the state court has the same operative effect as a dismissal. In
the latter event, plaintiff would have re-filed his suit in federal court before the
statute of limitations ran, and the matter then would have been consolidated with
the other multidistrict litigation actions as a "tag-along" action pursuant to Rules
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DOHSA in those judicial decisions which have taken the
claimant outside the parameters of recovering pecuniary
loss. Hence, prefatory to this section of the article, one
must adopt, for argument's sake, the assimilation between
9 and 10 of the Rules of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (1982). Upon completion of the pre-trial proceedings, plaintiffs suit
would have been transferred back to its original forum for a trial on the issue of
damages. Id.
Shortly after the Central District of California remanded the Van Ryn action,
despite the controlling authority of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision
in Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 80 (9th Cir. 1983)(DOHSA
preempts state wrongful death statutes), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ren-
dered a decision which gave rise to a direct conflict among the circuits on the issue
of the DOHSA's exclusivity. Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 754 F.2d 1274,
1280-84 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3193 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1985)(No.
85-202). Interestingly, the Tallentire dissent read Section 767 of the DOHSA in its
proper historical perspective and pointed to the Nygaard-type rationale as the only
viable resolution of this issue. Id. at 1289. Clearly, the question of exclusivity
now is a matter for the United States Supreme Court to resolve.
Any fuller discussion of this jurisdictional issue under the DOHSA is beyond
the scope of this article. Those decisions which have dealt with the issue of con-
currency as opposed to exclusivity are as follows: Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbot-
ham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978)(survivors are not entitled to recover additional
damages under general maritime law for loss of society); Moragne v. State Marine
Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970)(wrongful death action under federal maritime law
within state territorial waters maintainable for breach of maritime duties); Nyg-
aard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1983)(DOHSA preempts
state wrongful death statutes); Berry v. Pacific Sportfishing, Inc., 372 F.2d 213
(9th Cir. 1967)(state court had jurisdiction of action for death from maritime tort
within territorial waters), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 821 (1967); Trihey v. Transocean
Air Lines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958)(DOHSA action exclusively under
admiralty jurisdiction), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1959);Jennings v. Goodyear Air-
craft Corp., 227 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1964)(state court had no jurisdiction to
entertain widow's tort action against manufacturer of allegedly defective blimp);
Devlin v. Flying Tiger Lines, 220 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)(jurisdiction under
the DOHSA vested exclusively in federal courts); Wilson v. Transocean Air Lines,
Inc., 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954)(same); Cairl v. The Boeing Company, 39
Cal. App. 3d 137, 113 Cal. Rptr. 925 (1974)(same). Contra Alexander v. United
Technologies Corp., 548 F. Supp. 139 (D. Conn. 1982)(DOHSA does not pre-
empt state wrongful death statute); In re Complaint of Exxon Corp., 548 F. Supp.
977 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)(DOHSA does not preempt state remedies); Rairigh v.
Erlbeck, 488 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)(DOHSA did not confer exclusive juris-
diction on federal courts); Ledet v. United Aircraft Corp., 10 N.Y.2d 258, 219
N.Y.S.2d 245, 176 N.E.2d 820 (1961)(state substantive death statute prevails over
procedural federal statute).
See also Forde, Concurrent Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts in Actions Under the
Federal Death on the High Seas Act, 1969 TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 27; Note, State Court Has
Jurisdiction Over Wrongful Death on the High Seas - Rairigh v. Erlbeck, 6 MAR. LAW. 79
(1981).
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recovery under the law of a foreign state provided for by
an alternate damage provision of the DOHSA and the
"punitive" nature of such recovery that is unbound by
compensatory-type relief.
The strict confines of the Act itself do not provide for
any recovery beyond the pecuniary loss recoverable under
Section 761.121 However, Section 764 of the DOHSA
confers additional rights to the appropriate plaintiff
"[w]henever a right of action is granted by the law of any
foreign state on account of death by wrongful act."' 122 It is
the application of foreign laws providing for specialized
rights of recovery which may give Section 764 a punitive
effect because whatever remedy falls under this Section is
above and beyond the compensatory relief provided by
Section 761.23 These additional claims are generally
121 See Section 761, supra notes 111-119 and accompanying text.
12 46 U.S.C. § 764 (1982). Section 764 of the DOHSA provides as follows:
Whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any foreign state
on account of death by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring
upon the high seas, such right may be maintained in an appropriate
action in admiralty in the courts of the United States without abate-
ment in respect to the amount for which recovery is authorized, any
statute of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
I For example, in certain parts of the world, air navigation is controlled by
criminal law as well as civil law. In the United Kingdom, the 1976 Fatal Accidents
Act consolidated many prior laws from the mid-1800's. Fatal Accidents Act, 1976,
reprinted in 46 Halsbury Statutes of England 1115 (Butterworths 3d ed. 1977).
This Act provides, inter alia, that:
If death is caused by any wrongful act, neglect or default which is
such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the person
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof, the person who would have been liable if death had not en-
sued shall be liable to an action for damages notwithstanding the
death of the person injured.
Id. at § 1.
Moreover, the 1961 Carriage by Air Act provides for strict liability on the part
of the aircraft operator when death of a passenger has occurred during flight or in
the course of embarkation/disembarkation procedures. Carriage by Air Act, 9 &
10 Eliz. 2, ch. 3, art 17 (1961), reprinted in 2 Halsbury Statutes of England 604
(Butterworths 3d ed. 1968).
In addition to these civil law remedies, however, the English system provides
for criminal liability which is applicable only to aircraft operators. A pilot is guilty
of a criminal offense if he flies an aircraft knowing that he is too fatigued to prop-
erly do so. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Article 43 of the British Air
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granted without abatement of the claimant's right to pur-
sue recovery of pecuniary loss under Section 761.24
The case law dealing with Section 764 in the context of
aviation-oriented torts illustrates the interface between
Sections 761 and 764 of the DOHSA.1 25 The central issue
with which United States courts have grappled is reflective
of the threshold question which arises when the DOHSA
potentially is called into play. That is, by way of prelimi-
nary consideration, courts often are faced with a plaintiff's
Navigation Order, supra note 16, art. 43, states that: "A person shall not wilfully
or negligently act in a manner likely to endanger an aircraft, or any person
therein." The consequence of doing the above is two years imprisonment plus a
monetary fine. Id. Moreover, if the death of a passenger should ensue, the Order
provides that the pilot could be convicted for manslaughter. Id. Under this and
other provisions of the Air Navigation Law, mere negligence can constitute a
criminal offense. What is not clear about provisions such as the British Navigation
Order, supra note 16 and accompanying text, is whether they would be viewed as
"alternate remedies" under the DOHSA since they go beyond the civil law sector.
The law of the Republic of Korea provides for "consolation money in the case
of death." Article 752 of the Korean Civil Code provides as follows:
A person who has caused the death of another person shall be liable
for damages to the lineal ascendants, lineal descendants and the
spouse, even in the event that no property right of theirs has been
violated.
Laws of the Republic of Korea, Vol. III, Ch. 5, art. 752 (1983).
Article 752 of the Korean Civil Code is likely to be invoked in the recent litiga-
tion arising out of the September 1, 1983 shootdown of Korean Air Lines Flight
No. KE 007 over the Sea ofJapan. Plaintiffs representing the more than 240 pas-
sengers who lost their lives have contended that the Death on the High Seas Act,
among other laws, governs the resolution of their wrongful death actions. Inevi-
tably, plaintiffs will invoke Section 764 in order to get beyond the limitation for
the recovery of pecuniary loss under Section 761. See also Civ. & Com. Code,
Republic of Thailand §§ 443, 445 (1971).
Under the law of Japan, litigation generally is considered as the last resort to
settling disputes. Traditionally, conflicts between parties have been resolved in-
formally without the intervention of lawyers and the courts. Wrongful death com-
pensation under Japanese law recognizes a dual loss or "solatia": the solatium of
the decedent and that of his relatives. The loss then is computed by formulae
established through the Japanese Bengoshi Foundation, a confederation of local
bar associations. This methodology has received wide acceptance among liti-
gants. An illustration of the conservative nature of the formulae is a damage
range between $400,000 U.S. and $560,000 U.S. for a male medical doctor, thirty-
five years old at the time of death, who was earning $36,000 U.S. per year and left
surviving him a wife and two minor children.
12 See Section 764, supra note 122 and accompanying text.
21' See infra notes 130-202 for a discussion of the cases dealing with the interface
of § 761 and § 764.
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contention that he is not compelled to prosecute his claim
in federal court, particularly when he intentionally has
avoided pleading the DOHSA so as to maintain his
wrongful death cause of action in state court. 126 This
strategy by plaintiffs injects into the litigation the issue of
whether the DOHSA applies, regardless of the manner in
which plaintiff has pleaded his wrongful death cause of ac-
tion. The real nature of a plaintiff's claim, rather than his
characterization of it, governs the question of federal ju-
risdiction. 127 Thus, the plaintiff cannot avoid either re-
moval of his claim to federal court, where appropriate, or
consolidation of the case with other wrongful death ac-
tions arising out of the same set of operative facts. 28
Hence, the courts must decide whether the DOHSA in-
vokes federal jurisdiction to the exclusion of the state
court's jurisdiction or whether the two forums share juris-
diction over the subject matter of plaintiff's action. 129
So, too, when the provisions of the DOHSA are found
to apply to the resolution of damages, the courts have to
determine whether Section 761, which limits recovery to
pecuniary loss,' 30 applies to the exclusion of Section 764,
which governs rights of action given by laws of foreign
countries,' 3' or whether plaintiffs can seek recovery under
both. The latter allows the plaintiff to utilize Section 764
as a safety valve analogous to the recovery of damages
under state statutory provisions unrelated to those com-
pensatory damage issues designed to make the plaintiff
whole.
The factual prototype that gives rise to the interface be-
,2' See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 702 F.2d 189 (9th Cir.
1983); Clinton v. Hueston, 308 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1962).
128 See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981); Illinois v.
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1049
(1982); Nuclear Engineering Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 993 (1982); In re Air Crash Disaster atJuneau, Alaska on September 4,
1971, 360 F. Supp. 1406 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973).
129 See supra note 120.
1") See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
,.1, See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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tween Section 761 and Section 764 is an aviation disaster
over international waters involving the flag carrier of a
foreign country. The early decisions, although arising in
admiralty rather than aviation incidents, viewed the two
sections of the DOHSA as mutually exclusive. 32 The
courts reasoned that when the deaths occurred on a for-
eign vessel, the claimants did not have the option of suing
under both sections of the DOHSA. 33 In fact, the courts
were emphatic in holding that Section 761 was not appli-
cable at all when the death occurred on a foreign ves-
sel.'14 For example, in The Vulcania,1 5 the District Court
for the Southern District of New York sustained a libel
under Section 761 even though a foreign vessel was in-
volved. Subsequently, however, the district court dis-
missed the Section 761 claim on the basis that the foreign
law was sufficiently pleaded so as to provide the basis for
the claimants' cause of action under Section 764.136
Hence, the complexion of the foreign cause of action, at
least on the admiralty side, was that of a compensatory
rather than "punitive" nature and was analyzed in the
context of an interface of alternative remedies.
The judicial view of the interface between the two sec-
tions remained consistent until 1952 when the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, Judge Wein-
feld, rendered its decision in Iafrate v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique.37 In Iafrate, plaintiffs intestate, a passen-
ger on board the French vessel S.S. Liberte, became in-
jured and died on the high seas. 3 8 Two suits were filed in
the Southern District Court of New York, one in civil law
132 See, e.g., The Vestris, 53 F.2d 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); The Vulcania, 41 F. Supp.
849 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
,33 The Vestris, 53 F.2d at 855-56; The Vulcania, 41 F. Supp. at 849.
1.14 The Vestris, 53 F.2d at 855; The Vulcania, 41 F. Supp. at 849. In The Vulcania,
the Southern District of New York overturned itself after it originally sustained a
libel under Section 761 even though a foreign vessel was involved. The Vulcania,
32 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), rev'd, 41 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
32 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
The Vulcania, 41 F. Supp. at 849.
157 106 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
'.- Id. at 620.
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and the other grounded in admiralty. 3 9 The court per-
mitted recovery only in admiralty140 pursuant to Section
761 of the DOHSA, although the death occurred on the
vessel of a foreign carrier. 14  Despite an inadequate
pleading for recovery under Section 764, the court did
not welcome the potential confrontation between Sec-
tions 761 and 764. Instead, the court concluded that
"[f]oreign law [pursuant to Section 764 of the DOHSA] is
a matter of fact which must be pleaded and proved."' 14 2
This rationale shielded the court from having to deter-
mine the issue of exclusivity as it existed between the two
sections of the DOHSA. The court dismissed the Section
764 claim on grounds of insufficiently pleading French
law. "4s However, the court gave the plaintiff permission
to replead his cause of action based on French law,' 44
thereby leaving the unresolved issue of multiplicity of
remedies under the DOHSA on the doorstep of the next
forum where the issue would re-emerge.
Five years after Iafrate, the issue of multiple recovery
did re-emerge, on the same doorstep where it had been
left by Judge Weinfeld. In Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana,14 5 a United States citizen was killed when a
Venezuelan aircraft crashed into the Atlantic Ocean more
than one marine league from United States shores. The
carrier contended that the plaintiff's cause of action was
governed by Venezuelan law pursuant to Section 764 of
the DOHSA. 146 The district court rejected this contention
and sustained the libel action under Section 761. 47 In do-
ing so, the court implied that the remedies provided by
Sections 761 and 764 were cumulative in nature rather
than exclusive:
I.- Id.
140 Id. at 621.




145 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
14 6 Id. at 95-96.
147 Id. at 98.
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But the act as passed preserved not merely rights under
foreign law, but also, by § 1 [761] of the act, gave an addi-
tional right to the personal representative of the deceased
to maintain an action against the 'vessel, person, or corpo-
ration which would have been liable if death had not
ensued.'148
One year later, in litigation arising out of the same air
disaster as involved in Fernandez,'49 the District Court of
New Jersey in Noel v. Airponents, Inc. 150 disagreed with the
Southern District Court of New York. Although the death
occurred on a foreign carrier, the district court sustained
plaintiff's cause of action under Section 761 as the South-
ern District Court of New York had done in Fernandez.15 '
Unlike the Fernandez decision, however, the New Jersey
district court in Noel did not find Section 761 to be cumu-
lative with the remedy provided in Section 764.152
The Noel court did not squarely address the issue of cu-
mulation of these remedies because the defendant moved
to dismiss plaintiffs cause of action under Section 761, on
the basis that the law of the aircraft's registry exclusively
governed the tort liability of the defendant.'53 Although
the plaintiff did not plead Section 764, the court seemed
inclined to select one section over the other and assumed
Section 764 had been raised as an alternate or cumulative
remedy. 54 In accordance with some of the early deci-
sions, the Noel court treated the question of exclusivity as
a choice of law issue and found that all relevant ties with
the litigation were in the United States. 55 Of particular
importance to the court was that the carrier sued in the
148 Id. at 96. It is noteworthy that the Fernandez court, like the Vulcania court, see
supra notes 131-135, was unsure as to whether the plaintiff had sufficiently
pleaded a foreign cause of action and, therefore, dismissed it with leave to amend
under Section 764 of the DOHSA. Fernandez, 156 F. Supp. at 98-99.
.. See supra notes 145-48.
.. 169 F. Supp. 348 (D.N.J. 1958).
'' Id. at 351.
152 Id.




Fernandez litigation 56 was not sued in Noel. The only de-
fendant in Noel was Airponents, Inc, the agency that ser-
viced the aircraft prior to its departure on the day of the
crash.157 Moreover, Airponents was a domestic corpora-
tion and the decedent was a citizen of the United
States. 58 Hence, the court seemingly would not have fol-
lowed the cumulative rationale of Fernandez; yet on the
particular facts before the Noel court, the overwhelming
contacts with the United States diminished the strength of
the interface between Section 761 and Section 764.
With this judicial history before it, the Southern District
Court of New York reaffirmed its position in 1960 when
the case of Bergeron v. Koninklike Luchtvaart Maatschappy,
N. V. 159 presented the issue of double recovery under the
DOHSA. Wrongful death actions were commenced on
behalf of United States citizens who were killed when a
Dutch-operated aircraft crashed into the Atlantic Ocean
while en route to New York from Shannon, Ireland. The
personal representatives of the decedents sought recovery
on three bases: Section 761 of the DOHSA, Section 764
of the DOHSA, and the Dutch Wrongful Death Statute. 60
KLM moved to dismiss the claims brought pursuant to
Section 761 and the common-law claims brought under
Dutch law.' 61 KLM argued that although all decedents
were United States citizens, the governing principle estab-
lishing the scope of plaintiffs' remedy should be that
deaths occurred on the high seas aboard a foreign ves-
sel. 162 Thus, KLM claimed that Section 764 of the
DOHSA applied to the exclusion of any and all other
remedies. 63
156 See supra notes 145-48.
,.7 Noel, 169 F. Supp. at 349.
'" Id. at 350.
159 188 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), appeal dismissed, 299 F.2d 78 (2d Cir.
1962)
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Noting that the question of interaction between Sec-
tions 761 and 764 of the DOHSA "has long been a per-
plexing one, ' " 64 the District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Judge Kaufman, entertained an his-
torical review of the cases that dealt with the issue and
then granted KLM's motion to dismiss all claims except
those brought under Section 764.165 The court adopted
the methodology previously utilized by the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey in Noel 166 and
characterized the issue as a conflicts of law question.
16 7
The court in KLM reasoned that if an American citizen
died aboard an American carrier and thereby had but one
remedy under Section 761, then why should an American
citizen who dies aboard a foreign vessel have two or more
bases for recovery? 6  The court warned that Congress
did not intend such an anomalous result when it enacted
the DOHSA for the purpose of bringing uniformity to the
law of the high seas when American citizens lose their
lives by disaster. 69
The problem with the Bergeron court's analysis is that
the DOHSA's function is served once the Act is applied to
the exclusion of other state statutory or common law rem-
edies. It is neither inconsistent with the principle of uni-
formity fostered by the DOHSA nor an anomalous result
to apply the DOHSA exclusively and then permit alter-
nate remedies of recovery as provided within the confines
of the Act itself.
As interpreted by the District Court for the Southern
District of New York, however, the congressional design
in passing the DOHSA was to ensure that American citi-
zens killed on the high seas had some basis for recovery. 70
Judge Kaufman linked the judicial history of the interface
I6, Id.
' Id. at 598.
Noel, 169 F. Supp. at 348. See supra notes 150-58.
167 Bergeron, 188 F. Supp. at 596.
I," Id. at 596-97.
-, Id. at 597.
170 Id.
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between Sections 761 and 764 to his interpretation of
Congress' intent as follows: "Thus, the courts in lafrate,
Fernandez and Noel felt it necessary to apply American Law
when there appeared to be substantial doubt whether a
cause of action under foreign law existed, in order to en-
sure that some basis for recovery was present."'' 7 1
To the extent that Sections 761 and 764 create a genu-
ine issue as to how they are to be applied, their respective
application to a particular case should not depend upon
whether there is a viable alternate remedy under the law of
the foreign carrier. The existence or non-existence of
such a remedy never should affect the invocation of Sec-
tion 761. Such an analysis is reserved for resolution of
forum non conveniens issues, i.e., choosing appropriate fora
for plaintiffs to seek proper relief. Hence, the real ques-
tion proposed by the two damage sections of the DOHSA
is whether a viable additional remedy exists under the law
of the foreign carrier and, if it does, should it be permit-
ted over and above the compensatory remedy provided to
plaintiff pursuant to Section 761. Under the Bergeron
court analysis, however, Section 761 is interpreted out of
context as a fall-back provision to be used only when no
other remedy exists to afford plaintiff recoverable
damages.
Depiction of the interface as a choice of law analysis ex-
tracts the punitive element presented by Section 764 of
the DOHSA. As a practical matter, this section has come
to be utilized by plaintiffs as a method of recovery over
and above Section 761. Both the realistic interpretation
and practical effect of Section 764 can only be derived
from the unreported cases that settle out of court. When
the lives of American citizens are lost on the high seas,
plaintiffs will plead Section 764 of the DOHSA as a form
of leverage to entice a larger settlement from the defend-
ant carrier. Since Section 761 limits recovery to pecuniary
loss,1 72 Section 764 threatens the limitation of the former
171 Id. (Emphasis by the court).
172 Supra note 1 11 and accompanying text.
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provision by opening the door to unlimited recovery of
"moral" damages or "consolation money" under the for-
eign law. 173 In an effort to avoid the invocation of such
provisions and their potentially "punitive" implications,
the defendant carrier often will be more inclined to make
settlement offers that go beyond the scope of recover-
ability under Section 761. In this context then, Section
764, as seen through the eyes of the defendant, is a means
to an award of exemplary-type damages.
Since the Bergeron decision by the Southern District of
New York court in 1960, no significant developments
emerged from the judiciary's treatment of the exclusivity
issue until twenty-two years later. In 1982, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton addressed the issue in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bom-
bay, India on January 1, 1978.174 The Bombay litigation
arose out of the crash of an Air India Boeing 747 aircraft
on New Year's Day, 1978, shortly after take-off from Bom-
bay, India. Since almost all of the fatalities were Indian
nationals, their claims for wrongful death were settled di-
rectly with Air India at the outset of litigation. Thereafter,
the personal representatives of these and other decedents
brought suit in various United States district courts
against the aircraft manufacturer, The Boeing Company,
on the theory of negligent design and manufacture of var-
ious component parts and on the alternate theory of strict
tort liability.' 75 Plaintiffs contended that only by com-
mencing suit within the United States could they properly
litigate their claims against The Boeing Company be-
cause the proof of liability was to be found through docu-
ments and witness testimony all located in the United
States.' 76 The Boeing Company, on the other hand, ar-
gued that the aircraft did not suffer from any mechanical
or technical defects; that the crash was attributable to the
17- Supra note 122 and accompanying text.
, 531 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
17. Id. at 1176.
176 Id.
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flight crew's faulty operation of the aircraft; and that the
evidence upon which this theory rested existed exclusively
in India. 177
Hence, before addressing the issue of how Sections 761
and 764 of the DOHSA apply, the court faced a more im-
minent concern as to whether the United States courts
were the proper fora for the resolution of liability is-
sues. 178 Concluding that the United States courts served
as convenient fora for these cases' 79 and that the DOHSA
applied to the facts before it,'8 0 the District Court for the
Western District of Washington addressed the application
of the DOHSA damage provisions.
The plaintiffs in Bombay argued that Congress designed
Section 764 as a means of preserving additional rights af-
ter a plaintiff recovered the pecuniary measure of dam-
ages under Section 761.181 Relying upon Iafrate, 8 2 the
two Venezuelan carrier decisions, Noel18 3 and Fernandez,' a4
and an admiralty case entitled McPherson v. Steamship South
African Pioneer,'8 5 plaintiffs advocated the cumulative rem-
,77 Id. at 1177.
m7i Id. at 1189-91. Upon defendant Boeing's forum non conveniens motion, the
district court determined that the United States offered to plaintiffs the proper
forum and therefore denied the motion. Id. For further illuminating discussion
offorum non conveniens in the context of aviation cases, see Tompkins, Barring Foreign
Air Crash Cases from American Courts (pts. 1 & 2), 23 FOR THE DEFENSE No. 6, p. 16 &
No. 7, p. 12 (1981); Update: Barring Foreign Air Crash Cases from American Courts, 18
THE FORUM 93 (1982); Birnbaum & Wrubel, Foreign Plaintiffs and The American Man-
ufacturer: Is a Court in the United States a Forum Non Conveniens?, 20 THE FORUM 59
(1984).
179 Bombay, 531 F. Supp. at 1176-82. The actions filed in the various district
courts throughout the United States were consolidated for pre-trial proceedings
on liability issues in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Id. at 1176, pursuant to the Rules of the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
-0 Bombay, 531 F. Supp. at 1182-84.
11 Id. at 1185.
182 lafrate, 106 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See supra notes 137-44 and accom-
panying text.
18s Noel, 169 F. Supp. 348 (D.N.J. 1958). See supra notes 150-58 and accompany-
ing text.
- Fernandez, 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See supra notes 145-48 and ac-
companying text.
in., 321 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. Va. 1971). This case is discussed by the district court
in Bombay, 531 F. Supp. at 1185-86.
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edy theory originally pronounced in 1957 by the Southern
District of New York court in Fernandez.'86 The Boeing
Company strongly contested plaintiffs' theory and argued
that the interface between Sections 761 and 764 of the
DOHSA represented nothing more than a choice of law
question for the court to resolve. 87 The court did not
adopt the strict interpretation of the DOHSA advanced by
Boeing, but did agree with Boeing that the respective
remedies provided by Section 761 and Section 764 were
neither concurrent nor cumulative. 88
The District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton drew heavily from the Bergeron decision which held
that there is no warrant in the statutory language or policy
for the maintenance of concurrent causes of action under
both American law (Section 761) and foreign law (Section
764).89 Of primary interest to the court was the manner
in which the Bergeron court distinguished the Fernandez de-
cision, 90 considering that both Bergeron and Fernandez em-
anated from the same district court in New York. The
Washington district court reasoned that Fernandez should
be analyzed strictly within the confines of the facts upon
which it was decided.' 9' The indicia of cumulative reme-
dies in Fernandez stood as somewhat illusory because there
seemed to be no viable alternative remedy under foreign
law. 192
The Bombay court adopted the Bergeron rationale rather
than a theory of cumulative remedies because there was
"no warrant, whether in the Act [DOHSA] and its legisla-
tive history or in principles of logic and fairness, for such
a construction [as that postulated by plaintiffs].' 93 With
IHo Fernandez, 156 F. Supp. 94. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
187 Bombay, 531 F. Supp. at 1186.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 1186-88 (discussing Bergeron, 188 F. Supp. at 597).
I'm Fernandez, 156 F. Supp. at 94.
19 Bombay, 531 F. Supp. at 1186.
192 Id. at 1187 (citing Bergeron, 188 F. Supp. at 596. "Thus, to guard against this
possibility, a cause of action under Section 1 [761] was found [in Fernandez]".
Id.).
93 Bombay, 531 F. Supp. at 1188.
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the Fernandez decision distinguishable because it did not
offer two viable remedies from which to choose, the
Washington district court had to decide whether the law
of the United States applied over the law of India. 94 The
Bombay court utilized the choice of law analysis enunciated
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Lauritzen v.
Larsen,' 95 whereby the applicability of maritime law in a
given case is determined by ascertaining and valuing
points of contact between the transaction and the states
whose competing laws are involved.196 Whether Lauritzen
is applicable when the DOHSA is involved is an issue not
yet resolved by the circuits. 197 However, the general con-
sensus among those courts that have dealt with the issue
is that the choice of law principles of Lauritzen are equally
applicable to claims brought pursuant to the DOHSA. 9
Interestingly, by adopting the Lauritzen approach for
DOHSA cases, the Bombay court digressed from the real
issue as to whether Sections 761 and 764 were mutually
exclusive remedies. Those cases holding the choice of law
analysis from Lauritzen applicable to the DOHSA involved
a conflict between state law and the application of the
DOHSA itself.199 None of the DOHSA cases invoking
Lauritzen utilized the choice of law analysis for the purpose
of determining whether the two damage provisions of the
DOHSA were mutually exclusive. To that extent, the Lau-
ritzen principles distort the precise nature of the issue
presented by Sections 761 and 764 vis-a-vis the scope of
recoverable damages.
The Lauritzen decision espoused a multi-factor contact
examination. Seven points of contact were enumerated as
11,4 Id. at 1188-91.
345 U.S. 571 (1953).
Bombay, 531 F. Supp. at 1188 (citing Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 582).
1117 Id.
'11 See DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 894, 900-02 (3d Cir. 1977); Fitzger-
ald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 454 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052
(1976); Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464, 467-68 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 908 (1967).
"9 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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follows: 1) the place of the wrongful act; 2) the law of the
flag; 3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured; 4) the
allegiance of the shipowner; 5) the place of contract;
6) the inaccessibility of a foreign forum; and 7) the law of
the forum.2 0 0 From this analysis, the Supreme Court in
Lauritzen determined what substantive law should apply to
govern the rights of the parties to the litigation. The
multi-factor test was not utilized-nor was it intended to
be utilized-to determine whether alternate remedies under
the DOHSA should be applied in cumulative or exclusive
fashion. Nevertheless, having invoked the Lauritzen ra-
tionale, thereby concluding that the law of India prevailed
over the law of the United States,2 0 ' the Bombay court
found Section 764 to be the exclusive remedy available to
plaintiffs' claims for recovery.20 2 As such, this protracted
choice of law analysis disfigured the interface between
Sections 761 and 764 and totally distorted the issue of
whether the latter of the two DOHSA remedy provisions
is effectually "punitive" in nature.
From the judicial treatment of the DOHSA in the con-
text of punitive awards in aviation disaster cases, what can
be gleaned is that the courts are more inclined to treat
Section 764 as an "additional" remedy only when a choice
of law analysis is invoked. When this occurs, the question
of interface between Sections 761 and 764 transforms
from a legal to a factual issue because the court applies a
contact analysis to "choose" the law of either Section of
the DOHSA over the other. Should the court feel that
Section 761 is an inadequate remedy for the plaintiff, then
Section 764 acts as a safety valve and enters the damage
scenario through the back door.
To the potentially settling tortfeasor who has gained fa-
miliarity with the DOHSA issue, the contour of the inter-
2- Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 588-92. In 1970, the Supreme Court added an eighth
factor: the carrier's (or shipowner's) base of operations. See Hellenic Lines, Ltd.,
v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 310 (1970).
20, Bombay, 531 F. Supp. at 1190-91.
22 Id. at 1191.
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face between Sections 761 and 764 appears in a very
different light on the negotiating table. The many unre-
ported decisions that have involved extensive briefing of
the issue 20 3 have utilized Section 764 as a device by plain-
tiffs to promote higher settlement parameters from de-
fendant air carriers to the extent that the law of the
relevant jurisdiction seems to favor transcendence of Sec-
tion 761.204
Despite the demonstration of recent case law, Section
764 initially is raised in aviation litigation where the
DOHSA is applicable as an "alternate" remedy. Plaintiffs
often are asked in preliminary interrogatories what law
they will contend is relevant to the issue of recoverable
damages. Their answer not only puts the defendant on
notice that plaintiffs will seek damages beyond the scope
of Section 761, but also implicitly plants in the mind of
the defendant that this unknown quantity of damages
under Section 764 potentially will serve plaintiffs as a pu-
nitive-type remedy, in the sense that the particular foreign
state whose law is invoked may not limit recovery of dam-
ages to "compensatory" factors.
Citing the applicability of foreign law in answers to in-
terrogatories sends defense counsel into the cases that
have dealt with the issue of how Section 764 should be
interpreted. While the more recent decisions20 5 have
been inclined to utilize Section 764 as an alternative to
Section 761, the defendant still must weigh the counter-
vailing considerations which may demonstrate over-
whelming contacts between plaintiffs and the foreign
state. But, the choice of law analysis befits resolution of a
different issue: whether the DOHSA should apply at all
and not whether the two remedies provided within the Act
20.3 See, e.g., In re Korean Air Lines Disaster on September 1, 1983, 575 F. Supp.
342 (J.P.M.D.L. 1983). See supra note 120.
2( Unlike the implications of a wilful misconduct finding under the Warsaw
Convention, which is limited to the air carrier only, the invocation of Section 764
of the DOHSA is applicable to any party defendant and not merely to the carrier.
46 U.S.C. § 764 (1982). See also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 159 & 174 and accompanying text.
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are mutually exclusive.20 6 Despite this difference, courts
have utilized conflict of laws principles out of context to
determine the parameters of recoverable damages under
Sections 761 and 764.207
Hence, although defense counsel can support an argu-
ment based upon the cases that have viewed the two dam-
age sections as mutually exclusive, he also must anticipate
the type of choice of law analysis used by the district court
in the Bombay decision,20 8 which potentially overrides any
exclusivity argument. While no reported decision has
done so to date, it is feasible for a court to apply Section
761 at the outset and then invoke choice of law principles
to determine whether the Lauritzen-type contacts would
permit application of relief under foreign law. The Bom-
bay decision indicated that the choice of law analysis
would be a stop-gap against this kind of dual recovery.
However, the very misapplication of the Lauritzen princi-
ples to the interface issue2 09 opens the door for further
improper utilization of conflicts principles to discern how
Congress wanted the DOHSA to apply. Once the Laurit-
zen analysis is invoked to resolve the issue of the DOHSA's
applicability, that same analysis is not intended to be re-
applied when the court must dissect the various provi-
sions of the Act itself.
Without the benefit of a more pronounced judicial
viewpoint on the question of how Sections 761 and 764
are to interact, defense counsel confronted with a claim
under foreign as well as domestic law must be wary of liti-
gating the issue. In mass aviation disasters, counsel may
utilize the consolidated pre-trial liability procedures es-
tablished by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
to brief the issue and have the court rule on it well in ad-
vance of a trial on the scope of damages. In general, how-
.M, See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. See also DeMateos v. Texaco,
562 F.2d 894, 899 (3d Cir. 1977); Fitzgerald v. Texaco, 521 F.2d 448, 454 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
207 Bombay, 531 F. Supp. at 1182-84.
208 See supra note 174.
2... See supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.
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ever, the issue may be better left unresolved while
negotiations toward settlement take place, in light of the
danger imposed when a court relies upon Lauritzen to de-
cide whether Section 764 is an additional means to
recovery.
Perhaps proper briefing of the issue, should it come to
pass in future cases involving the DOHSA, will focus more
attention on the construction of foreign limitation statutes
and whether they are considered procedural rather than
substantive in nature. 210 This kind of distinction may lend
more incisive and clear delineation to the real issue of
whether the additional recovery provided by Section 764
of the DOHSA is premised upon principles of exemplary
damages rather than principles which evoke a choice be-
tween two equally viable remedies under the Act. It re-
mains to be seen whether the DOHSA will be judicially
interpreted as a means to permitting recovery of unlim-
ited or, in essence, punitive damages under the guise of a
foreign cause of action.
V. THE STATE LAW CONTROVERSY: DEPECAGE
AND THE ALIENATION OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
The statutory breakdown with respect to recovery of
punitive damages in wrongful death cases provides no
useful barometer for extracting a consensus among the
states. Presently, punitive damage claims arising out of
wrongful death actions are permitted in twenty-two
states.2 1 1 Twenty-three states and the District of Colum-
bia do not permit punitive damage claims in wrongful
death actions. 2  The issue apparently has not been ruled
210 See, e.g., The Titanic, 233 U.S. 718 (1914) (American rather than British limi-
tation of liability statute applied to British ship sued in American courts; limitation
of shipowner liability limits the remedy "in cases where it [the limitation] has
nothing to say about the rights." 233 U.S. at 732-33. See also, Note, Recovery From
Airlines Under the Death On The High Seas Act: A Conflicts Rule Suggested, 67 YALE LJ.
1445, 1448 (1958).
21 1 J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, supra note 6, at 19 & n.5.
212 Id. at § 5.19 & n.4.
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upon (at least in a reported decision) in the remaining
four states.213 Furthermore, a close examination of the
thirteen judicial circuits does not offer any general princi-
ples as to whether the permissibility of punitive damage
claims is affected by regional and socioeconomic
considerations.2 14
In every jurisdiction of the United States where punitive
damage claims are allowed, the standard of conduct by
which to justify a punitive damage award has received
either judicial or legislative delineation.21 5 The trier of
fact who must apply the standard to the facts before him,
however, is faced with broad terminology which varies
widely from one state to another. Although a majority of
the states that permit punitive damage claims require a
showing of either malice or ill motive,2 t6 there are some
states that permit recovery of punitive damages on the ba-
sis of less definable conduct that is "atrocious" or charac-
teristic of flagrancy and oppression.21 7 It is this latter
standard which digresses from the element of conscious-
ness and aligns punitive damage principles with legal the-
ories of deterrence in criminal law. In such instances, an
award of punitive damages can become justified by inad-
2, These states are Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Rhode Island and Vermont.
Id. at § 5.19 & n.7.
214 Of the thirteen circuits, only the states belonging to the Third Circuit (Penn-
sylvania, NewJersey and Delaware) are in agreement among themselves that puni-
tive damages are not allowed in wrongful death actions. See generally Kenney,
Punitive Damages in Aviation Cases: Solving the Insurance Coverage Dilemma, 48 J. AIR.
L. & CoM. 753, 754-56 (1983). In the Seventh Circuit, Illinois and Wisconsin
agree that punitive damages should be disallowed, however the state of Indiana
has no authority on the issue. In the Second Circuit, only New York has decided
the issue (in favor of permitting punitive damage claims) while the states of Con-
necticut and Vermont have no authority either way. All the other circuits demon-
strate a strong split of authority. Id.
21.3 1 J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, supra note 6, at § 5.01.
210 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.010
(1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (1955).
217 See Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922, 924-25 (Fla. 1976); Ellis v. Golconda
Corp., 352 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). See also Smith v. Jones,
382 Mich. 176, 169 N.W.2d 308 (1969) ("Where the act done is one which from
its very nature must be expected to result in mischief. . . carelessness or negli-
gence so great as to indicate a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others."
169 N.W.2d at 319).
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
vertent conduct or several acts of negligence which have a
cumulative effect. Even if the conduct under scrutiny does
not possess an element of deliberation, the trier of fact
can justify punitive damages if the assessment would serve
an admonitory function.21 8
Despite the clear delineation of the necessary standard
of conduct as enunciated by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, such transgressions in the courts' interpretations
of the Restatement standard depict a sliding scale of con-
duct which jeopardizes the rationale allowing punitive
damage claims in wrongful death cases. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts classifies two types of conduct. The
first classification focuses upon the element of delibera-
tion, where the defendant intends to cause harm to the
plaintiff.219 The second type of conduct focuses not on
the motive of the defendant as much as on his indiffer-
ence to the gravity of those consequences of which he is
aware. 22 0 While the former classification is typified by the
term "wilful misconduct,"'221 the latter is commonly re-
ferred to as "wanton misconduct" or a "reckless disre-
gard" for the safety or welfare of the plaintiff.222
The wilful or deliberative element often is not found in
a particular set of facts, yet the fact finder may impute the
element of consciousness or disregard it completely. In
the former instance, the jury might reason that a flight
crew taking off in adverse weather conditions certainly did
not intend to crash but did not sufficiently appreciate the
gravity of those adverse conditions. 23 In such a situation,
the jury must decide whether the failure of the flight crew
218 Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
2.. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8(A) (1965).
221, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
221 It should be noted that as this term is used to define a standard of conduct
under a state statute, its impact differs from the "wilful misconduct" exception to
the liability limitation regime under article 25 of the Warsaw Convention. See
Warsaw Convention, supra note 48, at art. 25.
222 1 J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, supra note 6, at § 5.03.
223 For a factual scenario which highlights this rationale, see In re Air Crash
Disaster at Washington D.C. on January 13, 1982, 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C.
1983).
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to carry out procedures mandated by inclement pre-take-
off weather conditions is sufficient to constitute reckless
disregard of the public safety. The countervailing consid-
eration for the jury is whether the "flight crew," two com-
plex individual human systems, would be so reckless as to
jeopardize their own lives as well as those of their
passengers.
In the latter instance, the trier of fact may not have suf-
ficient evidence to justify the imputation of some deliber-
ate or conscious motive. The only evidence before the
jury may be several decisions and omissions of the flight
crew, each of which, in and of itself, constitutes a single
act of negligence. But, when viewed in succession in the
context of the flight scenario leading to the crash, the jury
may find, if so instructed by the court,224 that cumulative
acts of negligence displace the requirement of a con-
scious, deliberate act or omission and demonstrate a type
of negligence that is gross in nature.225 This type of anal-
ysis tips the sliding scale over by stacking acts of negli-
gence one upon the other, thereby giving rise to a
punitive liability standard grounded in quantitative rather
than qualitative analysis.
To the extent punitive damages are assessed in civil
proceedings, their justification has stemmed from an as-
22 See, e.g., In re Pago Pago Aircrash of January 30, 1974, 419 F. Supp. 1158
(C.D.Cal. 1976). The instructions form the standard by which a jury determines if
the conduct warrants punitive liability. If the court says "you may find that when
all the acts of negligence are taken together, they demonstrate a wanton disregard
for public safety," then cumulative acts of negligence become the standard for
assessing punitive liability. See infra note 225.
225 See, e.g., Pago Pago, 419 F. Supp. at 1158. In this case, the claims were gov-
erned by the Warsaw Convention and not by state statutory law. Therefore, the
district court allowed the question of the flight crew's conduct to go to the jury to
determine whether those cumulative acts constituted wilful misconduct. Id. at
1 !60. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the jury properly could find
wilful misconduct from the cumulative acts of negligence. No. 78-3591, slip. op.
(9th Cir. 1982).
Although the case is distinguishable from one that is assessed under a state
punitive damage statute, the Pago Pago decision does demonstrate how "stacking"
acts of simple negligence can lead a jury to displace the element of a flight crew's
mental processes which is the touchstone to the proper analysis of punitive dam-
age liability.
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similation of criminal law and its mens rea standard of cul-
pability.226 Punishment on the civil side of the law first
required some conscious thought-making process which
preceded the act itself.227 As the need to find the con-
sciousness element diminished with the adoption of vary-
ing standards throughout the United States, the more
recent history of punitive damage liability in tort cases
represents either imputation or displacement of the delib-
erative motive behind the defendant's conduct. 228 When
the transgressions resulting from wilful misconduct ap-
proach the "gross negligence" standard, the spectrum of
potentially punitive conduct is interrupted. The qualita-
tive analysis necessary to determine whether a defend-
ant's conduct meets a particular state's standard for
measuring punitive damage liability no longer exists.
However large the dispute may loom with respect to the
propriety of permitting punitive damages against a strain
of negligent conduct, a greater controversy overshadows
the sliding scale when punitive damage claims emerge
from one aviation disaster but involve the law of more
than one state. This controversy centers around the con-
flict of law problem which ultimately dictates the outcome
of disputes regarding the recoverability of punitive
damages.
The choice of law question is a threshold issue when the
punitive damage laws of two or more jurisdictions are in
conflict with one another.22 9 As shall be demonstrated
below, the choice of law rules of the various jurisdictions
are so disparate that a highly incongruous result often
emerges against the carrier vis-a-vis the other defendants
226 "Mens rea" is the legal term for a guilty mind; a guilty, wrongful purpose; a
criminal intent. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (5th ed. 1979). See generally W. LA
FAVE & A. Sco-rr, supra note 6, at 192 for a discussion of mens rea.
227 See 1 J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, supra note 6, at ch. 1, 2 (discussion of histori-
cal basis of and current rationale behind punitive damages).
'" See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
229, Kennelly, Litigation Implications of the Chicago O'Hare Airport Crash of American
Airlines Flight 191, 15J. MAR. L. REV. 273, 297 (1982).
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in the litigation.2 30 To illustrate, suppose a mass aviation
disaster occurs in a jurisdiction that does not permit puni-
tive damage claims in wrongful death actions. A suit is
filed against the carrier and the aircraft manufacturer in
State X, whose conflict of law rules yield the conclusion
that the substantive law of the defendant's place of incor-
poration must apply to determine the applicability of pu-
nitive damages in wrongful death cases. If that
jurisdiction permits punitive damage claims against the
corporate defendant, the choice of law rules of the de-
fendant's own place of incorporation will subject the de-
fendant to punitive damage exposure, while the forum
where the conduct actually took place will insulate the de-
fendant from punitive damage claims. If the conduct of
the flight crew gave rise to the punitive damage claims in
the first instance, rather than the employer's training and
operation procedures, then this result is even more incon-
gruous. Since the conduct to be scrutinized vis-a-vis puni-
tive exposure is operational in nature, the law of the situs
of the crash should govern the permissibility of exemplary
damage claims.
Suppose further that the suit originally filed in State X
is transferred to a more convenient forum for purposes of
prosecuting and defending the suit. Under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens, the suit is transferred to the juris-
diction where the crash occurred. While State X invoked
the law of the defendant's place of incorporation to gov-
ern (and in this instance, permit) punitive damage claims,
suppose the transferee forum does not permit recovery of
punitive damage claims in wrongful death cases. Which
conflict of law rules apply: those of the transferee forum,
or those of the court where the suit originally was com-
menced, State X? As established by the United States
21 One glaring example hails from the mass air disaster of an American Airlines
DC-10 near O'Hare Airport in May, 1979. The respective choice of law ap-
proaches utilized by the interested jurisdictions led to the conclusion by the dis-
trict court that American Airlines was subject to punitive damages while the
aircraft manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas, was not. See infra notes 283-91 and
accompanying text. See also Kennelly, supra note 229, at 298-99 n.142.
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Supreme Court, the transferee forum must follow and
adopt the choice of law rules of the transferor.23  Hence,
the defendant is subject to punitive damage claims even
after transfer of the action to the more convenient forum,
where no punitive damage claims against him would have
been permitted if the suit had been commenced there
originally.232
This scenario raises the issue of what should dictate the
choice of law analysis in a punitive damage context. With
the principles of punishment and deterrence as the back-
drop, should the selection of applicable law be structured
around achieving uniformity among the defendants? One
commentator has viewed such uniformity as the "palat-
able result" in determining the applicable law on punitive
damages to be applied to an aircraft manufacturer and an
air carrier who are co-defendants in litigation arising out
of a mass aviation disaster.2 33
Whether the result of the punitive liability assessment is
palatable is irrelevant to the proper implementation of ex-
pansive principles which are designed to set examples by
awards of unlimited monetary damages. The real design
of the conflicts of law analysis is to respect the exemplary
231 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
2 s2 This issue arose in the context of determining what law would govern the
availability of punitive damage claims against American Airlines and McDonnell
Douglas in the American Airlines DC-10 Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois
on May 25, 1979. Adhering to the principle that the corporate defendant's princi-
pal place of business (as of May 25, 1979) should govern the choice of law issue,
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois determined that American
Airlines was subject to punitive damage claims under New York law but McDon-
nell Douglas was not subject to such claims under Missouri law. In re Air Crash
Disaster near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 500 F. Supp. 1044, 1049-52
(N.D. Ill. 1980).
In his opinion, Judge Will of the Northern District of Illinois acknowledged the
incongruity of his decision, noting that the bottom line is that the result is incon-
sistent, incongruous and crazy, "but that is the way the conflict of laws rules
work." Transcript Pretrial Hearing on June 26, 1980, at 8-9, as cited in Kennelly,
supra note 229, at 299 n.142.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this entire portion of
the district court's opinion. 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981). The opinion of the
Seventh Circuit became the touchstone for the modern-day analysis of punitive
damage law in aviation disasters.
2-3 Kennelly, supra note 229, at 299.
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principle such that it is purposefully utilized only when
warranted against that corporate carrier or flight crew
who have consciously turned their back on the safety of
their passengers. When the exemplary principle is in-
voked against conduct that falls short of this conscious el-
ement, punitive damages become a dangerous weapon,
abusively assessed to attain some kind of palatable uni-
formity or to establish an impressive precedent in a partic-
ular court's case of first impression. 234
This section will examine the punitive damage analysis
in litigation which arose out of three mass aviation disas-
ters. The first tragic disaster involved the collision of two
Boeing 747 jet aircraft on the airport runway at Tenerife
in the Canary Islands on March 27, 1977. The second in-
cident occurred on March 25, 1979 near Chicago, Illinois
when a DC-10 aircraft crashed shortly after take-off from
Chicago O'Hare Airport. The last and most recent disas-
ter discussed in this section took place near Washington,
D.C. when a Boeing 737 aircraft crashed into the Potomac
River shortly after its take-off from Washington National
Airport on January 13, 1982. In these three instances,
nearly 1,000 lives were lost.
As these cases will show, the most recent judicial view-
point on the issue of punitive liability in aviation cases has
been an exhibit of respect for the exemplary principle.
The reason behind this trend is not often identifiable,
however, because the analysis of each jurisdiction's treat-
ment of a defendant's culpability is visibly complex. Oft-
entimes, the intricacy of the analysis breeds nothing more
than judicial dissipation. Through the mesh of divergent
analytical models, however, a touchstone to the proper
treatment of the exemplary principle has emerged in a
handful of reported decisions where the courts have fo-
cused more of their attention on the pure facts of the par-
ticular case at hand rather than simply trying to attain a
palatable result. Thus, the goal of attaining a palatable
2" See, e.g., In re Mexico City Air Crash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400 (9th
Cir. 1983). See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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result has, in the recent judicial trend, been outweighed
by the desire to refine the more popular depecage
principle.
The pure factual analysis, which avoids overbreadth and
looks at each issue independently of all others, is
grounded in the principle of "depecage. ' ' 235 As an out-
growth of depecage, some courts have chosen to expound
upon the intricacy further and classify the potentially pu-
nitive conduct as extraterritorial to the situs of the disas-
ter.23 6 Yet, as sophisticated as the terminology has
become, this recent judicial outlook must be credited with
incorporating pragmatism into the law of punitive dam-
ages, particularly where the need for a practical solution is
pressing: a flight regime wherein life turns to death in a
split second. It is in such a factual scenario that the ele-
ment of deliberate decision-making seems gravely dis-
placed and "palatability" of results flies in the face of
logic.
In the 1978 decision of Sibley v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines
(Koninklike Luchtvaart Maatschappi N. V ),237 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New
York introduced what subsequently became known as
depecage. Wrongful death actions were consolidated in
2.5 See Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
58 (1973).
2- 6 The seminal decision which introduced the concept of extraterritoriality is In
re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594, 633
(7th Cir. 1982).
27 454 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Although a prior decision from the
Southern District of New York pronounced the importance of "issue" focus in the
choice of appropriate damage laws, that case did not deal with punitive damages.
In Gordon v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the district
court refused to provide a more elaborate remedy under Florida law to plaintiff
for the death of her husband. Although the crash occurred in Florida and the
carrier had its principal place of business there, the court reasoned that to select
the appropriate law on remedies rather than on liability, plaintiff's residency in
New York-which had nothing to do with the issue of the carrier's culpability-
must be invoked to limit plaintiff's recovery because the state's policy was to "pro-
tect its [New York's] domiciliaries from unjust foreign laws, not to enhance their
recovery by application of a more favorable foreign law..." 391 F. Supp. at 34.
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the district court in Manhattan 23 8 as a result of the tragic
collision of a Pan Am 747 aircraft with a KLM 747 on the
airport runway at Tenerife in the Canary Islands. Plaintiff
Sibley and his deceased father both were residents of
Massachusetts where the wrongful death action was com-
menced against the two commercial carriers. The plaintiff
sought a ruling against defendant KLM that the substan-
tive law of Massachusetts applied to determine KLM's lia-
bility for punitive damages. 239  KLM was a Dutch
corporation with its principal place of business in the
Netherlands.
The case came before the district court in Manhattan
pursuant to a Section 1407 transfer240 and, as such, the
applicable choice of law rules were those of the transferor
court in Massachusetts rather than those of the transferee
forum in Manhattan.2 4' A Section 1407 transfer is primar-
ily aimed at judicial efficiency and the preclusion of dupli-
238 Sibley, 454 F. Supp. at 426. Consolidation for purposes of pre-trial liability
proceedings was effected by 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
2.9 Sibley, 454 F. Supp. at 426. Plaintiff originally sought the same ruling against
co-defendant Pan Am but withdrew the claim for punitive damages against that
carrier. Id. at 426 n.1.
.0 Id. at 426. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
24 Sibley, 454 F. Supp. at 426. The type of transfer has significant impact on the
choice of rules which will govern resolution of all issues in a mass aviation disas-
ter. Section 1407 transfers are for the purpose of consolidating all cases in one
forum for non-duplicative pre-trial liability proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
Once these proceedings have been completed, each case can be transferred, upon
motion by plaintiffs, back to the original jurisdiction where plaintiff commenced
the action. Id. If the suit originated in state court and was removed by the de-
fendant so as to subject the action to the Section 1407 proceedings, then upon
transfer back to the federal court to which defendant removed the action, plaintiff
can seek to have the case remanded to the state court. See supra note 120 and infra
notes 394-400 and accompanying text.
The purpose in doing so is to allow plaintiff his right to try his case on the issue
of recoverable damages in the forum he selected. In the great majority of in-
stances, the multidistrict liability proceedings yield settlement of the cases so
there is no need for re-transfer to the original forum. The consolidated liability
proceedings also serve, as in the instant case, as the blueprint for the direction in
which the litigation should proceed. It was during these proceedings that plaintiff
Sibley determined that he had an insufficient basis upon which to proceed against
Pan American World Airways for punitive damages.
Other "transfer" provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code may yield
different choice of law developments in a particular piece of litigation. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1404 (1982).
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cative discovery; to that end, the transferee court is an
administrative device which should not dictate the sub-
stantive rights of the parties by utilization of its own
choice of law rules.242 The plaintiff and KLM did not dis-
pute that the choice of law rules of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts governed the resolution of the substantive
issues arising out of the crash.
The Massachusetts choice of law standard, like many
other jurisdictions', resulted from a replacement of a "lex
loci delicti" test in the mid-1970's 243 with the more practi-
cal standards enunciated in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws.244 Under the lex loci delicti standard, all
substantive issues arising out of plaintiffs cause of action
were governed by the law of the place where the injury
occurred. 45 The departure from this traditional ap-
proach gave rise to a principle calling for close examina-
tion of the respective interests of those jurisdictions
whose substantive law potentially controlled the resolu-
tion of legal issues.
Plaintiff Sibley argued that an interest analysis based on
the facts before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York would result in applying
Massachusetts law to resolve the issue of liability for both
242 See generally Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); In re Air Crash Disaster at
Boston, Mass. on July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975).
243 See, e.g., Saharceski v. Marcure, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (Mass. 1977); Penoski v.
Penoski, 358 N.E.2d 416 (Mass. 1976).
244 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971).
245 See, e.g., Brogie v. Vogel, 348 Mass. 619, 205 N.E.2d 234 (1965). However,
in many jurisdictions the onset of more practical choice of law analyses failed to
totally displace the lex loci delicti standard. Rather, the long-established principle
drawing upon the conflicts of law of the situs of injury remains as a decisive con-
sideration in appropriate instances. The Supreme Court of Florida's decision in
Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980) is highly illustra-
tive. As discussed below, the Bishop decision became the touchstone for dismissal
of several punitive damage claims against Air Florida, Inc. in those actions which
were commenced against the carrier as a result of the fatal crash of its flight Palm
90 in Washington, D.C. onJanuary 13, 1982 but could not be consolidated due to
a lack of diversity which barred removal from state court. See infra notes 394-400
and accompanying text.
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punitive and compensatory damages. 24 6 The plaintiff con-
tended that Massachusetts held the greatest interest in
having its law applied to resolve the scope of plaintiffs
recovery because the decedent, the plaintiff and his son all
were domiciliaries of the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts.247 Inasmuch as recovery of punitive damages for its
own domiciliary would have been in the interest of Massa-
chusetts, the district court in New York properly recog-
nized this interest as relative to the greater interest held
by the Netherlands. 248 The relativity of importance of the
various interests in assessing the choice of punitive dam-
age law served as the backdrop for the yet unpronounced
principle of depecage.
Admittedly, each state wants to see its citizens ade-
quately restored for the loss of a loved one, to the extent
that a monetary award even performs that function, even
if that restoration implicitly encompasses a design for
punishment of the alleged wrongdoer. The viability of
this interest notwithstanding, it digresses from the real is-
sue at hand when the fact finder must assess whether the
defendant's culpability reaches that degree of severity at
24,i The Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act provides:
A person who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a person, or
(2) by wilful, wanton or reckless act causes the death of a person
under such circumstances that the deceased could have recovered
damages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted, . . . shall
be liable in damages in the amount of: (1) the fair monetary value of
the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recov-
ered . . . including but not limited to compensation for the loss of
the reasonably expected net income, services, protection, care,
assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guidance, counsel, and
advice of the decedent to the persons entitled to the damages recov-
ered; (2) the reasonable funeral and burial expenses of the decedent;
(3) punitive damages in an amount of not less than five thousand
dollars in such case where the decedent's death was caused by the
malicious, wilful, wanton or reckless conduct of the defendant or by
the gross negligence of the defendant.
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 229, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985).
247 Sibley, 454 F. Supp. at 428.
24M Id. at 428-29. It should be noted that had the court adopted the lex loci delicti
standard to resolve the issue of punitive damage liability, the law of Spain would
have applied. Spanish law, the court noted, did not provide for the recovery of
punitive damages in wrongful death cases. Id.
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which punishment attaches. In examining the facts of the
crash against the degree of culpability necessary to find
punitive liability, the most significant interest would seem
to belong to the Netherlands because it must decide
whether to punish its own citizen-defendant. Having real-
ized this, the district court extracted the essence of the
principle of depecage without a specific reference to it:
"[T]he economic and social impact of this litigation will
fall on Massachusetts domiciliaries. . . . However, in
performing an interest analysis, the Court (sic) must look
to the particular issue in question to determine which
state has the strongest interest in having its law
applied." 24
9
The court proceeded to demonstrate that the issue of
"damages" as such is not a single issue to resolve in dis-
posing of a cause of action. By the dictates of a depecage-
type analysis, damage issues must be dissected so that dif-
ferent strains of damages are analyzed in the context of
the jurisdictions most legitimately interested in resolution
of the issues: "The issue presently before the Court (sic)
is the availability of punitive damages. Unlike compensa-
tory damages, the purpose of punitive damages is not to
restore the plaintiff, but rather to punish the defendant
and to deter future wrongful conduct by the defendant
and others. 25 °
The court defined as its mission the determination of
whether the jury should be instructed that damages
grounded in punishment could be considered by the
panel members. Having identified the interests involved,
the district court ruled that Massachusetts had no interest
in punishing KLM because the acts which gave rise to pu-
nitive scrutiny occurred in the Canary Islands. 25' KLM, or
any other carrier in its position, could not be expected to
conform its future conduct to Massachusetts standards
249 Id. at 428, quoting Penoski v. Penoski, 265 Mass. 366, 358 N.E.2d 416, 417
(1976).
2 Sibley, 454 F.2d at 428.
2.51 Id.
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"in order to avoid the slight risk of injuring Massachusetts
domiciliaries there. ' 252 The same principle would hold
true for domiciliaries of other states, particularly those ju-
risdictions adhering to the Restatement's interest analysis
approach.53
In connection with its use of the depecage principle, the
district court in Manhattan discussed an additional reason
why the seemingly generic issue of "damages" cannot be
disposed of summarily in wrongful death cases arising
out of a mass aviation disaster.254  By properly focusing
252 Id. at 429.
2-1 Three months afterJudge Robert Ward decided Sibley, three other wrongful
death cases arising out of the same Tenerife disaster were brought before Judge
Ward pursuant to the machinations of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).Jackson v. Konin-
klijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V., 459 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Three
plaintiffs who filed suit originally in the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California opposed KLM's motion to have all counts of punitive
damages against it dismissed. Id. at 954. Looking to the relevant interests under
California's choice of law rules, Judge Ward only had to weigh the interests of the
situs of the crash, Spain, against the situs of KLM's headquarters, the Nether-
lands. Id. at 955-56. It already was an established principle in the New York fo-
rum that the decedent's domiciliary state had no significant interest in imposing
punitive damages against conduct which occurred either in the cockpit at Tenerife
or at the corporate headquarters in the Netherlands. Id. at 954 n.2, 955. With
respect to those two interested jurisdictions the court stated:
Spain's policy of not imposing punitive damages in tort cases reflects
its judgment that its interest in protecting the financial security of
those doing business in Spain, such as KLM . . .outweighs its inter-
est in imposing punitive damages as a means of regulating conduct.
The Netherlands, KLM's place of incorporation, and principal place
of business, has a similar interest in protecting KLM from excessive
financial burdens.
Id. at 956.
With the interest analysis properly orchestrated, Judge Ward could, without fur-
ther analysis, determine whether the conduct giving rise to the claims for punitive
damages arose out of the flight crew's conduct, whereby the law of Spain would
apply, or as a result of corporate policy concerning training and operational pro-
cedures established by the carrier, in which case the law of the Netherlands would
apply. However, further analysis would become necessary in later cases due to the
origination and expansion of the principle of depecage. See e.g., In re Air Crash
Disaster near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1981). See also In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C.
on January 13, 1982, 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1982); In re Air Crash Disaster at
Malaga, Spain on September 13, 1982, MDL No. 530 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 1984).
KLM's motion to dismiss all claims for punitive damages accordingly was granted.
Jackson, 459 F. Supp. at 956.
..4 Sibley, 454 F. Supp. at 428.
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upon the detailed factual scenario in pan materia with the
advancement of genuine interests in the litigation, the
court realized that not only did Massachusetts have no le-
gitimate interest in applying its punitive damage law, but
the situs of the crash itself may have had an equally insig-
nificant interest. 255
Having dismissed the decedents' respective domiciliar-
ies as bearing no nexus to recovery of exemplary dam-
ages, the remaining analysis of potentially interested
jurisdictions should have been easy for Judge Ward be-
cause there was no need to rule upon the countervailing
interests of Spain and the Netherlands. 256 Nevertheless,
Judge Ward illustrated his grasp of an elusive area of
damage law, explaining how the defendant's domicile may
be of particular relevance because the arguably wilful or
reckless conduct at issue may have originated in deliber-
ate corporate procedures which rendered the flight crew
as helpless as its passengers in preventing the disaster.257
In this sense, what occurred in the cockpit in the flash of a
few seconds before death represented only the tip of the
iceberg, since the culpable conduct may have been com-
mitted by those officers at the carrier's headquarters who,
over a period of time, defined the procedures to be imple-
mented when operational danger appears imminent. In
this context, punitive culpability is "extraterritorial" to
the cockpit and shifts the focus of the prevailing interest
factors to the principal place of business of the carrier.
Judge Ward did not further pursue his analysis of the
relevant interests because there was no need to do so
based on the facts before him. However, throughout both
the Sibley and Jackson opinions, 258 he alluded to the es-
sence of the depecage principle. The court pointed out
that even after disposing of the interests of the states
255 Sibley, 454 F. Supp. at 428 n.6.
256 Sibley, 454 F. Supp. at 429.
257 Id.
2.8 See supra notes 237-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Sibley
and Jackson opinions.
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where the claimants are domiciled, the proper assessment
of the carrier's liability for punitive damages retains an el-
ement of difficult deliberation for any court that intends
to incisively focus on the few facts in the case from which
the most interested jurisdiction shall emerge. 259
Less than one year after the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York decided Sibley
and Jackson, the same issues re-emerged in one of the
worst mass disasters in aviation history. On May 25,
1979, at 3:04:05 p.m. (CDT), a McDonnell Douglas DC-
10 jet transport aircraft, operated by American Airlines as
Flight 191, crashed shortly after takeoff into an open field
and trailer park about 4,600 feet northwest of the depar-
ture end of runway 32R2 60 at Chicago's O'Hare Interna-
tional Airport.26' The aircraft carried 258 passengers and
13 crew members, all of whom were killed. The left en-
gine and related structures fell off the aircraft during its
2" It is not reasonable to expect that KLM or other potential defend-
ants will conform their future conduct to Massachusetts standards
when acting in the Canary Islands in order to avoid the slight risk of
injuring Massachusetts domiciliaries there. Furthermore, applica-
tion of the Massachusetts punitive damages provision would impair
the clear and substantial interest of the Netherlands . . .in protect-
ing its domiciliary KLM from excessive financial burdens.
Sibley, 454 F. Supp. at 429.
Spain's policy of not imposing punitive damages in tort cases reflects
its judgment that its interest in protecting the financial security of
those doing business in Spain. . .outweighs its interest in imposing
punitive damages as a means of regulating conduct. . . .The inter-
ests of Spain and the Netherlands are accentuated under present cir-
cumstances, where hundreds of damage claims have been asserted
against KLM.
Jackson, 459 F. Supp. at 956.
2- Kennelly, supra note 229.
Runway numbering corresponds to the magnetic heading of the run-
way to the nearest ten degrees on the compass rose; thus, an aircraft
landing or taking off on runway 32 would be flying a heading of ap-
proximately 320 degrees. "R" signifies that runway 32R is the right
of two parallel runways.
ld.
'd National Transportation Safety Board, Aircraft Accident Report; American Air-
lines, Inc., DC-J O, NJ I OAA, Chicago O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, May
25, 1979, at 1 (1979)[hereinafter cited as Chicago Accident Report].
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takeoff roll. 62 Initially, the aircraft climbed away from the
runway in a wings-level attitude, but shortly thereafter
rolled into a steep left bank, descended rapidly and
crashed. The impact occurred one minute and twenty
seconds after the takeoff roll had begun.263
This was the fourth worst air disaster in world history
and the worst ever in the United States as of that time.264
Congress and the National Transportation Safety Board,
realizing the need for a prompt and thorough inquiry, ini-
tiated a massive investigation. Only twelve days after the
accident, the Federal Aviation Administration suspended
the Type Certification for the McDonnell Douglas
DC-10. 26 5 All DC-10's operated by U.S. carriers were
grounded until the Type Certificate was reinstated on July
13, 1979.266
The left, or number 1, (underwing) engine fell off the
aircraft while it was in the air 267 because of the failure of
one of the pylons.26 a Initially, the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board believed that a fatigue fracture occurred
in a three-inch belt that was vital to the integrity of the
pylon. 2 69 Later in the investigation, this finding was repu-
diated. The bolt fracture, described as typical of over-
load, was not the cause but rather the result of the pylon
fracture.270 The pylon failure in turn caused the hydraulic
system to fail. When the left engine and pylon separated
from the DC-10, the aircraft had already accelerated from
262 Id.
'26 Id. at 2.
2 Disaster in the Air, TIME MAGAZINE, June 4, 1979 at 12.
2- 44 Fed. Reg. 33,389 (1979) (codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 91, 121, 129).
2- Id. at 42,170.
267 Chicago Accident Report, supra note 261, at 2.
2- Pylons are the structures beneath the wings which are incorporated into the
tail assembly and connect the engine assembly to the main frame of the aircraft.
There are three pylons on the DC-10 aircraft, one on each wing and one on the
rudder of the aircraft. The pylons support the demountable General Electric
CF6-6D engines. Chicago Accident Report, supra note 261, at 3.
269 Chicago Sun Times, May 28, 1979, at 2 (remarks of Elwood Driver, National
Transportation Safety Board Vice Chairman).
270 Chicago Accident Report, supra note 261, at 67. See also Kennelly, supra note
229, at 285 n.61.
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VI speed. 27' Despite the loss of one-third of the aircraft's
available power, the flight crew had no choice but to con-
tinue the takeoff. When the aircraft reached VR speed, 272
the number 1 engine and pylon assembly detached from
the aircraft, went over the top of the left wing and the
fuselage, and fell to the side of the runway.273 Despite the
total loss of the number 1 engine thrust, the aircraft con-
tinued its takeoff and became airborne at 3:03:38 p.m.,
approximately 6,700 feet from the start of its takeoff
roll.274
During an eighteen-second period after becoming air-
borne, the crew managed to maintain a relatively stable
attitude,2 75 an indication that the aircraft was being flown
to gain altitude. During this same period, the DC-10 air-
craft reached its highest altitude, approximately 325 feet
above ground level. 2 76 Twenty-two seconds after the air-
craft became airborne, however, the aircraft's previously
stable roll attitude began rapidly to deteriorate. Five
seconds later the aircraft crashed.277
The numerous wrongful death cases arising out of the
crash were filed in Illinois, California, New York, Michi-
gan, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.278 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407,79 the cases were transferred to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for con-
solidated pre-trial liability proceedings. Plaintiffs sought
27, "VI" Speed is referred to as the critical engine failure speed or the "deci-
sion speed", at and above which the aircraft is committed to takeoff and no longer
can be aborted. See Kennelly, supra note 229, at 286 n.63.
272 VR is the speed at which the aircraft is "rotated", i.e., the action of applying
back pressure to the aircraft's nosewheel off the runway. Id. at 286 n.65.
27. Chicago Accident Report, supra note 261, at 2.
274 Id at 5.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 For a more detailed sequence of the flight scenario leading up to this crash,
as well as for insightful analysis of the various factual and legal issues arising out
of this crash, see Kennelly, supra note 229, at 273.
278 In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 500 F. Supp.
1044, 1048 (N.D. Ill. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Chicago I], modified, 644 F.2d 633
(7th Cir. 1982) [herinafter cited as Chicago Ii in the footnotes and as Chicago in the
text], cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
279 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
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punitive damages from both McDonnell Douglas, the air-
craft manufacturer, and American Airlines, the carrier, for
allegedly egregious conduct in the design, manufacture,
maintenance and operation of the DC-10 aircraft. 2 0 Mc-
Donnell Douglas was a Maryland corporation at the time
relevant to the litigation, with its principal place of busi-
ness in Missouri. The design and manufacture of the DC-
10 took place in California. American Airlines was a Dela-
ware corporation which had moved its principal place of
business from New York to Texas just two months after
the May 25, 1979 crash.
Both defendants moved in the district court to strike all
claims for punitive damages. 28 ' The conflict of laws issue
and the respective conflict standards of the many poten-
tially interested jurisdictions spearheaded the intricate
dispute over the issues arising out of the question of puni-
tive damage liability. The district court looked to Illinois'
"most significant relationship" test. This test analyzes the
nexus between the type of damages being assessed and a
particular jurisdiction's interest in having that assessment
applied pursuant to its substantive law on punitive dam-
ages.28 2 In each instance where the court invoked the sub-
stantive law of that state with the greatest interest in the
issue, it found that interest to be in the state where Mc-
Donnell Douglas' and American Airlines' respective prin-
cipal places of business were located at the time of the
occurrence. 28 3  Under Missouri law, punitive damage
claims were permitted in wrongful death cases.284 New
• Chicago 1, 500 F. Supp. at 1047.
28, Id.
282 Id. at 1047-49.
28s At the time of the occurrence, McDonnell Douglas had its principal place of
business in Missouri and American Airlines in New York. Although American Air-
lines moved its principal place of business to Texas before these issues were
presented to the court, the Northern District of Illinois determined that a corpo-
rate move during lengthy litigation should not affect the substantive law to be
applied. Chicago 1, 500 F. Supp. at 1049, 1050.
2-8 Id. at 1050. The court noted, however, that Missouri does not characterize
these damages as "punitive". See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.090 (Vernon 1949); Wise-
man v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 575 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. App. 1979); Glick v. Ballentine
Produce, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965).
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York, which amended its law on this issue in 1982, did not
permit such claims in 1979.285 Illinois did not permit pu-
nitive damage claims in wrongful death actions. 86
The court found that the law of the state of the defend-
ant's principal place of business should apply.287 Even if
the law of the principal place of business conflicts with
that of the place where the particular conduct occurred,
the former should prevail 288 because "responsibility for
corporate conduct in the form of punitive damages should
be uniform regardless of where the particular operation
took place. 289
The district court then defended the reasoning behind
its analysis, pointing out that:"[th]is result is best
achieved by placing the responsibility for corporate con-
duct at the corporate headquarters where, as in the case
of punitive damages, the purpose of the tort rule is to
punish or deter wrongful conduct or to regulate the finan-
cial burdens on resident persons or corporations. 290
The result of the court's analysis making punitive dam-
ages available against McDonnell Douglas but not against
American Airlines was an anomaly. This seemingly
placed the principle of depecage in its proper perspective:
"The inconsistency of finding punitive damages against
one defendant and not the other is compelled by differ-
ences in the various states' conflict of law and punitive
damages rules and reflects the problems inherent in the
2-5 Chicago I, 500 F. Supp. at 1052.
286 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (Supp. 1985).
287 Chicago I, 500 F. Supp. at 1049.
288 Id.
2'8, Id. at 1049-50. The court illustrated its rationale by pointing to American
Airlines' corporate organization:
American maintained its corporate headquarters in New York, its
operations base in Texas, its maintenance department in Oklahoma,
and conducts business throughout the country. Application of the
law where the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred would require
extensive examination of the particular employees and operations





application of state law to activities of national scope. ' 291
With this closing comment in mind, the district court cer-
tified its order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).292 An in-
terlocutory appeal from the district court's multi-faceted
ruling followed with the intention to "materially advance
the ultimate termination" of the litigation. 3
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, the concept of depecage received its due
attention.29 4 First, the Seventh Circuit court noted that:
"The application of choice-of-law rules is not a mechani-
cal process of cranking various factors through formula.
Critical to conflicts analysis is the notion that we must ex-
amine the choice-of-law rules not with regard to various
states' interests, in general, but precisely, with regard to
each state's interest in the specific question of punitive
damages. '"295 Hence, the court specifically approved the
concept of "depecage", whereby the rules of different
states are applied according to the precise issue involved
vis-a-vis which state has the greatest purpose and policy in
awarding punitive damages.296
Following an exhaustive analysis of the various inter-
ested jurisdictions, the court reversed in part and affirmed
2,31 Id. at 1054.
292 Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982) provides as follows:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not other-
wise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termina-
tion of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The
Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal
to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten
days after the entry of the order. Provided, however, that application
for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district
court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge
thereof shall so order.
Id.
Id.293 Chicago 1, 500 F. Supp. at 1054.
21" Chicago 11, 644 F.2d at 594.
295 Id. at 611.
1I- Id. at 611 n. 13.
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in part the finding of the district court.297 Under all appli-
cable choice of law rules, the court determined that the
substantive law of Illinois applied in determining the right
to punitive damages in all wrongful death cases.2 98 Ac-
cordingly, neither American Airlines nor McDonnell
Douglas was subject to claims for punitive damages in any
of the wrongful death cases, regardless of where the suits
originally were filed, the location of the principal place of
business of the respective defendants or the place of the
commission of the alleged egregious conduct.29 9
The court commenced its analysis by considering those
actions filed in Illinois. Noting that Illinois state courts
apply the "most significant relationship test" advocated
by the Restatement, the court identified two sets of crite-
ria for the measurement of the "most significant relation-
ship" test. ° °
The first set of criteria includes general factors such as the
need of the interstate system; relevant policies of the fo-
rum and other interested states; protection of justified ex-
pectations; the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law; certainty, predictability and uniformity of re-
sult; and ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied. The second set of criteria includes the
contacts to be taken into account in applying these princi-
ples. These contacts are: (1) the place of injury; (2) the
place of misconduct; (3) the domicile, residence, national-
ity, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties; and (4) the place where the relationship between
the parties is centered.30 '
Having set forth the parameters of what would be dic-
tated by proper utilization of the depecage principle, the
court began its factual analysis with the defendant Mc-
2117 Id. at 633.
2' Id. at 626.
Z13 Id. at 633.
- Id. at 611.
-01 Id. at 611-12. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6,
145 (1971).
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Donnell Douglas. °2 The states with relevant contacts that
had to be taken into account in analyzing McDonnell
Douglas' exposure to punitive damages were: Illinois, the
place of injury; California, the place of McDonnell Doug-
las' alleged misconduct; Missouri, McDonnell Douglas'
principal place of business; and, as noted by the court, the
states where the relationship among the parties was cen-
tered, to the extent that this factor could be
determined. °3
Turning to the prospective interests of the states of
domicile of the various plaintiffs, the court summarily dis-
missed such interests by highlighting the underpinnings
of the principle of depecage. The court noted that the
domiciliary states of plaintiffs have no interest in disallow-
ing punitive damages because the decision to disallow
such damages is "obviously designed to protect the inter-
est of resident defendants, not to effectuate the interest of
the domiciliary states in the welfare of plaintiffs. 3 0 4 Nor
do the domiciliary states of plaintiffs have an interest in
imposing punitive damages on the defendants. The legiti-
mate interests of the states are limited to assuring that
each plaintiff is adequately compensated for his or her in-
juries and that the proceeds of any award are distributed
-12 Chicago H, 644 F.2d at 612. In the court below, the principal place of busi-
ness of each defendant was determined to have the controlling interest in resolv-
ing the question of punitive damages against both defendants. Noting that
Missouri, McDonnell Douglas' principal place of business at all times relevant to
the litigation, allowed punitive damages in wrongful death cases, the district court
found that punitive damages were allowed in wrongful death claims under Mis-
souri law and thus could be assessed against McDonnell Douglas. Chicago I, 500 F.
Supp. at 1050.
- ChicagoHI, 644 F.2d at 612. In searching for the "center" of the relationship,
the court ultimately determined that it made little difference whether the center
was Illinois, where the decedents purchased their tickets for a flight originating in
Illinois, or California, the destination of the flight. Neither state allowed punitive
damages in wrongful death actions. Id.
Moreover, this "center" really had little to do with the punitive damage analy-
sis. The mere fact that a relationship is based upon certain contacts arising out of
general factors such as contract origin, flight origin and destination, had nothing
to do with the issue of punishment. Id. at 612 n.20.
.04 Id. at 612.
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to the appropriate beneficiaries.3 0 5 Hence, the court rea-
soned that the interests of the domiciliary states of plain-
tiffs are fully served by the application of the law of
plaintiffs' domiciles to issues involving the measure of
compensatory damages: "Once the plaintiffs are made
whole by the recovery of the full measure of compensa-
tory damages to which they are entitled under the law of
their respective domiciles, the interests of those states are
satisfied.' '306
The court thereby narrowed the number of relevant ju-
risdictions to three: Illinois, the situs of the crash and
place where many of the lawsuits originally were com-
menced; California, the place of McDonnell Douglas' al-
leged misconduct; and Missouri, the principal place of
business of the defendant aircraft manufacturer. In the
interest of depecage, the court addressed its judicial obli-
gation by examining the precise interest of each state with
respect to the purpose of punitive damages.3 7 Identify-
ing the underlying purpose of punitive damages as pun-
ishment or deterrence, the court noted that California and
Missouri held a very definite interest in pursuing and ac-
complishing this purpose.0 8 The interest of the situs of
injury, where the litigation was consolidated and pending,
was comparable to the respective interests of McDonnell
Douglas' principal place of business and the situs of al-
leged misconduct. 30 9
California derived its substantial interest in the resolu-
so0, Id. at 612-13.
so Id. at 613.
307 Id. The principle of depecage dictated rejection of a "grouping" of contacts,
as advocated by the defendants. Id. at 613 n.21.
. " Id. at 613.
.,o. Id. The court stated: "Because the corporate headquarters of MDC [Mc-
Donnell Douglas] is located in Missouri, Missouri has an obvious interest in deter-
ring wrongful conduct in such design and manufacture, even if the actual work
was performed in California. To find otherwise would be to gut the very concept
of corporate accountability." Id.
Under a grouping of contacts, McDonnell Douglas argued, Missouri would have
no interest in the imposition of punitive damages. Since the law of the place of
injury (Illinois) and the law of the place of misconduct (California) both would
disallow punitive damages, so the argument goes, the choice-of-law analysis must
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tion of the punitive damage exposure of McDonnell
Douglas from its vested interest in the economic health of
corporations doing business there.3 1 0  Furthermore, as
the court pointed out, California was the recipient of sub-
stantial sales revenues and income taxes both directly and
indirectly from the corporation's activities within the
state.3 1  But the fact that California did not permit puni-
tive damages in wrongful death claims while Missouri did
became the catalyst for the district court's conclusion that
when the law of the principal place of business conflicts
with the law of the place of alleged misconduct, the for-
mer should prevail.31 2
The district court reasoned that responsibility for cor-
porate conduct should be uniform regardless of where in-
dividual instances of such conduct take place. The
Seventh Circuit used the district court's reasoning to
highlight the depth of the depecage analysis and to
demonstrate the significant interests of the situs of injury
in resolving the issue of punitive damage exposure: "But
the district court's analysis only looked at the purpose be-
hind the decision to allow punitive damages. As we have
discussed, both the decision to allow punitive damages
and the decision to disallow punitive damages must be ac-
proceed as if injury and misconduct occurred in the same state. Thus Missouri's
potential interest would be discounted. Id. at 613 n.21.
The Seventh Circuit responded to this argument as follows:
[T]o say that Missouri has no interest in the imposition of punitive
damages-as defendants do-would encourage rampant subterfuge
and confusion. . . .If courts held that the place of 'conduct' had the
critical interest in punitive damages, then litigation would center
around exactly where activities and decisions occurred. The practi-
cal effect of such a holding would be to require extensive examina-
tions of numerous employees and to require complex investigations
into the precise locations of many areas of corporate decision.
Id. at 613-14. The court realized how this type of defense strategy could lead to
total circumvention of punitive damage exposure: "Corporations seeking to
avoid potential punitive damages would be encouraged to structure decisions so
that no specific locus for a major decision could ever be proved to have occurred
in a 'punitive' state." Id. at 614.
310 Id. at 614.
31, Id.
.112 Chicago I, 500 F. Supp. at 1049.
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corded great respect. 31 3
The court acknowledged that the place of injury is
largely fortuitous in aircrash disasters3 t4 and that the in-
terest of the situs of injury is relative to the significance of
the interests of a defendant's place of alleged misconduct
and the principal place of business .315 The court empha-
sized, however, that these interests do not disqualify Illi-
nois from holding a legitimate stake in determining the
outcome of the punitive damage issue. First, Illinois was
more than the situs of injury. Many other significant con-
tacts were within the state of Illinois. Second, the state of
Illinois contains one of the world's busiest airports and
thereby has a significant interest in encouraging air trans-
portation corporations to do business in the state. Third,
Illinois had a very strong interest in not suffering further
air crash disasters. Fourth, as accepted by judicial notice,
the DC-10 crash sent shock waves throughout the metro-
politan area. Many sectors of the state's emergency oper-
ations were affected by the crash: immediately deploying
disaster units to the crash site, incurring significant ex-
penses in attempted rescue and cleanup operations; and
the long and difficult task of identifying decedents and no-
tifying their respective next of kin.3 6 Once the Seventh
Circuit justified the legitimacy of Illinois' interest, it bal-
anced the relevant countervailing considerations and
thereby forged the nexus to a proper utilization of the
depecage principle throughout the analysis of the punitive
damage issue. 7
Turning its analysis to the co-defendant, American Air-
lines, the court of appeals grappled with the change in
American's principal place of business during 1979. Dur-
ing 1979, American moved its principal place of business
from New York, which did not allow punitive damages at
,'. Chicago H, 644 F.2d at 615. See also supra note 253 and accompanying text.
34 See Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 44 N.Y.2d 698, 699, 376 N.E.2d 914,
915, 405 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442 (1978).




the time, to Texas, which did and still does318 allow puni-
tive damages in wrongful death claims. The plaintiffs
took the position that since the design of a punitive dam-
age statute is to punish and deter, the aim of punitive
damages is to control future conduct rather than present
or past conduct of the corporation. The plaintiffs added
that only the current principal place of business can con-
trol future conduct. Therefore, Texas, the new principal
place of business of American Airlines, should be adopted
as the principal place of business for purposes of the
court's choice-of-law analysis as it applies to American
319Airlines.
Reinforcing the necessity for an issue-by-issue analysis
based purely upon the facts of the case before it, the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals used two points to reject
the plaintiffs' argument and conclude that, for purposes
of its choice-of-law analysis, American Airlines' principal
place of business was New York. First, the court stated
that it is not enough simply to look at whether a state's
interest is legitimate or significant for purposes of the
choice-of-law analysis.3 2' The judicial obligation must go
further and determine when that interest has vested.
Because Illinois has such strong interests in promoting
airline safety, it would have a strong interest in allowing
punitive damages to deter corporate misconduct relating
to air safety. But because Illinois also has such strong in-
terests in having airlines fly into and out of the state and
having related air transportation companies do business
within the state, it would have a strong interest in protect-
ing air transportation companies by disallowing punitive
damages. Thus, the decision made by the Illinois legisla-
ture [to disallow punitive damages] must be accorded spe-
cial weight.32'
3,8 Id. at 617. See TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 26.
-1, Chicago 11, 644 F.2d at 616-17, supra note 253.
320 Id. at 617.
' Id. at 615-16. Thus, in terms of a principled basis upon which a choice can
be made, neither state has a 'more significant interest' than Illinois. "[Hence] ...
it is important to resolve the conflict between states by principled means. Deter-
mining that, all other factors being equal, the law of the place of injury shall be
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Thus, with respect to McDonnell Douglas' exposure to
punitive liability, the court of appeals concluded that
while either California or Missouri, taken separately,
would have a greater interest than Illinois in the resolu-
tion of this issue, the absolute conflict in the laws of Cali-
fornia and Missouri indicates that neither state has an
interest greater than the other's. Accordingly, the "more
significant interest" rationale is of no assistance to resolv-
ing the dispute. Based upon this fact and the finding of a
significant legitimate interest in the state of Illinois to see
the punitive damage issue resolved, the Seventh Circuit
chose to apply the law of Illinois governing punitive dam-
ages. With this choice, the court thereby granted McDon-
nell Douglas' motion to strike the punitive damage claims
in all actions filed in Illinois. s22
Viewing the analysis from a different vantage point, if a
state's interest in punitive damages vests at the time of the
trial of the action rather than at the time the conduct actu-
ally took place, then a state choosing to allow punitive
damages could never deter the conduct.3 23 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
It is true, of course, that New York made the decision to
give more importance to protection of defendants than to
punishment and deterrence. But the issue confronted-
punishment or protection-only has meaning in terms of
the time of the conduct. Otherwise, both the decision to
allow and the decision to disallow punitive damages would
have the effect of providing protection from punitive dam-
ages for the commission of any misconduct, so long as a
corporation timely moved thereafter.3 24
The second point established by the court's finding that
American Airlines' principal place of business was New
York rather than Texas, was that even if the court applied
used provides a principled means of decision which also creates certainty." Id at
616.
322 Id. at 616.
323 Id. at 617.
324 Id.
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a "nerve center ' 325 test, used by the Seventh Circuit to
establish diversity issues, this test would not alter the
court's choice of New York over Texas. The mere fact
that American's operations base was located in Texas on
the date of the crash does not suggest that the operations
center was the true "nerve center" of American's
activities.326
In continuing its analysis of the defendant, American,
the court focused upon the law of Oklahoma, which per-
mitted recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death
claims. Oklahoma served as the place of American's al-
leged misconduct because it is the state in which Ameri-
can's maintenance department was located. Thus, the
court's choice of law included: Oklahoma, as the place of
misconduct and allowing punitive damages; New York, as
American's principal place of business and not allowing
punitive damages; and, Illinois, as the situs of the acci-
dent, disallowing recovery of punitive damages. Tracking
the same argument it made with respect to McDonnell
Douglas, the court reasoned that the interest of Oklahoma
in allowing punitive damages and the interest of New
York in disallowing them cancelled each other out, and
therefore, the law of Illinois remained to determine
whether punitive damages would be permitted in wrong-
ful death claims arising out of the Illinois actions.3 27 Ac-
.1. See Chicago 11, 644 F.2d at 612, supra note 313 and accompanying text.
.2; Id. at 620.
.27 Id. at 620-21.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals proceeded to apply the same analysis to
those actions filed in California, New York, Michigan, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii.
(i) California followed a choice-of-law analysis somewhat at variance from the
approach generally found among the other jurisdictions. Known as the "compar-
ative impairment" approach, this analysis proceeded on the principal theory that,
when the respective laws of two or more states are in conflict, the law to be ap-
plied is that state's whose interest would be the most impaired if not applied.
Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 164-65, 148 Cal. Rptr.
867, 870, 583 P.2d 721 (1978). The Seventh Circuit developed its own criteria
from the "comparative impairment" test a l depecage:
The comparative impairment theory requires that the court attempt to
determine the relative commitment by each interested state to the law
involved. [Citation omitted]. This examination of relative commitment
examines two factors: (1) the current status of a statute and the intensity
1986]
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cordingly, the punitive damage claims against American
of interest with which it is held; and (2) the 'comparative pertinence' of
the statute: the 'fit' between the purpose of the legislature and the situa-
tion in the case at hand.
Chicago H, 644 F.2d at 622.
Applying these two factors under the guise of California's "impairment" stan-
dard, the Seventh Circuit drew the following conclusions:
a) Missouri had a strong current interest in allowing punitive damages,
but the 'fit' " between the purpose of that law and its application to a Missouri-
based corporation suffered from some "slippage" in that Missouri could
achieve a policy of deterrence by means other than the implementation of puni-
tive damages. Id. at 623;
b) California has an equally current interest in its policy to disallow pu-
nitive damages but also suffered from some slippage in the 'fit' because the
underpinnings of California's punitive damage policy-financial protection for
the enhancement of commerce within the state-could have been achieved at
least in part by alternative means (e.g., insurance). Id. at 623-25;
c) Due to the major effect of this crash on Illinois, the situs of injury was
not purely fortuitous. Illinois' purpose in disallowing punitive damages was to
protect defendants from excessive liability. As such, the court found a stronger
'fit' between Illinois' legislative purpose and the facts at hand than it found with
either Missouri or California; and
d) The disallowance of punitive damages under Illinois law was a
'unique' interest and thereby warranted special attention. Id. at 625. All of the
other factors being equal, the interests of Illinois tipped the scales against the
allowance of punitive damages in the wrongful death actions originally com-
menced in California. Id. at 625-627.
(ii) Noting that New York's choice-of-law standard was the functional
equivalent of the Restatement (Second) test, the court ruled that the analysis of
those cases filed in New York would follow the analysis of the Illinois cases. The
New York punitive damage claims against McDonnell Douglas and American Air-
lines were dismissed. Id. at 629.
(iii) The Michigan choice-of-law standard had moved away from the lex loci
delicti standard, but a replacement test was not clearly defined. Id. at 630. Like
other jurisdictions, the lex loci standard was deeply rooted in so many jurisdictions
of the United States that states which considered it outmoded nevertheless re-
tained it for certain cases. See, e.g., Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So.
2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980), which is discussed infra notes 397-400 and accompany-
ing text.
With some of lex loci's roots still embedded in Michigan's conflicts law, the Sev-
enth Circuit reasoned that the place of conduct and principal place of business as
applied to both defendants had equal interests in the application of their laws.
Accordingly, Michigan would resolve the matter by relying upon its strong history
of lex loci delicti. Chicago H, 644 F.2d at 630. The motions of both McDonnell
Douglas and American Airlines to strike all punitive damage claims in the Michi-
gan actions were granted.
(iv) Puerto Rico abided by the lex loci delicti standard and the law of the place of
injury, Illinois, did not permit recovery of punitive damages. The punitive dam-
age claims against both defendants pending in actions commenced in Puerto Rico
were therefore dismissed. Id.
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Airlines, like those against McDonnell Douglas, were dis-
missed in all actions originally commenced in Illinois
courts.
The analysis developed by the Seventh Circuit to con-
sider the assessment of exemplary damages in a mass avi-
ation disaster was quickly used by other courts faced with
similar issues. Just one year after the Seventh Circuit
handed down its decision in Chicago, a Boeing 737 taking
off from Washington National Airport on January 13,
1982 crashed into the icy waters of the Potomac River.328
The flight crew and all but five passengers were killed in
the crash. 29 Most of the victims were residents of the Dis-
trict of Columbia or the states in which the District's sub-
urbs lie, namely, Maryland and Virginia. Other victims
were from the states of Florida, Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, Georgia and Texas.
Litigation arising out of the crash involved more than
seventy wrongful death actions against the operator of the
aircraft (Air Florida), the manufacturer of the aircraft
(v) Finally, the district court had been unable to discern the choice-of-law ap-
proach utilized by the state of Hawaii. In turn, the court reasoned that under any
of the conflicts rules it considered, the law of New York or Illinois ultimately
would apply to the carrier. With respect to McDonnell Douglas, however, the
court found that some of the potentially applicable choice-of-law rules would as-
sess punitive damages against the manufacturer. Chicago 1, 500 F. Supp. at 1052.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the reasoning of the district
court and concluded that where the choice-of-law approach cannot be deter-
mined, the forum presumably will apply its own law. Chicago 11, 644 F.2d at 631.
The punitive damage claims against both defendants were dismissed.
The court indicated some uncertainty in its conclusion, not because of the ac-
tual end result, but due to the manner in which the court reached its conclusion.
Concluding that Hawaii law did not authorize recovery of punitive damages in
wrongful death cases, the court of appeals looked to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
Or CONFLICT OF LAWS to determine whether application of Hawaii law would "not
meet the needs of the case or. . . not be in the interest ofjustice." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 136 comment h (1971). The court found that,
if applied, Hawaii law would contravene neither the needs of the case nor the
interest of justice. Chicago 11, 644 F.2d at 632.
To buttress its finding and diminish uncertainty, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the use of Illinois' and California's varied conflicts standards,
as well as the lex loci delicti rule of Michigan, all yielded the same result in this case.
Id. "Palatability" was a means to an end.
.121" The Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
3 Id. at 1, col. 5.
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(The Boeing Company), and a contractor responsible for
de-icing the aircraft (American Airlines). The litigation
proceedings were consolidated in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia for purposes of
resolving all pre-trial liability issues. 3 °
Plaintiffs sought recovery of both punitive and compen-
satory damages against the defendants. Plaintiffs alleged
that Air Florida did not follow proper procedures for op-
eration of the aircraft in adverse weather conditions; The
Boeing Company did not adequately warn operators of
the B-737 aircraft about operation in adverse weather
conditions; and American Airlines did not properly imple-
ment all de-icing procedures prior to the aircraft leaving
the gate and lining up for its takeoff from Washington Na-
tional Airport. As such, the alleged punitive conduct of
each of the defendants implicated not only the situs of
takeofP3 ' and the situs of injury33 2, but also the states
where each of the three corporate defendants was head-
quartered. Air Florida's corporate headquarters was lo-
cated in the state of Florida; The Boeing Company
maintained its corporate headquarters in the state of
Washington, which also was the site of all design, con-
struction and certification phases of the 737 aircraft;
American Airlines maintained its corporate headquarters
in the state of Texas. 333
The aircraft originally was scheduled to depart Wash-
ington National Airport at 2:15 p.m. as Air Florida Palm
90 to Tampa, Florida. 3 4 The airport was closed from
" 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982). The statute sets forth the procedures governing
transfer of cases for consolidated treatment in multidistrict litigation.
-1 Washington National Airport is physically located on the Virginia side of the
Potomac River. For purposes of the district court's analysis, however, the District
of Columbia was considered the place of departure. In re Air Crash at Washing-
ton, D.C. onJanuary 13, 1982, 559 F. Supp. 333, 344 n.13 (D.D.C. 1983)[herein-
after cited as Washington, D.C.].
..2 Technically speaking, the aircraft hit the north span of the Rochambeau Me-
morial Bridge which connects Arlington, Virginia and the District of Columbia.
The aircraft thereafter fell through the Potomac River, within the District of Co-
lumbia. Washington D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 339.
-, Id. at 340.
..4 Washington, D.C. Accident Report, supra note 1. References to the factual
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1:38 p.m. to 2:53 p.m. while snow was removed from the
runways, delaying Palm 90's scheduled departure. At
2:59:21 p.m., Palm 90 requested and received an Instru-
ment Flight Rules (IFR) clearance from Clearance Deliv-
ery. Between 2:45 and 2:50 p.m., the pilot in command,
Captain Larry Wheaton, requested that the de-icing oper-
ation, which had been discontinued after it became appar-
ent that the airport would not re-open as scheduled, be
resumed by American Airlines' employees.
With the de-icing/anti-icing of Palm 90 completed be-
tween 3:10 p.m. and 3:15 p.m., the aircraft was closed up
and the jetway retracted. The American Airlines Mainte-
nance Crew Chief personally advised Captain Wheaton in
the cockpit of the completion of the de-icing. By universal
custom and usage, this assured Captain Wheaton that his
aircraft was free of snow and ice, adequately protected
from subsequent formation of ice, and ready for push-
back. At 3:16:45 p.m., Palm 90 requested push-back
clearance, but was delayed for approximately seven min-
utes by Ground Control. Moderate snow continued to
fall.
Starting at approximately 3:25 p.m., American Airlines
personnel attempted the push-back using a tug. This ef-
fort proved unsuccessful because the tug was not
equipped with chains and lacked sufficient traction to
move the aircraft. The crew started the aircraft's engines
and deployed the thrust reversers to assist the tug in a
second attempt at push-back. This attempt also proved
unsuccessful. The engines were shut down and a different
tug equipped with chains was requested. During the sec-
ond unsuccessful attempt at pushback, the engines were
operated for approximately 40-60 seconds but the thrust
reversers were deployed for only 15-30 seconds of this
time. Deploying the thrust reversers caused some snow to
swirl around the aircraft, but the leading edges of the
analysis of the Air Florida flight are taken from the Washington, D.C. Accident
Report, § 1.1 and Appendix "F" to the Report, supra note 1.
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wings and the inside and outside of the engines were free
of snow and ice after shutting down the engines.
A different tug, equipped with chains, was then used to
successfully push-back the aircraft at approximately 3:35
p.m. The reversers were still deployed in accordance with
approved procedures, but the engines were not operating
during this push-back. The flight crew requested that the
tug be disconnected before the engines were started. At
3:36:34 the tug-operator told the flight crew: "Stand by
for salute and we'll see ya later." The Captain responded:
"Right'o, thanks a lot." This "salute" by custom assured
Captain Wheaton that his aircraft was ready for taxi and
takeoff.
Prior to approving Palm 90's push-back at 3:23:37 p.m.,
the Ground Controller could not give Palm 90, or any of
the other aircraft scheduled to depart Washington Na-
tional, any reasonable idea of the length of delay which
could be expected prior to actual departure. At 3:38:38
p.m., Ground Control advised Palm 90 to commence its
taxi and hold in line behind a New York Air DC-9. Eleven
minutes later, at 3:49:42 p.m., Ground Control cleared
Palm 90 to cross Runway 3 and await further instructions
from the Local Controller. The Local Controller advised
Palm 90 at 3:52:04 p.m. that it would take off immediately
after the New York Air DC-9.
At 3:53:21 p.m., the Captain (CAM-i) and the First Of-
ficer (CAM-2) exchanged the following comments indicat-
ing their concern about the weather and its effect on the
aircraft:
CAM-2 Boy, this is a, this is a losing battle here on trying
to de-ice those things, it (gives) you a false feel-
ing of security that's all that does
CAM-i That, ah, satisfies the Feds
CAM-2 Yeah
As good and crisp as the air is and no heavier
than we are I'd
CAM-i Right there is where the icing truck, they oughta
have two of them, you pull right
CAM-2 Right out
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
CAM-I Like cattle, like cows right Right in between
these things and then
CAM-2 Get your position back
CAM-1 Now you're cleared for takeoff





CAM-2 Let's check these tops again since we've been
setting (sic) here awhile 335
At 3:57:42 p.m., after the New York Air DC-9 was
cleared for takeoff, Captain Wheaton and First Officer
Pettit proceeded with the pre-take-off checklist, including
verification of the take-off EPR setting of 2.04:
"CAM-2 EPR all the way two oh four"
This subsequently was confirmed as being the correct
take-off power setting.
Immediately thereafter, the cockpit crew continued
their dialogue about the effects of the weather on their
take-off and flight regime:
CAM-2 Slush (sic) runway, do you want me to do any-
thing special for this or just go for it
CAM-1 Unless you got anything special you'd like to do
CAM-2 Unless just takeoff the nose wheel early like a
soft field takeoff or something
CAM-2 I'll take the nose wheel off and then we'll let it fly
off
3 3 6
At 3:58:55 p.m., the Local Controller advised Palm 90
to "taxi into position and hold, be ready for an immediate
[take-off]." Palm 90 acknowledged that transmission at
3:58:58 p.m. Immediately after this exchange, the Local
Controller requested Eastern Flight 1451 to continue at a
reduced speed on its final approach to Runway 36, in view
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At 3:59 p.m., the Local Controller cleared Palm 90 for
take-off and followed immediately with the instruction not
to delay since there was inbound traffic (Eastern 1451) on
final approach at 2 1/2 miles. Palm 90 acknowledged re-
ceipt of both these transmissions. At 4:00:11 p.m., East-
ern 1451 acknowledged the Local Controller's clearance
to land and advised that it was "over the lights." At this
time Palm 90 had only reached a speed of 80 KIAS. At
4:00:30 p.m., the Local Controller instructed another air-
craft, Gulf 68, to taxi into position for take-off. This in-
struction was not given until the Controller had observed
Eastern 1451 on the ground south of the intersection of
Runway 36/18 and Runway 33/15.
The Local Controller did not observe the actual touch-
down of Eastern 1451, which occurred between 4:00:28
and 4:00:31 p.m. However, throughout this 3-second pe-
riod and beyond, Palm 90 was still on the same active run-
way as Eastern 1451. This is evidenced by the fact that




CAM (Sound of stickshaker starts and continues to im-
pact) [indicating the onset of a stall]
CAM-1 Forward, forward
CAM- Easy
CAM-1 We only want five hundred
CAM-1 Come on, forward
CAM- 1 Forward
CAM-1 Just barely climb
CAM (Stalling) we're (falling)337
During the early stages of the take-off roll, First Officer
Pettit appears to have been concerned by some aspect of
the aircraft's performance, although his comments do not
reveal his exact concern. However, Captain Wheaton as
pilot in command was satisfied, upon reaching speeds of
"37 Id.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
80 KIAS, 120 KIAS and through to V1, that continuation
of the take-off was appropriate.
At approximately 4:00:32 p.m., just after the VI callout,
Palm 90 began rotation. At 4:00:37 p.m. the V2 callout
was made, and approximately 2 seconds later the stick-
shaker activated and continued until impact. Within four
seconds from the onset of the stickshaker, the aircraft be-
came uncontrollable.
"CAM-2 Larry, we're going down, Larry
CAM-i I know it
(Sound of impact)" 338
About 4:01 p.m., the aircraft struck the northbound span
of the Fourteenth Street Bridge, which connects the Dis-
trict of Columbia with Arlington County, Virginia and
plunged into the Potomac River. It came to rest west of
the bridge, .75 nautical miles from the departure end of
Runway 36.
The district court began its analysis of the choice of law
issue as it related to the applicability of punitive damages
by specific reference to the principle of depecage: "Mod-
ern choice of law analysis regards an examination not sim-
ply of the various states' interests generally, but of their interests
regarding the various distinct issues to be adjudicated."' 33 9 Rec-
ognizing at the outset that the analysis would turn strictly
upon the basic facts pertaining to each defendant's con-
duct vis-a-vis the location of the alleged misconduct, the
court noted that most of the interested jurisdictions aban-
doned the lex loci delicti standard and either explicitly or
implicitly adopted the test of the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws.34 °
The District of Columbia stands as one of the jurisdic-
'"sId.
Washington D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 341 (emphasis added).
34,1 Id. It should be noted that the District of Columbia abandoned the lex loci
delicti standard before the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws was published
in 1971. See Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao aerea Rio Grandeuse, 350
F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, Tramontana v. Varig Airlines, 383 U.S. 943.
The Commonwealth of Virginia and the states of Maryland and Georgia had not
formally abandoned the lex loci delicti rule.
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tions that did not explicitly adopt the standard found in
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.34' How-
ever, the court stated that in a recent decision, the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals used the factors
enumerated in the Restatement Second in applying the
District of Columbia choice of law analysis. 42 This test,
which incorporated the factors of the Restatement Sec-
ond, is commonly referred to by the District of Columbia
courts as a "governmental interest" analysis. 43
Under the "governmental interest" analysis, the court
is directed first to identify the respective state policies un-
derlying each law in conflict 344 and then to determine
which state's policy would be advanced by having its law
applied.345 Comparatively speaking, the Restatement
formula seeks to determine which state has the "most sig-
nificant relationship" to the occurrence and parties as
they relate to the specific issue under consideration.34 6
Once the contacts of each potentially interested state are
designated, each contact is evaluated in terms of its rela-
tive importance with respect to the particular issue. 47
Hence, as the district court pointed out, the state with the
''most significant relationship" should also be that state
whose policy would be advanced by application of its
law.3 4
8
Most of the plaintiffs represented by the Plaintiffs'
Steering Committee contended that the District of Co-
lumbia's law should apply because of the obvious contacts
between the litigation and the District of Columbia juris-
.41 Washington D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 341.
341 Id. See Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
.14 Id. at 335, 341-42. The court noted at the outset that the choice of law anal-
ysis is premised on a genuine conflict among the laws of the potentially interested
jurisdictions and, in air crash disasters, such conflicts prove difficult to resolve. In
re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
.44 Semler v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D.C., 575 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
-14-1 Id. at 924.
346 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971).
.47 Id. § 145(2).
44 Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 342, supra note 331.
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diction.349 The District of Columbia allows the recovery
of punitive damages in survival actions, but not in wrong-
ful death actions.3 50 Florida, on the other hand, permits
recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death ac-
tions.3 5 1 Thus, in the alternative, the Plaintiffs' Steering
Committee argued that Florida law should be applied in
determining whether Air Florida should be liable for pu-
nitive damages. The Committee noted that Air Florida re-
ceived Boeing's warnings and instructions for operation
of the 737 aircraft and trained its pilots in the state of
Florida. 52 Other plaintiffs asserted that the laws of their
respective decedents' domiciles, Pennsylvania and Massa-
chusetts, 53 should be applied with respect to the issue of
Air Florida's liability for punitive damages. 54 Both states
allow punitive damage claims in wrongful death
actions .
Defendants Air Florida and American Airlines con-
tended that the law of Virginia should govern their assess-
ments of liability for punitive damages. The defendants
claimed that the allegations as to their conduct relevant to
punitive damages occurred in Virginia.3 56  The Boeing
Company, on the other hand, argued that the law of
Washington should govern the determination of its liabil-
3411 Id. at 335.
15o D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-101, 16-2701 (1982). See Runyon v. District of Co-
lumbia, 463 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3-, The Florida Wrongful Death Act of 1973 is codified in FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.16-.27 (West 1972). See Martin v. United Security Services, Inc., 314 So. 2d
765 (Fla. 1975).
-152 Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 352, supra note 331.
353 Id. at 353.
354 Id. The law of the decedent's domicile was originally used by courts trans-
ferring the cases to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
pretrial proceedings.
3.15 MASS. ANN. LAws. ch. 229 § 2 (Michie/Law Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1982); Penn-
sylvania permits the recovery of punitive damages even when compensatory dam-
ages are not awarded. See Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157
(1979); Rhoads v. Heberling, 306 Pa. Super. 35, 451 A.2d 1378 (1982).
5- The Virginia Death by Wrongful Act statute did not permit recovery of puni-
tive damages at the time this crash occurred inJanuary, 1982. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-
50, -52 (1967). This law was subsequently amended in 1982 to permit punitive
damage claims in wrongful death actions; however, the amendment had no effect
on the application of Virginia law disallowing punitive damages in this case.
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ity for punitive damages since all aspects of design, manu-
facture and testing, as well as dissemination of
information for operation of the aircraft, took place within
the state of Washington. 5 Both Virginia and Washing-
ton disallow recovery for punitive damages in wrongful
death actions. 58
The District Court for the District of Columbia tracked
the analysis utilized by the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Chicago359 and determined that the law of the Dis-
trict of Columbia governed resolution of the issue of
liability for punitive damages as applied to each of the
three defendants. n°
Nevertheless, while the district court drew strongly
from the depecage principle which was the keynote to the
Chicago decision, the District of Columbia court made two
important digressions from the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals' analysis. These digressions, though seemingly
at variance with the principle of depecage, actually illumi-
nated the principle more so than had the Seventh Circuit.
This illumination emerged through two observations criti-
cal to the principle of depecage.
First, particularly with respect to the aircraft manufac-
turer, the court found that the inquiry into the interest of
-7 The state of Washington not only has disallowed punitive damages but has
gone so far as to say that the doctrine of punitive damages is "unsound in princi-
ple." Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Products, 436 P.2d 186, 197 (Wash. 1968). The
strong pronouncement against punitive damages is largely due to the commercial
impact which The Boeing Company has upon the state of Washington.
.1" See supra notes 356-57.
." See supra notes 295-327 and accompanying text.
, The district court originally ruled that with respect to Boeing's liability for
punitive damages, the most interested jurisdiction was the state of Washington
and, upon the application of its law, no punitive damage claims would be permit-
ted against Boeing. Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 356-58, supra note 331. See
infra notes 361-86 and accompanying text for more detailed discussion of why the
court reached this conclusion.
Upon motion by Air Florida for reconsideration of this ruling, the district court
overturned its original ruling and held that the District of Columbia's law with
respect to liability for punitive damages would govern Boeing's liability as well as
the liability of its co-defendants, Air Florida and American Airlines. Id. at 337-38.
See infra notes 369-84 and accompanying text where reconsideration of the issue
by the court is discussed in detail.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
the state of injury has two components: the state's con-
nection with the defendant alleged to have caused the in-
jury and the state's connection with the injury itself.36'
The district court reviewed the Seventh Circuit's ruling in
Chicago, and found that the site of the crash for the purpose
of establishing a nexus between the jurisdiction and the defendant
was fortuitous. 62 With respect to the second and more
important connection between the state and the injury,
the Seventh Circuit had found the interest of the place of
injury less than the interests of the place of the manufac-
turer's business headquarters363 and the place of the al-
leged misconduct. However, this did not mean that the
site of injury held no interest in resolving the punitive
damage issue. 64 The District of Columbia, like Illinois,
holds strong interests in not suffering through air crash
disasters and in promoting safety. Moreover, the district
court pointed out, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
had taken judicial notice of the shock waves sent through-
out the metropolitan Chicago area after the DC-10 crash
and added that the crash of Air Florida Flight 90 had the
same ramifications upon the District of Columbia.3 65 Be-
yond the underpinnings of the Chicago decision, the dis-
trict court found the District of Columbia's stake in the
manufacturer's liability for punitive damages greater than
Illinois' interest in the Chicago case:
In Chicago, since Illinois did not impose punitive damages,
that state would not have been disturbed by the applica-
tion of California's equivalent law to that action. On the
other hand, applying Missouri law would not have con-
cerned it either, inasmuch as Illinois as home of none of
the defendants, had no interest in shielding any party from
punitive damages. In the instant case, however, the poli-
-, Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 357, supra note 331.
.162 Chicago H, 644 F.2d at 615. See Reese, The Law Governing Airplane Accidents, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1303, 1314 (1983), which was relied upon heavily by theAir
Florida court throughout its opinion.
Chicago H, 644 F.2d at 615, supra note 253.
4 Id.
Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 357, supra note 331.
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cies of the District of Columbia of preventing air disasters
and promoting safe air travel are advanced by the district's
decision to allow punitive damage assessments in actions
such as this. Those policies would be offended by the ap-
plication of a law such as the state of Washington's [Boe-
ing's principal place of business] which denies such
awards 366
The district court's second point of departure from the
Chicago decision intricately relates to the first point. In
the District Court's consideration of the site of the alleged
misconduct, Air Florida and American Airlines argued
that the conduct which must be scrutinized for purposes
of determining whether liability for punitive damages
should attach is the conduct that occurred outside of, or
"extraterritorial" to, their respective places of business,
the states of Florida and Texas.367 Under this theory, if
the jurisdiction where a corporate defendant resides holds
any interest in scrutinizing that defendant with a standard
of "corporate accountability," that interest is lessened
when the conduct under analysis for purposes of attach-
ing punitive damage liability occurs outside of the state. 68
As such, the entire punitive damage scenario vis-a-vis
the corporate defendants turned upon the single factual
determination by the court of the situs of alleged miscon-
duct. This finding would determine not simply the issue of
liability but, more specifically, the issue of liability for puni-
tive damages. The District of Columbia court determined
that the situs of injury must be examined at least as closely
as the corporate headquarters of each defendant to deter-
mine where the alleged misconduct which could give rise
to liability for punitive damages occurred. 69 Insofar as
3" Id. at 358.
367 Id. at 355.
-" Id. at 356.
-9 As between the District of Columbia and Virginia, it was a difficult decision
as to which state's interest was paramount to the other. Although the court deter-
mined that the District of Columbia was the place of departure, it did not discount
the interests of Virginia:
This is not to say that the Commonwealth of Virginia does not have
an interest in the safe condition and operation of planes at National
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Air Florida and American Airlines were concerned, the
court reasoned that the District of Columbia and the
Commonwealth of Virginia held a concurrent regulatory
interest. The allegations of wrongful conduct on the part
of Air Florida's flight crew centered around their actions
throughout the take-off procedure; conduct which took
place either in the District of Columbia or in the Com-
monwealth of Virginia. Again, the court determined that
the conduct was "extraterritorial" to Air Florida's corpo-
rate headquarters in the state of Florida.3 70 With respect
to American Airlines' liability for punitive damages, the
court used the same reasoning as it did with respect to Air
Florida to conclude that the conduct at issue occurred at
the airport during the de-icing procedures rather than at
the corporate headquarters of American Airlines. The
court concluded, therefore, that the District of Columbia
and Virginia were the most significant jurisdictions for
resolution of the issue of punitive damages as applied to
American Airlines.3 7 1
The District of Columbia court did not as easily dispose
of the choice of law issue with respect to the potential as-
sessment of punitive damages against the manufacturer of
Airport. On the contrary, the circumstances of the Airport create
among the District of Columbia and Virginia a concurrent interest in
this and many related issues. On the facts of this case, however,
since the effect of the accident was felt to a much greater extent by
the District of Columbia, the District's interests necessarily will be
greater than Virginia's.
Id. at 344 n.14.
The court drew extensively from Professor Reese's analysis in The Law Governing
Airplane Accidents, supra note 362, at 1317-18. The Reese approach suggests that
there are three potentially interested jurisdictions in an action by a passenger for
punitive damages against a carrier: (1) the carrier's place of business; (2) the place
where the aircraft was maintained (in an instance where injury resulted from faulty
inspection/maintenance of the aircraft); and (3) the place of navigational error
(when the injury resulted from such error). Hence, Florida and Texas each had a
diminished interest in this issue because the allegedly wrongful conduct took
place outside each state's borders. Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 356 n.38,
supra note 331. As between the District of Columbia and Virginia, both states
shared the impact of injury but the impact was felt primarily by the District. Id.
.70 Id. at 355-56.
371 Id. at 356.
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the 737 aircraft, The Boeing Company. 2 In fact, the Dis-
trict of Columbia court made two points of departure
from the Chicago decision; namely, (i) the close examina-
tion of the nexus between a particular state's interests in
application of its punitive damage law and the actual in-
jury sustained based upon the facts of the case; and
(ii) the concept of "extraterritoriality". These departures
led the district court to reverse itself on its finding of the
law applicable to the punitive damage liability of The Boe-
ing Company. 7 3
The court premised its choice of law analysis by track-
ing the findings of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Chicago regarding the aircraft manufacturer involved
therein, McDonnell Douglas. 74 In Chicago, the Seventh
Circuit selected the law of Illinois, the site of injury, to
govern the manufacturer's liability for punitive dam-
ages.3 7 5 However, the district court in the Washington D.C.
case also noted that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
expressly stated that Illinois' interest in the question of
punitive damages was not as significant as that of Califor-
nia, the state where the aircraft was designed and manu-
factured, or Missouri, the manufacturer's principal place
of business. 76 Because the laws of California and Mis-
souri conflicted on the recoverability of punitive dam-
ages, the Chicago Court could not resolve the issue based
purely upon an interest analysis. 7 The Chicago court also
was unable to arrive at a "moderate and restrained" inter-
pretation of the relevant policies underlying state interest
in determining liability for punitive damages. 7 8 Instead,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reverted to the law
of the site of injury in order to break the tie and to tip the
72 Id.
-17. Id. at 359.
-174 Id. at 352-59.
375 Chicago H, 644 F.2d at 615-16.
.7,1 Id. at 615.
.'77 Id.
-178 Washington D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 357.
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balance in favor of the use of Illinois law.379 However, in
the pure application of the depecage principle, a manufac-
turing or design defect in an aircraft, unlike a navigational
or operational error, renders the place of injury fortuitous
in virtually every factual setting.3 80
The depecage principle notwithstanding, the District of
Columbia district court found Boeing's relationship to the
District of Columbia much more substantial than the
usual relationship between a manufacturer and the site of
injury in a typical "fortuitous crash" case:
[Boeing] reasonably could have foreseen, and no doubt
desired, that its short-haul 737 aircraft would be used for
flights out of Washington National Airport, one of the na-
tion's busiest airports and a station limited by federal reg-
ulation to flights shorter than 1,000 statute miles.
[citation omitted] As the allegations against Boeing con-
cern the aircraft's performance upon departure, it would
not be unreasonable to hold Boeing, with respect to the
issues of this case, to the standards of the District of
Columbia.38 '
Moreover, although Boeing's conduct conceivably
could have caused injury wherever a 737 took off under
similar circumstances surrounding the departure of Air
Florida's Flight 90, "the fact [that] the likely places of re-
sultant harm are limited to areas around commercial air-
ports renders the site of injury in this case, with respect to
Boeing, less fortuitous than the injury sites in cases such
as Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp." 382
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the district court
shifted its focus away from the conflict faced by the Chi-
379 Chicago 11, 644 F.2d at 615-16.
.4- Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 357.
s"' Id. at 358.
382 Id. In Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 418 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Okla. 1975),
afd, 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976), a flight bound for Utah crashed in Colorado
after takeoff from Kansas. Plaintiffs were domiciled in Oklahoma and Kansas and
the aircraft manufacturer-defendant was headquartered in Maryland. The district
court in Oklahoma determined that the place of injury was of relatively minor
importance to the issue of product liability because the crash occurred while the
aircraft was merely passing through Colorado. Bruce, 418 F. Supp. at 832-33.
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cago court. The district court found that both Boeing's
principal place of business and the site of Boeing's alleged
misconduct, where the aircraft was designed and manu-
factured, were in the state of Washington.385 Washington,
therefore, had the greatest interest in applying its law to
resolve Boeing's liability for punitive damages. s4 Upon
reconsideration of this analysis, the court concluded that
the conflict created by the interest of the site of injury, vis-
a-vis the manufacturer in the Chicago case, was even more
starkly present in the instant case:
[I]n each case [Chicago and in the instant case] the aircraft
was built or designed in a state other than the state of in-
jury. Consequently, with respect to this issue neither
state would have had a superior interest in such extraterri-
torial conduct causing injury within its borders, unless one
of those states had a policy of punishing such conduct-
which it would if its law provided for punitive damages.
There lies the rub. This is where the facts of the instant
case depart from those of Chicago. Illinois' interest in the
DC-10 manufacturer's liability for punitive damages vis a
vis the interest of the other two potentially interested
states, Missouri and California, was not as great as is the
District of Columbia's interest in Boeing's liability vis a vis
the interest of Washington State.38 5
Hence, the Air Florida court narrowed its depecage
analysis to whether the interest of the jurisdiction where
the injury occurred was of such significance that the juris-
diction should govern the manufacturer's punitive dam-
age liability despite the appearance of fortuity. More
importantly, the court asked whether it would disturb
state policies to not select that jurisdiction above other
conflicting, yet potentially more interested jurisdictions:
Since Illinois did not impose punitive damages, Illinois
would not have been disturbed by the application of Cali-
-- Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 359.
-184 In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C. on January 13, 1982, No. 82-
0055, slip op. at 46 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 1983), vacated and withdrawn, 559 F. Supp.
333 (D.D.C. 1983).
., Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 337.
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fornia's equivalent law to the action. On the other hand,
applying Missouri law would not have concerned it either,
inasmuch as Illinois, as home of none of the defendants,
had no interest in shielding any party from punitive dam-
ages. In the instant case, however, the policies of the Dis-
trict of Columbia of preventing air disasters and
promoting safe air travel are advanced by the District's de-
cision to allow punitive damage assessments in actions
such as this. Those policies would be offended by resort
to Washington's law, which denies such awards.386
From an operational standpoint, the decision of the
District of Columbia court shifted the focus of the car-
rier's conduct away from activities that may have occurred
during a long period of time at the carrier's corporate
headquarters. The corporate decision-making process
continued until the flight crew of Palm 90 was forced into
making split-second decisions in the final moments before
beginning the take-off roll from Washington Airport.
These facts serve as the backdrop for determining
whether the corporate operational philosophy extended
far enough to assure that Air Florida pilots were able to
spontaneously respond to unforeseeable difficulties; diffi-
culties which could surprisingly arise in a cockpit on any
given day in an aircraft taking off with fare-paying passen-
gers aboard despite inclement weather.
Closer scrutiny of the conduct of the corporation rather
than the "extraterritorial" conduct of the flight crew prior
to the crash may have given rise to a very different result
in the Washington, D.C. decision. Air Florida's liability for
punitive damages would be determined by the law of the
District of Columbia, which permits punitive damages
only in a survival action and not in a wrongful death ac-
tion. Once the focus shifted to the activities in the cockpit
during those final moments in the lives of the flight crew
and the passengers it .became an extremely burdensome
task for the plaintiff to prove that the flight crew, waiting
to be released for takeoff, nevertheless recklessly disre-
.,- Id.
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garded the lives of all those aboard Palm 90.387
The depecage analysis emerging out of the district
court's decision in Washington, D.C. immediately became
an imposing precedent for the state court of Florida. For
procedural reasons, several cases arising out of the same
set of operative facts were still pending in the Florida
state court. Thus, the Florida court undertook the task of
determining Air Florida's liability for punitive damages.3 88
Although the decision in Washington, D.C. did not bind
the state court of Florida's assessment of Air Florida's lia-
bility for punitive damages, the decision nevertheless
served as a strong influence in the determination of Air
Florida's exposure. The District of Columbia court,
through a sound utilization of the depecage principle,
firmly established that conduct which occurred extraterri-
torial to Air Florida's corporate headquarters in Florida
was the operative conduct for purposes of assessing puni-
tive damages. This became the cornerstone of the Florida
state court's choice of law analysis.
By a motion to dismiss all counts for punitive damages
arising out of the wrongful death actions pending in state
court, Air Florida invited the court to consider a two-
prong analysis. First, Air Florida argued, the court should
ask itself whether there is any basis on which to character-
ize the conduct of the flight crew of Air Florida as wilful,
wanton, malicious, oppressive or atrocious pursuant to
the standards by which punitive damages would be mea-
sured in the jurisdictions having an interest in applying
their laws. Secondly, if and only if, the court is able to
make such a finding, then it must determine whether the
18, See generally the transcript of the Cockpit Voice Recorder from Flight 90,
which appears in the Washington, D.C. Accident Report, supra note 1, at Appen-
dix 'F".
."" Several actions, commenced by plaintiffs domiciled in Florida could not be
removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332 and 1441 (1982)
because no diversity jurisdiction existed between plaintiffs and defendant Air
Florida. Without removal capacity, those actions thereby could not be consoli-
dated with and become part of the multidistrict litigation proceedings conducted
in Washington, D.C.
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corporation itself, through its management personnel,
either ratified that conduct under the law of the District of
Columbia or committed any separate tort that could be
considered contributory to the accident under the law of
Florida.38 9 Air Florida argued that if either prong of the
analysis is answered in the negative, the court should find
in Air Florida's favor and dismiss all counts of punitive
390damages.
Harnessed with the strong utilization of the depecage
principle by the District of Columbia district court, plain-
tiffs in the state court actions confronted the argument
that the prevailing interest of the District of Columbia in
applying its law to Air Florida's alleged liability for puni-
tive damages would not be affected, although plaintiffs
were Florida domiciliaries. Plaintiffs knew at the outset
that their cases could not be removed to federal court and
therefore they could complete their actions in the forum
they selected: the forum of their own domiciliary. In the
punitive damages analysis, however, it made no difference
that plaintiffs were litigating the issue in their "home
court" because, as the Chicago and Washington, D.C. deci-
sions demonstrated, the domicile of plaintiffs has little or
no interest in having its law applied when the issue is
something other than compensation to plaintiffs.39 '
In an effort to counter the depecage analysis brought by
Air Florida to the state court, plaintiffs contended that at
least some of the conduct giving rise to the question of
liability for punitive damages occurred strictly within
Florida. This conduct consisted of the training of the pi-
lots of Palm 90 and the receipt of warnings and other op-
erational instructions from the manufacturer of the
aircraft, Boeing, within the state of Florida. 92 Air Flor-
389 Memorandum of Law of Defendant Air Florida in Support of Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability for Punitive Damages, at 2,
Keefer v. Air Florida, Inc., No. 82-6908 Ct. 12 (Tendrich, J.)[hereinafter cited as
Air Florida Memo of Law].
9OId.
Chicago 11, 644 F.2d at 613-16; Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. at 355-57.
". Air Florida Memo of Law, supra note 389, at 12.
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ida's rebuttal emphasized to the court that conduct of the
flight crew relating to decision-making processes of the
corporation itself becomes relevant only after the court
answers a threshold issue in the affirmative. That issue,
Air Florida argued, is whether the actions of the flight
crew itself, just prior to the take-off roll, constituted con-
duct possessing an evil motive under the District of Co-
lumbia's standard or was malicious or atrocious in nature
under the state of Florida's alternate standard. 9 3
Before providing the court with analysis of the relevant
law under each of the two interested jurisdictions, the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Florida, Air Florida contended that
the District of Columbia maintained a more significant in-
terest than Florida due to the extraterritorial nature of the
conduct of the flight crew.394 Moreover, although Florida
was the site of Palm 90's destination, that alone did not
amplify Florida's interest in resolving an issue that had
nothing to do with compensating victims of the crash. 95
Finally, the turning point in the state court's decision ul-
timately to dismiss all punitive damage claims against Air
Florida seemed to be Air Florida's argument that
although Florida adopted a Restatement-type conflict of
law standard, the predecessor standard of lex loci delicti has
not been abandoned in certain circumstances applicable
to the instant case. 96 According to the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision in Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Com-
pany,397 when a Florida plaintiff is not deprived of recov-
ery under the remedies provided by an alternate state's
statutory law, 98 the lex loci delicti standard not only is via-
ble, but is preferred. 99
Applying Bishop to the instant case, vis-a-vis the princi-
ple of depecage, the Supreme Court of Florida's logic re-
-'5 Id.
.494 Id.
39 See Reese, supra note 362, at 1312.
-11 Air Florida Memo of Law, supra note 389, at 12-14.
397 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
.'- Id. at 1000.
3w Id. at 1001.
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vealed that the essential consideration in Bishop of
assuring just compensation of a Florida resident was not
before the Florida state court in Air Florida. As upheld by
the Florida judiciary,40 0 the gravamen of selecting the ap-
plicable law for punitive damage liability was deterrence
of similar future conduct.
Advocating the use of depecage and adoption of the de-
cision in Washington, D. C., Air Florida launched a five-
prong argument. First, Air Florida contended the Dis-
trict of Columbia held a greater interest than Florida in
having its law applied to the issue of punitive damages.40 '
Second, the law of the District of Columbia would man-
date extremely close scrutiny of the conduct of Palm 90's
flight crew. Under this scrutiny the crew's conduct, taken
singularly or cumulatively, would not support a finding of
punitive damages.40 2 Third, in the event the Florida court
digresses from the factual findings of the District of Co-
lumbia court, the Florida court could look to the alleged
misconduct which occurred at Air Florida's corporate
headquarters in Florida and still find no support for an
assessment of punitive damages against the carrier.40 3
Fourth, even if the court rejected the legal as well as the
factual analysis of the district court and thereby found the
law of Florida controlling, the alleged misconduct of the
flight crew would not meet the standard of culpability nec-
essary to establish liability for punitive damages.40 4 Fi-
nally, paralleling the analysis under the law of the District
of Columbia and measuring the conduct of Air Florida in
rejection of the concept of "extraterritoriality," the cor-
porate conduct nevertheless would not support a finding
of punitive liability under Florida's less stringent test.40 5
On the first prong of attack, Air Florida pointed out to
4-0 Arab Termite and Pest Control of Florida, Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039,
1042 (Fla. 1982).
40, Air Florida Memo of Law, supra note 389, at 11-15.
4 2 Id. at 15-18.
4o. Id. at 18-21.
4- Id. at 22-26.
405 Id.
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the court that the District of Columbia looked with disfa-
vor upon punitive damages40 6 and only awarded punitive
damages to punish and deter outrageous conduct.40 7 The
facts from two District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decisions, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. 40 8 and Knip-
pen v. Ford Motor Co.,409 were discussed in detail by Air
Florida to demonstrate the stringency of the punitive
damages standard utilized by the District of Columbia
court.41 o
In Nader, an airline passenger sued Allegheny Airlines
when his confirmed reservation was not honored due to
overbooking of the flight. The district court awarded
plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages. The
basis of the punitive award was that Allegheny misrepre-
sented its booking status, knew it had been overbooking
in persistent fashion, and discriminated against plaintiff
Nader.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the punitive damage award holding that the record
could not support such an award for three reasons. First,
there was no evidence that Allegheny engaged in any
"outrageous conduct": "[t]he tort must be aggravated by
evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppres-
sion."' 41 ' Second, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the record failed to support a find-
ing of discrimination. While the gate agent may have re-
fused to take reasonable measures to accommodate Nader
while the plane was at the gate, the court again concluded
that "no evil or wanton motive" could be deduced from
the agent's conduct.41 2 Third, since a punitive damage
4- Id. at 15 (citing Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976), and Knippen v. Ford Motor Co.,
546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976)); Price v. Griffin, 359 A.2d 582 (D.C. 1976).
407 Air Florida Memo of Law, supra note 389, at 15 (citing Rogers v. Loews
L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 534 (D.D.C. 1981).
4- 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'don other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
4- 546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
411) Air Florida Memo of Law, supra note 389, at 15.
4,, Nader, 512 F.2d at 459.
412 Id. at 550.
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award first requires a finding of malice or reckless disre-
gard for the rights of others, the defendant's motives are
crucial.41 3 The court could not justify a punitive assess-
ment because the carrier was not motivated by a discrimi-
natory or intentional scheme to keep Nader off the
airplane. Furthermore, the court seriously considered the
policy underlying awards for punitive damages, and noted
that the rationale for doing so must be grounded in de-
terrence. On the facts before the court, the deterrence
argument was not pursuasive because the overbooking
policy was regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board
rather than by Allegheny Airlines.41 4
One year later, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals looked back upon its decision in Nader and re-
lied upon that holding to decide an identical issue in Knip-
pen v. Ford Motor Co. .415 In Knippen, the record contained
evidence that the government and industry were con-
cerned with the injury potential of force-localizing protru-
sions on automobiles and that, despite such concern, the
Ford Motor Company designed an automobile with sharp
metal protrusions. The district court held this evidence
insufficient to submit the question of punitive damages to
the jury. The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia upheld the lower court's directed verdict On the
ground that such evidence was insufficient as a matter of
law to support an award of punitive damages. Relying di-
rectly on its decision in Nader, the court demonstrated the
stringency of the standard which must be met in order to
assess punitive liability:
I think what the court said in the Nader and Allegheny Air-
lines case which just came down is that the tort, in order to
support punitive damages, must be aggravated by evil mo-
tive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression; a de-
liberate thing: We are going to go out and get as many
4,. Id. at 551.
414 Id. at 550.
415 546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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pedestrians and motorcyclists as we can.4 16
Air Florida contended that the judiciary's interpretation
of the requisite criteria for assessing punitive liability
made it clear that the conduct of Palm 90's flight crew
could not justify punitive liability as a matter of law.41 7 In
closely scrutinizing the motivation of the flight crew, the
motive would have to be considered suicidal or homicidal
before the state court could find that a factual issue ex-
isted with respect to the alleged punitive damage liability
on behalf of the carrier.41 8
Thus, the court was presented with a purely factual is-
sue of whether the flight crew, who had to make split-
second decisions in order to save the lives not only of
commercial fare-paying passengers but of themselves as
well, could have had some suicidal or homicidal motive.
Without such a motive, punitive damages under the law
of the District of Columbia could not be assessed. Even if
the court determined that the crew's decision to combat
the adverse weather conditions prevailing on January 13,
1982 constituted a form of gross negligence, Air Florida
argued that fair-minded persons would not disagree that
the flight crew would never have risked the lives of those
aboard if they thought there was any possibility that the
aircraft would crash immediately after take-off.419
In the second prong of its argument, Air Florida drew
further from these same stringent criteria to persuade the
court that even if it were to find that exemplary damages
befit the flight crew's conduct, there was no "corporate
ratification" of that conduct. 420 To buttress its position,
Air Florida submitted to the court a sworn affidavit from
the Federal Aviation Administration's Principal Opera-
tions Inspector assigned to oversee Air Florida's opera-
tions during the relevant period before the crash. This
4,6 Id. at 1002.
41,7 Air Florida Memo of Law, supra note 389, at 17.
4181 Id.
4'1' Id. at 17-18.
4211 Id. at 18.
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affidavit was intended to "objectify" the entire motion for
dismissal of all counts of punitive damages with the affiant
stating, in his official governmental capacity, that none of
Air Florida's operations was deficient and no Federal Avi-
ation Regulation had been violated by Air Florida.4 '
In order for a corporation to be found liable for the ma-
licious or wanton conduct of an employee or agent under
the law of the District of Columbia, the corporation must
either participate in the tortious conduct or subsequently
ratify it with full knowledge of the facts.422 Just as it had
demonstrated how the alleged misconduct of the flight
crew did not satisfy the standard by which punitive dam-
ages could be assessed, Air Florida relied upon the facts
as presented in two decisions, both of which interpreted
the standard of "corporate ratification" in a stringent
manner.
423
First, in Woodard v. City Stores Co.,424 false imprisonment
and assault and battery were the subject of a civil suit to
recover compensatory and punitive damages. The trial
court refused to submit the issue of punitive damages to
the jury and plaintiff appealed. The record in the case
demonstrated that after the plaintiff was taken to the store
security office a store detective threw the plaintiff to the
floor, beat and kicked him, and slammed his head against
a wall. 25 However, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals upheld the trial court's decision not to permit the
issue of punitive damages to be submitted to the jury.
The court of appeals performed the requisite two-tier
analysis, holding that the conduct in question would have
to be intentional, malicious or wilful in order to assess pu-
nitive damages.426 Even if this conduct had met this stan-
421 Id. See also Affidavit of Robert Wiltuck, annexed to Air Florida Memo of Law,
supra note 389, at Exhibit "Z".
42 Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Wood-
ward v. City Stores Co., 334 A.2d 189, 191 (D.C. 1975).
423 Air Florida Memo of Law, supra note 389, at 19.
424 334 A.2d 189 (D.C. 1975).
425 Id. at 191.
426 Id.
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dard, the corporation, through its officers or directors,
would have to be found to have participated in the wrong-
ful conduct or otherwise to have authorized or subse-
quently ratified the offending conduct with full knowledge
of the facts.427 Finally, Air Florida asked the court to take
note that in Woodard, the corporate employer permitted
the employee to continue his employment, subsequently
granted him a promotion, and still avoided a finding of
ratification of wrongful conduct.42 8
The second case illustrating the stringent standard of
corporate ratification under the law of the District of Co-
lumbia is Rieser v. District of Columbia.429 In Rieser, the court
held the District of Columbia liable for the negligence of
its parole officers in failing to disclose a parolee's criminal
background to a potential employer and further failing to
properly supervise his parole, resulting in the murder of
a resident of an apartment where the parolee was em-
ployed. Whalen, the parolee, had not only been previ-
ously convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, but
as a juvenile, also had murdered an elderly woman. Im-
mediately prior to being paroled he was diagnosed by a
psychiatrist as a "serious potential danger." Following his
parole for the assault charges, he was hired as a mainte-
nance man at an apartment complex and approximately
six months later became a suspect in the rape-murder of a
woman and the murder of her small child at the complex
where he worked. Thereafter, Whalen quit his job and
applied for new employment. At that time, his parole of-
ficer, in filling out an employment application, failed to
mention Whalen's prior murder offense, current psychiat-
ric evaluation, prior conviction for attempted rape, and
the murder case in which he was a suspect. Subsequently,
after Whalen was hired at a second apartment complex,
he became a suspect in a third murder at his original place
of employment. Although the parole officer recom-
427 Id.
42M Id.
42.. 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
mended that Whalen's parole be revoked, the Parole
Board declined. Approximately six months later, the pa-
rolee murdered a young woman at the apartment complex
where he worked.
At trial, it was clear that the acting Chief Parole Officer
was aware of the details surrounding the case, but did not
insist upon the revocation of parole. Although the court
assessed compensatory damages for the failure of the pa-
role officers to disclose the background of the parolee and
to supervise his parole, it declined to award punitive dam-
ages, finding, inter alia, no evidence in the record that the
high officers of the District of Columbia participated in or
ratified the act.430 The court found that the corporate au-
thorization must be explicit in order to subject the corpo-
ration to liability for punitive damages; the act must be
ratified by the corporation itself through an officer em-
powered to bind the corporation, and the very conduct to
which the corporation is held accountable must entail
much more than one isolated instance.43'
Based upon Woodard and Rieser, Air Florida argued that
its management neither expressly nor impliedly author-
ized or ratified the allegedly wrongful acts of the flight
crew resulting in the crash.43 2 The corporation, therefore,
could not be held liable for punitive damages absent wil-
ful or wanton misconduct on the part of the corporate of-
ficers. Air Florida recited portions of the cockpit voice
recorder transcript as well as other relevant portions of
the record to demonstrate that the entire record was de-
void of any evidence of malicious or wanton acts or con-
duct which could give rise to an inference of malice on
the part of the officers or the management of Air
Florida.3
The fourth and fifth prongs of Air Florida's attack cen-
tered on the law of Florida. Even if the court determined
4- Id. at 482.
4" Id. at 481.
432 Air Florida Memo of Law, supra note 389, at 22.
4S3 Id.
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that it was not bound by the decision in Washington, D. C.,
and thereby chose the substantive law of Florida as con-
trolling, that law would be equally unsupportive of a find-
ing of liability for punitive damages against Air Florida.43 4
The general principle governing punitive damages in
Florida is that the conduct necessary to justify a finding of
punitive liability in a civil case must be tantamount to that
conduct which would support a conviction of manslaugh-
ter in a criminal case.4 3 5 The courts of Florida draw such
a parallel because punitive liability is cautiously assessed
by the Florida judiciary and reserved only for those in-
stances where punitive damages serve some admonitory
function.43 6 This factor, the application of an admonitory
function, became the springboard for the Florida state
court to determine that under the law of Florida, as under
the law of the District of Columbia, no punitive damages
could be assessed against Air Florida based upon the facts
before the court.4 37
4.4 Id. at 23.
4.- Ellis v. Golconda Corp., 352 So. 2d 1221, 1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
1.1,1 Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
4.,7 There is no reported decision from the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in
and for Dade County, Florida. This was an unfortunate result because, histori-
cally, the facts of the Air Florida crash arguably presented the closest punitive
damage scenario of any mass aviation disaster in recent history.
Exactly eight months after the Air Florida crash, a DC-10 aircraft operated by
Spantax, S.A. crashed at Malaga, Spain. The suits for wrongful death arising out
of the crash were consolidated in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
Spantax moved to dismiss all counts of punitive damages which arose out of the
allegedly reckless operation of the aircraft. Relying heavily upon Judge Ward's
decision from the Southern District of New York in Sibley v. KLM, 545 F. Supp.
425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), supra note 237, Spantax argued that the choice of law rules
of New York yielded the law of Spain as controlling on the issue of liability for
punitive damages. Memorandum of Law of Spantax in Support of Motion to
Strike all Claims for Punitive Damages, at 8, MDL No. 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). As
the "depecage" principle applied, Spantax argued, the principal purpose to be
achieved by awarding punitive damages is to deter defendants from the commis-
sion of intentional torts. Id. at 13. (citing the Washington D.C. decision, 559 F.
Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983)). Spantax demonstrated to the court that a Spanish cor-
poration is not likely to conform its future conduct to the standards of a foreign
jurisdiction and, therefore, the law of Spain, which disallowed punitive damages,
controlled resolution of the issue. Id. at 20. The motion to dismiss all claims for
punitive damages against Spantax was granted by the district court.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although most people are familiar with Dickens' Christ-
mas allegory, how many realize the statement of the
human condition underlying the classic tale. In stave four
of A Christmas Carol, Scrooge is led to his own tombstone
and, faced with the reality of his own death, pleads,
"Good Spirit . . .your nature intercedes for me . . .As-
sure me that I yet may change these shadows you have
shown me, by an altered life." 438
In the book of prose where Scrooge resided, the course
of man's wrongdoings foreshadowed certain ends, but
when the courses were departed from, the ends would
change. For those like us who do not reside in the book
of prose, however, the hands of time cannot be turned
back and wrongful conduct cannot be erased in the wake
of each individual's own human finitude. Everyone pos-
sesses an infinite awareness that death is final, irreversible
and consequently, conduct leading up to it can only be
judged through retrospect.
And isn't that the rub? No one of us would consciously
place ourselves in the throes of destruction and deliber-
ately orchestrate the demise of our own existence. When
we become the fact finders who must determine whether a
flight crew deserved punishment either directly or
through the corporate carrier, the dualistic struggle
presented by the finality of human finitude arguably taints
whatever justification exists for assessing exemplary dam-
ages in operational aviation incidents. Mass aviation di-
sasters do not strike at the heart of those elements within
the criminal law sector that are satisfied by the imposition
of punishment and whatever societal gains attach thereto.
Perhaps the proper alignment of the punitive rationale
with civil aviation rests in preventive penalties specifically
designed to force the carrier's hand to implement "air-
tight" safeguards for its flight crews. The problem is,
even in procuring more efficient overtraining and accu-
4-1" Charles Dickens, A Christmas Carol (1843).
4111986]
412 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
rate simulation of impending doom, no one can be sure
how the human system will respond when the dress re-
hearsal is over. The complexities of the human mind dic-
tate a closer understanding of the appellation "pilot
error" before punishment is appropriately assessed
against the carrier.
The various scenarios portrayed throughout this article
do show that "wilful misconduct" under the Warsaw Con-
vention has seldom been assessed, regardless of whether
that standard amounts to punitive damage liability. In at
least one of the Warsaw cases finding wilful misconduct,
the flight crew survived. 43 9 Arguably, this factor serves as
the impetus to view the flight crew as possessing the
power over the passengers' fate. In aviation disasters fall-
ing under the Death on the High Seas Act, the judicial
inclination to go beyond the parameters of the Act to per-
mit recovery under foreign law has been minimal at best.
Finally, despite the variance in state punitive damage stat-
utes, the underlying theme constructed by the judiciary
has been that punitive damages seldom have been war-
ranted to punish conduct which makes no distinction over
who survives disaster and who does not.
Is the punitive damage standard simply an insurmount-
able task for plaintiffs to prove? Is the issue of additional
recovery under foreign jurisdictions pursuant to the
DOHSA a red herring which United States courts prefer
to avoid because of the intricate international questions of
law which arise? Are most of the Warsaw Convention
cases that hinge on being "wilful misconduct" prototypes
unreported because they are settled out of court by realis-
tic defense counsel?
Consideration and resolution of these issues certainly
cannot be discounted in the overall analysis of punish-
ment's role in the civil sector. But if calamity does, in fact,
come like the whirlwind, is the design of punitive liability
really facilitated by its application to the operational avia-
431, Koninklijke Luchtvaart Mattschappij N.V. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Hol-
land v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
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tion disaster? Perhaps the real burden of proof is not in
some legal terminology, but resides instead in the very
consciousness of each individual; that is, the awareness
that the fear of death is almost as universal as mortality
itself, and no commercial air carrier is ever motivated to
foster human destruction within the parameters which de-
fine civil aviation.

